2024
van Grunsven, Janna; Marin, Lavinia
Technosocial disruption, enactivism, & social media: On the overlooked risks of teenage cancel culture Journal Article
In: Technology in Society, vol. 78, pp. 102602, 2024, ISSN: 0160-791X.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: 4E Cognition, Philosophy of Mind, Technosocial disruption, Teenage Cancel Culture
@article{vanGrunsven2024,
title = {Technosocial disruption, enactivism, & social media: On the overlooked risks of teenage cancel culture},
author = {Janna van Grunsven and Lavinia Marin},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160791X24001507?via%3Dihub
https://www.esdit.nl/technosocial-disruption-enactivism-amp-social-media-on_2024_technology/},
doi = {10.1016/j.techsoc.2024.102602},
issn = {0160-791X},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-09-01},
urldate = {2024-09-01},
journal = {Technology in Society},
volume = {78},
pages = {102602},
abstract = {In a world undergoing rapid, large-scale technological change, the phenomenon of technosocial disruption is receiving increasing scholarly and societal attention. While the phenomenon is most actively delineated in philosophy of technology, it is also receiving growing attention within a different area of philosophy, namely the so-called “4E Cognition” approach to philosophy of mind. Despite this shared interest in technosocial disruption, there is relatively little exchange between the theorizing going on in these two different areas of philosophy. One of our paper's two main aims is programmatic: to motivate the fruitfulness of such an exchange. We do this by turning to a specific case of technosocial disruption, namely Teenage Cancel Culture [TCC]. TCC cannot be disentangled from the introduction of social media platforms [SMPs] into modern day social life. Hence, we will speak of SMP-Afforded TCC. SPM-afforded TCC is a phenomenon fretted over by societal actors but strikingly ignored in academic research. In our effort to narrow this knowledge gap, we analyze SMP-afforded TCC from a perspective of technosocial disruption enriched by insights from 4E-Cognition. This brings out a specific worry about the role of SMPs in the social lives of teenagers. We argue that SMP-afforded TCC disrupts the social relational domains within which teenagers develop, maintain, and express their precarious social identities, by creating social affordances that are hostile to healthy risky interpersonal identity-exploration. As such, SMP-afforded TCC not only cancels particular individuals for particular acts; it may also pre-emptively cancel a certain way of being a social self, namely a healthy social risk-taker. We conclude the paper by proposing several potential routes for mitigating the perniciously disruptive effects of SMP-afforded TCC and identifying future areas for research.},
keywords = {4E Cognition, Philosophy of Mind, Technosocial disruption, Teenage Cancel Culture},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In a world undergoing rapid, large-scale technological change, the phenomenon of technosocial disruption is receiving increasing scholarly and societal attention. While the phenomenon is most actively delineated in philosophy of technology, it is also receiving growing attention within a different area of philosophy, namely the so-called “4E Cognition” approach to philosophy of mind. Despite this shared interest in technosocial disruption, there is relatively little exchange between the theorizing going on in these two different areas of philosophy. One of our paper's two main aims is programmatic: to motivate the fruitfulness of such an exchange. We do this by turning to a specific case of technosocial disruption, namely Teenage Cancel Culture [TCC]. TCC cannot be disentangled from the introduction of social media platforms [SMPs] into modern day social life. Hence, we will speak of SMP-Afforded TCC. SPM-afforded TCC is a phenomenon fretted over by societal actors but strikingly ignored in academic research. In our effort to narrow this knowledge gap, we analyze SMP-afforded TCC from a perspective of technosocial disruption enriched by insights from 4E-Cognition. This brings out a specific worry about the role of SMPs in the social lives of teenagers. We argue that SMP-afforded TCC disrupts the social relational domains within which teenagers develop, maintain, and express their precarious social identities, by creating social affordances that are hostile to healthy risky interpersonal identity-exploration. As such, SMP-afforded TCC not only cancels particular individuals for particular acts; it may also pre-emptively cancel a certain way of being a social self, namely a healthy social risk-taker. We conclude the paper by proposing several potential routes for mitigating the perniciously disruptive effects of SMP-afforded TCC and identifying future areas for research.
2022
Hermann, Julia
Socially Disruptive Technologies and Moral Certainty Book Chapter
In: Eriksen, Cecilie; Hermann, Julia; O'Hara, Neil; Pleasants, Nigel (Ed.): pp. 19-34, Routledge, 1, 2022.
