2023
Hopster, Jeroen; Löhr, Guido
Conceptual Engineering and Philosophy of Technology: Amelioration or Adaptation? Journal Article
In: Philosophy & Technology , vol. 36, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Amelioration, Conceptual adaptation, Conceptual engineering, Disruption, Misalignment, Preservation, Social disruptive technologies
@article{Hopster2023,
title = {Conceptual Engineering and Philosophy of Technology: Amelioration or Adaptation?},
author = {Jeroen Hopster and Guido Löhr},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/conceptual-engineering-and-philosophy-of-technology/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-023-00670-3 },
year = {2023},
date = {2023-10-18},
urldate = {2023-10-18},
journal = { Philosophy & Technology },
volume = {36},
abstract = {Conceptual Engineering (CE) is thought to be generally aimed at ameliorating deficient concepts. In this paper, we challenge this assumption: we argue that CE is frequently undertaken with the orthogonal aim of conceptual adaptation. We develop this thesis with reference to the interplay between technology and concepts. Emerging technologies can exert significant pressure on conceptual systems and spark ‘conceptual disruption’. For example, advances in Artificial Intelligence raise the question of whether AIs are agents or mere objects, which can be construed as a CE question regarding the concepts AGENT and OBJECT. We distinguish between three types of conceptual disruption (conceptual gaps, conceptual overlaps, and conceptual misalignments) and argue that when CE occurs to address these disruptions, its primary aim is not to improve concepts, but to retain their functional quality, or to prevent them from degrading. This is the characteristic aim of CE when undertaken in philosophy of technology: to preserve the functional role of a concept or conceptual scheme, rather than improving how a concept fulfills its respective function.},
keywords = {Amelioration, Conceptual adaptation, Conceptual engineering, Disruption, Misalignment, Preservation, Social disruptive technologies},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Conceptual Engineering (CE) is thought to be generally aimed at ameliorating deficient concepts. In this paper, we challenge this assumption: we argue that CE is frequently undertaken with the orthogonal aim of conceptual adaptation. We develop this thesis with reference to the interplay between technology and concepts. Emerging technologies can exert significant pressure on conceptual systems and spark ‘conceptual disruption’. For example, advances in Artificial Intelligence raise the question of whether AIs are agents or mere objects, which can be construed as a CE question regarding the concepts AGENT and OBJECT. We distinguish between three types of conceptual disruption (conceptual gaps, conceptual overlaps, and conceptual misalignments) and argue that when CE occurs to address these disruptions, its primary aim is not to improve concepts, but to retain their functional quality, or to prevent them from degrading. This is the characteristic aim of CE when undertaken in philosophy of technology: to preserve the functional role of a concept or conceptual scheme, rather than improving how a concept fulfills its respective function.
Hopster, Jeroen; Maas, Matthijs
The technology triad: disruptive AI, regulatory gaps and value change Journal Article
In: AI and Ethics, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Artificial intelligence, Regulation, Social disruptive technologies, Technology ethics, Technology law, Value change
@article{nokey,
title = {The technology triad: disruptive AI, regulatory gaps and value change},
author = {Jeroen Hopster and Matthijs Maas },
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/the-technology-triad/},
doi = {doi.org/10.1007/s43681-023-00305-5 },
year = {2023},
date = {2023-06-28},
urldate = {2023-06-28},
journal = {AI and Ethics},
abstract = {Disruptive technologies can have far-reaching impacts on society. They may challenge or destabilize cherished ethical values and disrupt legal systems. There is a convergent interest among ethicists and legal scholars in such “second-order disruptions” to norm systems. Thus far, however, ethical and legal approaches to technological norm-disruption have remained largely siloed. In this paper, we propose to integrate the existing ‘dyadic’ models of disruptive change in the ethical and legal spheres, and shift focus to the relations between and mutual shaping of values, technology, and law. We argue that a ‘triadic’ values-technology-regulation model—“the technology triad”—is more descriptively accurate, as it allows a better mapping of second-order impacts of technological changes (on values and norms, through changes in legal systems—or on legal systems, through changes in values and norms). Simultaneously, a triadic model serves to highlight a broader portfolio of ethical, technical, or regulatory interventions that can enable effective ethical triage of—and a more resilient response to—such Socially Disruptive Technologies. We illustrate the application of the triadic framework with two cases, one historical (how the adoption of the GDPR channeled and redirected the evolution of the ethical value of ‘privacy’ when that had been put under pressure by digital markets), and one anticipatory (looking at anticipated disruptions caused by the ongoing wave of generative AI systems).},
keywords = {Artificial intelligence, Regulation, Social disruptive technologies, Technology ethics, Technology law, Value change},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Disruptive technologies can have far-reaching impacts on society. They may challenge or destabilize cherished ethical values and disrupt legal systems. There is a convergent interest among ethicists and legal scholars in such “second-order disruptions” to norm systems. Thus far, however, ethical and legal approaches to technological norm-disruption have remained largely siloed. In this paper, we propose to integrate the existing ‘dyadic’ models of disruptive change in the ethical and legal spheres, and shift focus to the relations between and mutual shaping of values, technology, and law. We argue that a ‘triadic’ values-technology-regulation model—“the technology triad”—is more descriptively accurate, as it allows a better mapping of second-order impacts of technological changes (on values and norms, through changes in legal systems—or on legal systems, through changes in values and norms). Simultaneously, a triadic model serves to highlight a broader portfolio of ethical, technical, or regulatory interventions that can enable effective ethical triage of—and a more resilient response to—such Socially Disruptive Technologies. We illustrate the application of the triadic framework with two cases, one historical (how the adoption of the GDPR channeled and redirected the evolution of the ethical value of ‘privacy’ when that had been put under pressure by digital markets), and one anticipatory (looking at anticipated disruptions caused by the ongoing wave of generative AI systems).