ESDiT Publications

@article{Hopster2023,

title = {Conceptual Engineering and Philosophy of Technology: Amelioration or Adaptation?},

author = {Jeroen Hopster and Guido Löhr},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/conceptual-engineering-and-philosophy-of-technology/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-023-00670-3 },

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-10-18},

urldate = {2023-10-18},

journal = { Philosophy & Technology },

volume = {36},

abstract = {Conceptual Engineering (CE) is thought to be generally aimed at ameliorating deficient concepts. In this paper, we challenge this assumption: we argue that CE is frequently undertaken with the orthogonal aim of conceptual adaptation. We develop this thesis with reference to the interplay between technology and concepts. Emerging technologies can exert significant pressure on conceptual systems and spark ‘conceptual disruption’. For example, advances in Artificial Intelligence raise the question of whether AIs are agents or mere objects, which can be construed as a CE question regarding the concepts AGENT and OBJECT. We distinguish between three types of conceptual disruption (conceptual gaps, conceptual overlaps, and conceptual misalignments) and argue that when CE occurs to address these disruptions, its primary aim is not to improve concepts, but to retain their functional quality, or to prevent them from degrading. This is the characteristic aim of CE when undertaken in philosophy of technology: to preserve the functional role of a concept or conceptual scheme, rather than improving how a concept fulfills its respective function.},

keywords = {Amelioration, Conceptual adaptation, Conceptual engineering, Disruption, Misalignment, Preservation, Social disruptive technologies},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Nickel2023b,

title = {Justice and Empowerment Through Digital Health: Ethical Challenges and Opportunities},

author = {Philip Nickel and Iris Loosman and Lily Frank and Anna Vinnikova },

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/s44206-023-00075-x/},

doi = {10.1007/s44206-023-00075-x },

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-10-10},

urldate = {2023-10-10},

journal = {Digital Society},

volume = {2},

abstract = {The proposition that digital innovations can put people in charge of their health has been accompanied by prolific talk of empowerment. In this paper we consider ethical challenges and opportunities of trying to achieve justice and empowerment using digital health initiatives. The language of empowerment can misleadingly suggest that by using technology, people can control their health and take responsibility for health outcomes to a greater degree than is realistic or fair. Also, digital health empowerment often primarily reaches people who already have high technological and health literacy, leaving others behind. We critically investigate whether the concept of health empowerment could be re-engineered to mean something different, namely the process of improving the health literacy and access of those who least possess it, in line with recent proposals for conceptual engineering in the service of justice. We settle on the weaker conclusion that underlying ethical values including justice should be used to interpret the existing concept of empowerment. To conclude, we take a high-level view of various strategies for achieving the ethical value associated with digital health empowerment.},

keywords = {Access to care, Conceptual engineering, Digital health, Equity, Ethics of Technology, Health  literacy, Health empowerment, Justice, Responsibilization},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Conceptual disruption and 21st century technologies: A framework.},

author = {Guido Löhr},

doi = {10.1016/j.techsoc.2023.102327},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-08-01},

urldate = {2023-08-01},

journal = {Technology in Society},

volume = {74},

number = {102327},

abstract = {Modern technologies like artificial intelligence, robotics, geo-engineering, social media, or next-generation genomics have been and will continue to be socially (culturally, economically, legally, etc.) disruptive. Several philosophers of technology have noted that technology is not only socially but also conceptually disruptive. Technologies do not only change the way we live together. They also challenge the way we conceptualize or classify ourselves and the world around us. However, it is not clear what it means for technology to disrupt our concepts, as the very idea of conceptual disruption and its relation to conceptual and social change remain opaque. In what way can technologies disrupt our concepts and how we can overcome such disruptions? This paper proposes a framework for studying technology-induced conceptual disruptions that draws both on mediation theory and recent work on conceptual engineering.},

keywords = {Conceptual change, Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, Disruptive innovation, Social disruption, Socially disruptive technologies},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Conceptual engineering, predictive processing, and a new implementation problem},

author = {Guido Löhr and Christian Michel},

doi = {10.1111/mila.12471},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-07-18},

urldate = {2023-07-18},

journal = {Mind and Language},

abstract = {According to predictive processing, an increasingly influential paradigm in cognitive science, the function of the brain is to minimize the prediction error of its sensory input. Conceptual engineering is the practice of assessing and changing concepts or word meanings. We contribute to both strands of research by proposing the first cognitive account of conceptual engineering, using the predictive processing framework. Our model reveals a new kind of implementation problem as prediction errors are only minimized if enough agents embrace conceptual changes. This problem can be overcome by emphasizing the importance of social norms and conceptual pluralism.},

