2023
Löhr, Guido
Do socially disruptive technologies really change our concepts or just our conceptions? Journal Article
In: Technology in Society, vol. 72, no. 102160, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Conceptual change, Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, Inferential role semantics, Philosophy of technology, Socially disruptive technologies
@article{nokey,
title = {Do socially disruptive technologies really change our concepts or just our conceptions?},
author = {Guido Löhr},
doi = {10.1016/j.techsoc.2022.102160},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-02-01},
urldate = {2023-02-01},
journal = {Technology in Society},
volume = {72},
number = {102160},
abstract = {New technologies have the potential to severely “challenge” or “disrupt” not only our established social practices but our most fundamental concepts and distinctions like person versus object, nature versus artificial or being dead versus being alive. But does this disruption also change these concepts? Or does it merely change our operationalizations and applications of the same concepts? In this paper, I argue that instead of focusing on individual conceptual change, philosophers of socially disruptive technologies (SDTs) should think about conceptual change as a change in a network of interrelated concepts. What really generates a potential social disruption are changes of inferential relations between concepts – whether or not this entails a change of the respective individual concepts. Philosophers of socially disruptive technologies are therefore in the privileged position of being able to avoid commitments regarding the individuation of individual concepts.},
keywords = {Conceptual change, Conceptual disruption, Conceptual engineering, Inferential role semantics, Philosophy of technology, Socially disruptive technologies},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
New technologies have the potential to severely “challenge” or “disrupt” not only our established social practices but our most fundamental concepts and distinctions like person versus object, nature versus artificial or being dead versus being alive. But does this disruption also change these concepts? Or does it merely change our operationalizations and applications of the same concepts? In this paper, I argue that instead of focusing on individual conceptual change, philosophers of socially disruptive technologies (SDTs) should think about conceptual change as a change in a network of interrelated concepts. What really generates a potential social disruption are changes of inferential relations between concepts – whether or not this entails a change of the respective individual concepts. Philosophers of socially disruptive technologies are therefore in the privileged position of being able to avoid commitments regarding the individuation of individual concepts.
2022
Jongepier, Fleur; Klenk, Michael (Ed.)
Routledge research in applied ethics. The philosophy of online manipulation Book
First, Routledge, 2022.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Digital Ethics, Ethics of manipulation, Moral philosophy, Philosophy of technology
@book{nokey,
title = {Routledge research in applied ethics. The philosophy of online manipulation},
editor = {Fleur Jongepier and Michael Klenk},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/the-philosophy-of-online-manipulation/},
doi = {10.4324/9781003205425},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-06-20},
urldate = {2022-06-20},
publisher = {Routledge},
edition = {First},
abstract = {Are we being manipulated online? If so, is being manipulated by online technologies and algorithmic systems notably different from human forms of manipulation? And what is under threat exactly when people are manipulated online?
This volume provides philosophical and conceptual depth to debates in digital ethics about online manipulation. The contributions explore the ramifications of our increasingly consequential interactions with online technologies such as online recommender systems, social media, user friendly design, microtargeting, default settings, gamification, and real time profiling. The authors in this volume address four broad and interconnected themes:
- What is the conceptual nature of online manipulation? And how, methodologically, should the concept be defined?
- Does online manipulation threaten autonomy, freedom, and meaning in life and if so, how?
- What are the epistemic, affective, and political harms and risks associated with online manipulation?
- What are legal and regulatory perspectives on online manipulation?
This volume brings these various considerations together to offer philosophically robust answers to critical questions concerning our online interactions with one another and with autonomous systems. The Philosophy of Online Manipulation will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in moral philosophy, digital ethics, philosophy of technology, and the ethics of manipulation.},
keywords = {Digital Ethics, Ethics of manipulation, Moral philosophy, Philosophy of technology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {book}
}
Are we being manipulated online? If so, is being manipulated by online technologies and algorithmic systems notably different from human forms of manipulation? And what is under threat exactly when people are manipulated online?
This volume provides philosophical and conceptual depth to debates in digital ethics about online manipulation. The contributions explore the ramifications of our increasingly consequential interactions with online technologies such as online recommender systems, social media, user friendly design, microtargeting, default settings, gamification, and real time profiling. The authors in this volume address four broad and interconnected themes:
- What is the conceptual nature of online manipulation? And how, methodologically, should the concept be defined?
- Does online manipulation threaten autonomy, freedom, and meaning in life and if so, how?
- What are the epistemic, affective, and political harms and risks associated with online manipulation?
- What are legal and regulatory perspectives on online manipulation?
This volume brings these various considerations together to offer philosophically robust answers to critical questions concerning our online interactions with one another and with autonomous systems. The Philosophy of Online Manipulation will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in moral philosophy, digital ethics, philosophy of technology, and the ethics of manipulation.
This volume provides philosophical and conceptual depth to debates in digital ethics about online manipulation. The contributions explore the ramifications of our increasingly consequential interactions with online technologies such as online recommender systems, social media, user friendly design, microtargeting, default settings, gamification, and real time profiling. The authors in this volume address four broad and interconnected themes:
- What is the conceptual nature of online manipulation? And how, methodologically, should the concept be defined?
- Does online manipulation threaten autonomy, freedom, and meaning in life and if so, how?
- What are the epistemic, affective, and political harms and risks associated with online manipulation?
- What are legal and regulatory perspectives on online manipulation?
This volume brings these various considerations together to offer philosophically robust answers to critical questions concerning our online interactions with one another and with autonomous systems. The Philosophy of Online Manipulation will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in moral philosophy, digital ethics, philosophy of technology, and the ethics of manipulation.
2021
von Schomberg, Lucien; Blok, Vincent
Technology in the Age of Innovation: Responsible Innovation as a New Subdomain Within the Philosophy of Technology Journal Article
In: Philosophy & Technology, vol. 34, iss. 2, pp. 309-323, 2021.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: History of innovation, Philosophy of innovation, Philosophy of technology, Responsible research and innovation, Techno-economic paradigm, Technological innovation
@article{nokey,
title = {Technology in the Age of Innovation: Responsible Innovation as a New Subdomain Within the Philosophy of Technology},
author = {Lucien von Schomberg and Vincent Blok},
doi = {10.1007/s13347-019-00386-3 },
year = {2021},
date = {2021-06-01},
journal = {Philosophy & Technology},
volume = {34},
issue = {2},
pages = {309-323},
keywords = {History of innovation, Philosophy of innovation, Philosophy of technology, Responsible research and innovation, Techno-economic paradigm, Technological innovation},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Blok, Vincent
What is Innovation? Laying the Ground for a Philosophy of Innovation Journal Article
In: Techné, vol. 25, iss. 1, pp. 72-96, 2021.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Innovation, Ontogenesis, Philosophy of technology, Schumpeter, Technology
@article{Blok2021d,
title = {What is Innovation? Laying the Ground for a Philosophy of Innovation},
author = {Vincent Blok},
doi = {10.5840/techne2020109129 },
year = {2021},
date = {2021-01-01},
journal = {Techné},
volume = {25},
issue = {1},
pages = {72-96},
keywords = {Innovation, Ontogenesis, Philosophy of technology, Schumpeter, Technology},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}