Abstract | BibTeX | Tags: Moral certainty, Technosocial disruption
@inbook{nokey,
title = {Socially Disruptive Technologies and Moral Certainty},
author = {Julia Hermann},
editor = {Cecilie Eriksen and Julia Hermann and Neil O'Hara and Nigel Pleasants},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-30},
urldate = {2022-12-30},
pages = {19-34},
publisher = {Routledge},
edition = {1},
abstract = {The work of Wittgenstein has so far received little attention from scholars working in the philosophy of technology. In this chapter, I relate my Wittgenstein-inspired account of moral certainty, which conceives of moral certainty as the certainty of morally competent agents, to recent work on socially disruptive technologies and the phenomenon of technosocial disruption. In a complex interplay with other factors, technologies such as artificially intelligent systems and robots challenge norms, practices, and concepts that play a fundamental role in human life. I argue that technosocial disruption involves the disruption of moral certainty, and that we should refine our notion of moral certainty by integrating the idea of technological mediation. In our technological world, technology mediates how something acquires the role of a moral certainty or loses it, and how moral certainty is manifested in different contexts. I discuss two examples of contexts in which technological developments challenge moral agency at the level of moral certainty: the introduction of robots in elderly care practices and the potential use of ectogestative technology for foetal development.},
keywords = {Moral certainty, Technosocial disruption},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
The work of Wittgenstein has so far received little attention from scholars working in the philosophy of technology. In this chapter, I relate my Wittgenstein-inspired account of moral certainty, which conceives of moral certainty as the certainty of morally competent agents, to recent work on socially disruptive technologies and the phenomenon of technosocial disruption. In a complex interplay with other factors, technologies such as artificially intelligent systems and robots challenge norms, practices, and concepts that play a fundamental role in human life. I argue that technosocial disruption involves the disruption of moral certainty, and that we should refine our notion of moral certainty by integrating the idea of technological mediation. In our technological world, technology mediates how something acquires the role of a moral certainty or loses it, and how moral certainty is manifested in different contexts. I discuss two examples of contexts in which technological developments challenge moral agency at the level of moral certainty: the introduction of robots in elderly care practices and the potential use of ectogestative technology for foetal development.
O'Hara, Neil; Eriksen, Cecilie; Hermann, Julia; Pleasants, Nigel
Introduction on Moral Certainty Book Chapter
In: Eriksen, Cecilie; Hermann, Julia; O'Hara, Neil; Pleasants, Nigel (Ed.): pp. 1-18, Routledge, 1, 2022.
Abstract | BibTeX | Tags: Moral certainty, Technosocial disruption
@inbook{nokey,
title = {Introduction on Moral Certainty},
author = {Neil O'Hara and Cecilie Eriksen and Julia Hermann and Nigel Pleasants },
editor = {Cecilie Eriksen and Julia Hermann and Neil O'Hara and Nigel Pleasants},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-30},
urldate = {2022-12-30},
pages = {1-18},
publisher = {Routledge},
edition = {1},
abstract = {The work of Wittgenstein has so far received little attention from scholars working in the philosophy of technology. In this chapter, I relate my Wittgenstein-inspired account of moral certainty, which conceives of moral certainty as the certainty of morally competent agents, to recent work on socially disruptive technologies and the phenomenon of technosocial disruption. In a complex interplay with other factors, technologies such as artificially intelligent systems and robots challenge norms, practices, and concepts that play a fundamental role in human life. I argue that technosocial disruption involves the disruption of moral certainty, and that we should refine our notion of moral certainty by integrating the idea of technological mediation. In our technological world, technology mediates how something acquires the role of a moral certainty or loses it, and how moral certainty is manifested in different contexts. I discuss two examples of contexts in which technological developments challenge moral agency at the level of moral certainty: the introduction of robots in elderly care practices and the potential use of ectogestative technology for foetal development.},
keywords = {Moral certainty, Technosocial disruption},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
The work of Wittgenstein has so far received little attention from scholars working in the philosophy of technology. In this chapter, I relate my Wittgenstein-inspired account of moral certainty, which conceives of moral certainty as the certainty of morally competent agents, to recent work on socially disruptive technologies and the phenomenon of technosocial disruption. In a complex interplay with other factors, technologies such as artificially intelligent systems and robots challenge norms, practices, and concepts that play a fundamental role in human life. I argue that technosocial disruption involves the disruption of moral certainty, and that we should refine our notion of moral certainty by integrating the idea of technological mediation. In our technological world, technology mediates how something acquires the role of a moral certainty or loses it, and how moral certainty is manifested in different contexts. I discuss two examples of contexts in which technological developments challenge moral agency at the level of moral certainty: the introduction of robots in elderly care practices and the potential use of ectogestative technology for foetal development.
2021
Hopster, Jeroen
What are socially disruptive technologies? Journal Article
In: Technology in Society, vol. 67, no. 101750, 2021.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Disruptive technology, Disruptiveness, Society, Technology, Technosocial disruption
@article{Hopster,
title = {What are socially disruptive technologies? },
author = {Jeroen Hopster},
doi = {10.1016/j.techsoc.2021.101750},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-11-01},
urldate = {2023-01-01},
journal = {Technology in Society},
volume = {67},
number = {101750},
keywords = {Disruptive technology, Disruptiveness, Society, Technology, Technosocial disruption},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}