keywords = {Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, conceptual pluralism, Methodology},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {If conceptual engineering is a new method in the ethics of AI, what method is it exactly?},

author = {Guido Löhr},

doi = {10.1007/s43681-023-00295-4},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-05-16},

urldate = {2023-05-16},

journal = {AI and Ethics},

abstract = {Can a machine be a person? Can a robot think, be our friend or colleague? These familiar questions in the ethics of AI have recently become much more urgent than many philosophers anticipated. However, they also seem as intractable as ever. For this reason, several philosophers of AI have recently turned their attention to an arguably new method: conceptual engineering. The idea is to stop searching for the real essence of friendship or our ordinary concept of the person. Instead, ethicists of AI should engineer concepts of friend or person we should apply. But what exactly is this method? There is currently no consensus on what the target object of conceptual engineers is or should be. In this paper, I reject a number of popular options and then argue for a pragmatist way of thinking about the target object of conceptual engineering in the ethics of AI. I conclude that in this pragmatist picture, conceptual engineering is probably what we have been doing all along. So, is it all just hype? No, the idea that the ethics of AI has been dominated by conceptual engineers all along constitutes an important meta-philosophical insight. We can build on this insight to develop a more rigorous and thorough methodology in the ethics of AI.},

keywords = {AI Ethics, Artificial intelligence, Conceptual engineering, Conceptual ethics, Pragmatism, Representationalism},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Do socially disruptive technologies really change our concepts or just our conceptions?},

author = {Guido Löhr},

doi = {10.1016/j.techsoc.2022.102160},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-02-01},

urldate = {2023-02-01},

journal = {Technology in Society},

volume = {72},

number = {102160},

abstract = {New technologies have the potential to severely “challenge” or “disrupt” not only our established social practices but our most fundamental concepts and distinctions like person versus object, nature versus artificial or being dead versus being alive. But does this disruption also change these concepts? Or does it merely change our operationalizations and applications of the same concepts? In this paper, I argue that instead of focusing on individual conceptual change, philosophers of socially disruptive technologies (SDTs) should think about conceptual change as a change in a network of interrelated concepts. What really generates a potential social disruption are changes of inferential relations between concepts – whether or not this entails a change of the respective individual concepts. Philosophers of socially disruptive technologies are therefore in the privileged position of being able to avoid commitments regarding the individuation of individual concepts.},

keywords = {Conceptual change, Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, Inferential role semantics, Philosophy of technology, Socially disruptive technologies},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Linguistic Interventions and the Ethics of Conceptual Disruption},

author = {Guido Löhr},

doi = {10.1007/s10677-022-10321-9},

year  = {2022},

date = {2022-09-24},

urldate = {2022-09-24},

journal = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},

volume = {25},

pages = {835-849},

keywords = {Communicative disruption, Concept creeps, Concepts, Conceptual engineering, Conceptual ethics, Linguistic intervention, Meaning},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Technology as Driver for Morally Motivated Conceptual Engineering},

author = {Herman Veluwenkamp and Marianna Capasso and Jonne Maas and Lavinia Marin},

doi = {10.1007/s13347-022-00565-9},

year  = {2022},

date = {2022-07-28},

journal = {Philosophy and Technology},

volume = {35},

number = {71},

keywords = {Conceptual engineering, Control, Critical thinking, Freedom, Moral conflict, Technology},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Inferentialist conceptual engineering},

author = {Sigurd Jorem and Guido Löhr},

doi = {10.1080/0020174X.2022.2062045},

year  = {2022},

date = {2022-01-27},

journal = {Inquiry},

keywords = {Conceptual engineering, Conceptual ethics, Inferential role semantics, Inferentiali, Inferentialism, Representationalism},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Commitment Engineering. Conceptual Engineering without Representations},

author = {Guido Löhr},

doi = {10.1007/s11229-021-03365-4},

year  = {2021},

date = {2021-12-01},

urldate = {2021-12-01},

journal = {Synthese},

volume = {199},

issue = {5-6},

pages = {13035-13052},

keywords = {Commitments, Concepts, Conceptual engineering, Meanings, Non-representationalism, Normativity, Pragmatism},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}