ESDiT Publications

@article{nokey,

title = {Technosocial disruption, enactivism, & social media: On the overlooked risks of teenage cancel culture},

author = {Janna van Grunsven and Lavinia Marin},

url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160791X24001507?via%3Dihub

https://www.esdit.nl/technosocial-disruption-enactivism-amp-social-media-on_2024_technology/},

doi = {10.1016/j.techsoc.2024.102602},

issn = {0160-791X},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-09-01},

journal = {Technology in Society},

volume = {78},

pages = {102602},

abstract = {In a world undergoing rapid, large-scale technological change, the phenomenon of technosocial disruption is receiving increasing scholarly and societal attention. While the phenomenon is most actively delineated in philosophy of technology, it is also receiving growing attention within a different area of philosophy, namely the so-called “4E Cognition” approach to philosophy of mind. Despite this shared interest in technosocial disruption, there is relatively little exchange between the theorizing going on in these two different areas of philosophy. One of our paper's two main aims is programmatic: to motivate the fruitfulness of such an exchange. We do this by turning to a specific case of technosocial disruption, namely Teenage Cancel Culture [TCC]. TCC cannot be disentangled from the introduction of social media platforms [SMPs] into modern day social life. Hence, we will speak of SMP-Afforded TCC. SPM-afforded TCC is a phenomenon fretted over by societal actors but strikingly ignored in academic research. In our effort to narrow this knowledge gap, we analyze SMP-afforded TCC from a perspective of technosocial disruption enriched by insights from 4E-Cognition. This brings out a specific worry about the role of SMPs in the social lives of teenagers. We argue that SMP-afforded TCC disrupts the social relational domains within which teenagers develop, maintain, and express their precarious social identities, by creating social affordances that are hostile to healthy risky interpersonal identity-exploration. As such, SMP-afforded TCC not only cancels particular individuals for particular acts; it may also pre-emptively cancel a certain way of being a social self, namely a healthy social risk-taker. We conclude the paper by proposing several potential routes for mitigating the perniciously disruptive effects of SMP-afforded TCC and identifying future areas for research.},

keywords = {4E Cognition, Philosophy of Mind, Technosocial disruption, Teenage Cancel Culture},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Viewpoint: Hybrid Intelligence Supports Application Development for Diabetes Lifestyle Management},

author = {Bernd J. W. Dudzik and Jasper S. van der Waa and Pei-Yu Chen and Roel Dobbe and Inago M.D.R. de Troya and Roos M. Bakker and Maaike H. T. de Boer and Emre Erdogan and Pinar Yolum and Shihan Wang and Selene Baez Santamaria and Lea Krause and Bart Kamphorst},

url = {https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.15916

https://www.esdit.nl/15916wpgs/},

doi = {10.1613/jair.1.15916},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-07-10},

journal = {JAIR – Journal for Artificial Intelligence Research},

volume = {80},

abstract = {Type II diabetes is a complex health condition requiring patients to closely and continuously collaborate with healthcare professionals and other caretakers on lifestyle changes. While intelligent products have tremendous potential to support such Diabetes Lifestyle Management (DLM), existing products are typically conceived from a technology-centered perspective that insufficiently acknowledges the degree to which collaboration and inclusion of stakeholders is required. In this article, we argue that the emergent design philosophy of Hybrid Intelligence (HI) forms a suitable alternative lens for research and development. In particular, we (1) highlight a series of pragmatic challenges for effective AI-based DLM support based on results from an expert focus group, and (2) argue for HI’s potential to address these by outlining relevant research trajectories.},

keywords = {Diabetes lifestyle, Digital health, Digital health intervention, Healthcare},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {From an Eco-Relational Approach to Ecologically Responsible Robot Ethics},

author = {Anna Puzio},

url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13347-024-00772-6

https://www.esdit.nl/wp-content/uploads/s13347-024-00772-6.pdf},

doi = {10.1007/s13347-024-00772-6},

issn = {2210-5441},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-07-02},

urldate = {2024-07-02},

journal = {Philosophy & Technology},

volume = {37},

issue = {3},

pages = {83},

abstract = {In this reply, I respond to Joshua C. Gellers’ commentary on my article “Not Relational Enough? Towards an Eco-Relational Approach in Robot Ethics” (Puzio, 2024a), in which I present a deeply relational, “eco-relational approach”. This approach asserts that it is necessary to consider the relationality with non-human entities such as animals and technology on a deeper level than has been done in robot ethics so far. This disrupts traditional ethical concepts. In his commentary “Not Ecological Enough: A Commentary on an Eco-Relational Approach in Robot Ethics” (2024), Gellers raises criticisms of my method and the consequences of the eco-relational approach. In this reply, I address these criticisms and focus especially on the ecological responsibility of the eco-relational approach.},

keywords = {Eco-Relational Approach, Robot ethics},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Anticipatory gaps challenge the public governance of heritable human genome editing},

author = {Jon Rueda and Seppe Segers and Jeroen Hopster and Karolina Kudlek and Belèn Liedo and Samuela Marchiori and John Danaher},

