ESDiT Publications

@article{Hummel2024,

title = {Algorithmic Fairness as an Inconsistent concept },

author = {Patrik Hummel},

url = {https://research.tue.nl/en/publications/algorithmic-fairness-as-an-inconsistent-concept},

doi = {https://research.tue.nl/en/publications/algorithmic-fairness-as-an-inconsistent-concept},

issn = {0003-0481},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-05-14},

urldate = {2024-05-14},

journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},

number = {1},

issue = {62},

abstract = {In this article, I investigate whether algorithmic fairness is an inconsistent concept (the inconsistency thesis). Drawing on the work of Kevin Scharp, inconsistent concepts can apply and disapply at the same time (2.). It is shown that paradigmatic issues of algorithmic fairness fit this description (3.). Similarities and differences to received views (4.) and alternatives to the inconsistency thesis are considered (5.). Suggestions are articulated on how the inconsistency thesis might hold ground nevertheless, or at the very least denotes a distinctive option in argumentative space whose status and implications merit further evaluation.},

keywords = {Algorithms, Concepts, Fairness, Impossibility, Inconsistency},

pubstate = {forthcoming},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Are concepts a natural kind? On concept eliminativism},

author = {Guido Löhr},

doi = {10.33735/phimisci.2023.9632},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-07-19},

urldate = {2023-07-19},

journal = {Philosophy and the Mind Sciences},

volume = {4},

abstract = {Concept eliminativists argue that we should eliminate the term ‘concept’ from our vocabulary in psychology because there is no single natural kind that is picked out by it. I argue that the most developed version of concept eliminativism by Edouard Machery depends on the assumption that concepts are defined as stable and context-independent bodies of information. It is this assumption that leads Machery to eliminativism and it is an assumption we have reason to reject. Another assumption that leads to the eliminativist conclusion and that we have reason to reject is that the type of content represented in long-term memory is the relevant property based on which we should individuate certain natural kinds in cognitive psychology. Finally, I argue that certain pieces of information are functionally integrated enough to meet the conditions for being a natural kind.},

keywords = {Concept Eliminativism, Concept Hybridism, Concept Pluralism, Concepts, Contextualism, Natural kinds},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Linguistic Interventions and the Ethics of Conceptual Disruption},

author = {Guido Löhr},

doi = {10.1007/s10677-022-10321-9},

year  = {2022},

date = {2022-09-24},

urldate = {2022-09-24},

journal = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},

volume = {25},

pages = {835-849},

keywords = {Communicative disruption, Concept creeps, Concepts, Conceptual engineering, Conceptual ethics, Linguistic intervention, Meaning},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Commitment Engineering. Conceptual Engineering without Representations},

author = {Guido Löhr},

doi = {10.1007/s11229-021-03365-4},

year  = {2021},

date = {2021-12-01},

urldate = {2021-12-01},

journal = {Synthese},

volume = {199},

issue = {5-6},

pages = {13035-13052},

keywords = {Commitments, Concepts, Conceptual engineering, Meanings, Non-representationalism, Normativity, Pragmatism},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Löhr2021,

title = {What Are Abstract Concepts? On Lexical Ambiguity and Concreteness Ratings},

author = {Guido Löhr},

doi = {10.1007/s13164-021-00542-9},

year  = {2021},

date = {2021-03-30},

urldate = {2021-03-30},

journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},

keywords = {Abstract concepts, Abstractness, Concepts, Concreteness, Context-availability, Imageability, Natural kinds, Polysemy, Scientific kinds},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Löhr2020,

title = {Concepts and Categorization. Do Philosophers and Psychologists Theorize about Different Things?},

author = {Guido Löhr},

doi = {10.1007/s11229-018-1798-4},

year  = {2020},

date = {2020-01-01},

urldate = {2020-01-01},

journal = {Synthese},

volume = {197},

issue = {5},

pages = {2171-2191},

keywords = {Categorization, Compositionality, Concepts, Contextualism, Meta-philosophy, Prototype theory, Semantic externalism},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}