url = {https://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2024/07/01/jme-2023-109801.citation-tools

https://www.esdit.nl/jme-2023-109801-full/},

doi = {10.1136/jme-2023-109801},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-06-14},

journal = {Journal of Medical Ethics},

abstract = {Considering public moral attitudes is a hallmark of the anticipatory governance of emerging biotechnologies, such as heritable human genome editing. However, such anticipatory governance often overlooks that future morality is open to change and that future generations may perform different moral assessments on the very biotechnologies we are trying to govern in the present. In this article, we identify an ‘anticipatory gap’ that has not been sufficiently addressed in the discussion on the public governance of heritable genome editing, namely, uncertainty about the moral visions of future generations about the emerging applications that we are currently attempting to govern now. This paper motivates the relevance of this anticipatory gap, identifying the challenges it generates and offering various recommendations so that moral uncertainty does not lead to governance paralysis with regard to human germline genome editing.},

keywords = {Biotechnology, Human genome editing},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Towards an Eco-Relational Approach: Relational Approaches Must Be Applied in Ethics and Law},

author = {Anna Puzio},

url = {https://link.springer.com/epdf/10.1007/s13347-024-00753-9?sharing_token=myT770guIG5NPRTnru5p-ve4RwlQNchNByi7wbcMAY6zDiN9WeE-Kg6yFt6J6cLYDtfiC8X3lkou9Lw3p2TF_UuhEUb37xWDcxxO4PNy8vVKJNVYwrgHGSlkQ-zhyV_iyRqjZUXWiZKnpCXpKckGAn6tQW9QpzanX0pjEhkuwCY%3D},

doi = {13347-024-00753-9},

issn = {2210-5441},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-05-25},

journal = {Philosophy & Technology},

volume = {37},

issue = {2},

pages = {67},

abstract = {Relational approaches are gaining more and more importance in philosophy of technology. This brings up the critical question of how they can be implemented in applied ethics, law, and practice. In “Extremely Relational Robots: Implications for Law and Ethics”, Nancy S. Jecker (2024) comments on my article “Not Relational Enough? Towards an Eco-Relational Approach in Robot Ethics” (Puzio, 2024), in which I present a deep relational, “eco-relational approach”. In this reply, I address two of Jecker’s criticisms: in section. 3, I deal with the connection of personhood and human identity with relationality, and in section. 4, I discuss the consequences of relational approaches for practical ethics and law. Unlike Jecker, I am strongly convinced that relational approaches can and should be implemented in applied ethics and law.},

keywords = {Relational ethics},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {4E cognition, moral imagination, and engineering ethics education: shaping affordances for diverse embodied perspectives},

author = {Janna van Grunsven and Lavinia Marin and Andrea Gammon and Trijsje Franssen},

url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-09987-6https://www.esdit.nl/4e-cognition-moral-imagination-engineering-ethics-imagination/},

doi = {10.1007/s11097-024-09987-6},

isbn = {1572-8676},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-05-25},

urldate = {2024-05-25},

journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},

abstract = {While 4E approaches to cognition are increasingly introduced in educational contexts, little has been said about how 4E commitments can inform pedagogy aimed at fostering ethical competencies. Here, we evaluate a 4E-inspired ethics exercise that we developed at a technical university to enliven the moral imagination of engineering students. Our students participated in an interactive tinkering workshop, during which they materially redesigned a healthcare artifact. The aim of the workshop was twofold. Firstly, we wanted students to experience how material choices at the levels of design and functionality can enable morally significant reimaginings of the affordances commonly associated with existing artifacts. We term this type of reimagining world-directed moral imagination. Secondly, through the design process, we wanted students to robustly place themselves in the lived embodied perspectives of (potential) users of their selected artifacts. We term this person-directed moral imagination. While student testimonies about the exercise indicate that both their world-directed and person-directed moral imagination were enlivened, we note that the fostering of robust person-directed moral imagination proved challenging. Using 4E insights, we diagnose this challenge and ask how it might be overcome. To this end, we engage extensively with a recent 4E-informed critique of person-directed moral imagination, raised by Clavel Vázquez and Clavel-Vázquez (2023). They argue that person-directed moral imagination is profoundly limited, if not fundamentally misguided, particularly when exercised in contexts marked by emphatic embodied situated difference between the imaginer and the imagined. Building upon insights from both the 4E field and testimonies from critical disability studies, we argue that, while their critique is valuable, it ultimately goes too far. We conclude that a 4E approach can take on board recent 4E warnings regarding the limits of person-directed moral imagination while contributing positively to the development of moral imagination in engineering ethics education.},

keywords = {Education, Ethical Education, Moral imagination},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Algorithmic Fairness as an Inconsistent concept (Pre-Print)},

author = {Patrik Hummel},

url = {https://research.tue.nl/en/publications/algorithmic-fairness-as-an-inconsistent-concept},

doi = {https://research.tue.nl/en/publications/algorithmic-fairness-as-an-inconsistent-concept},

issn = {0003-0481},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-05-14},

urldate = {2024-05-14},

journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},

number = {1},

issue = {62},

abstract = {In this article, I investigate whether algorithmic fairness is an inconsistent concept (the inconsistency thesis). Drawing on the work of Kevin Scharp, inconsistent concepts can apply and disapply at the same time (2.). It is shown that paradigmatic issues of algorithmic fairness fit this description (3.). Similarities and differences to received views (4.) and alternatives to the inconsistency thesis are considered (5.). Suggestions are articulated on how the inconsistency thesis might hold ground nevertheless, or at the very least denotes a distinctive option in argumentative space whose status and implications merit further evaluation.},

keywords = {Algorithms, Concepts, Fairness, Impossibility, Inconsistency},

pubstate = {forthcoming},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {There is no "I" in Postphenomenology},

author = {Kristy Claassen},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/there-is-no-i-in-postphenomenology/},

doi = {10.1007/s10746-024-09727-4},

issn = {1572-851X},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-04-28},

journal = {Human Studies},

abstract = {Human beings are embedded in diverse social, cultural and political groups through which we make sense of our technologically mediated lived experience. This article seeks to reaffirm the postphenomenological subject as a primarily social subject. Critics maintain that the current postphenomenological framework does not adequately address the social, cultural and political context in which human-technology relations take place. In recent years, various additions to postphenomenology have been suggested in order to address this contextual deficit. In this article, I argue that a return to the phenomenological roots of postphenomenology reveals underexamined analytical tools that allow for greater socio-cultural and political sensitivity. I take Don Ihde’s supposed macroperceptual and microperceptual divide as a point of departure in claiming that postphenomenology has too hastily turned away from the subject as primarily socially situated. I draw upon the phenomenological tradition, particularly the social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz, to develop a social postphenomenological approach. This approach is informed by the Schutzian notions of action, the stock of knowledge at hand and consociates. In the resulting account, the postphenomenological schema of I—Technology—World is reconstrued as We—Technology—World.},

keywords = {Postphenomenological Subject, Postphenomenology, Social Subject},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Is digital sovereignty normatively desirable?},

author = {Matthias Braun and Patrik Hummel},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/is-digital-sovereignty-normatively-desirable/},

doi = {doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2024.2332624},

issn = {1369-118X},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-04-23},

urldate = {2024-04-23},

journal = {Information, Communication & Society},

pages = {1-14},

abstract = {Sovereignty is a frequently used term when it comes to analyzing and shaping digital processes and transformations. For example, digital sovereignty has become a central concept in European politics in recent years. In this article, we argue that references to digital sovereignty have largely operated with an implausibly one-dimensional, overly simplified notion of sovereignty in general and its application to the digital in particular. We explore the question of what talking about sovereignty in the context of data and digital spaces can comprise. As a basis for this exploration, we distinguish three aspects of the concept of sovereignty: (1) sovereignty as absolute power, (2) sovereignty as embodied power, and (3) sovereignty as institutional power. We argue that, at least in the European debate on digital sovereignty, two of these aspects pertaining to the intricate relation between sovereign and addressee(s) of claims to sovereignty are consistently overlooked. Once understood as encompassing the three aspects distinguished above, digital sovereignty could be part of a normative framework that is normatively oriented towards vulnerability and freedom, that remains open and sensitive to tensions and ambivalences, and that continuously takes these as starting points for new approaches to governance and regulation of digital practices.},

keywords = {Digital Sovereignty, Normativity},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Breaking the Mold: Normative Hybridity as the Key to Contemporary “Non-Western” Political Theorizing},

author = {Elena Ziliotti},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/breaking-the-mold-normative-hybridity-as-the-key-to-contemporary-non-western-political-theorizing/},

doi = {10.1017/S0003055424000194},

issn = {0003-0554},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-04-15},

journal = {American Political Science Review},

pages = {1-14},

abstract = {What normative compass can appropriately ground a theory for contemporary “non-Western” societies? This question has become urgent amid the pressure to decolonize political science and academia. The hybridity of numerous contemporary non-Western societies means that political theorists cannot refuse to engage with either Western-originated or premodern Indigenous concepts and ways of thinking that bear on the local public culture. However, these normative strands alone are unsuitable for grounding a contemporary theory. This methodological dilemma can be overcome if theorists adopt normative hybridity as a methodological stance. Normative hybridity suggests that hybridity is not only a feature of the theorist’s context of reference but should also be their modus operandi. Normative hybridity already underpins relevant works in contemporary Confucian political theory. Drawing from these works, I illustrate three methods to apply normative hybridity to theory building. This novel methodological approach uniquely addresses current political theory discussions and influences non-Western policymaking.},

keywords = {Confucian perspective, Confucian political meritocracy, Non-Western Political Theory, Normative Hybridity, Policy considerations, Political Theory},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Hic sunt leones. User orientation as a design principle for emerging institutions on social media platforms},

author = {Lavinia Marin and Constantin Vica},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/hic-sunt-leones/},

doi = {10.1007/s00146-024-01932-0},

issn = {1435-5655},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-04-08},

journal = {AI & SOCIETY},

volume = {n/a},

issue = {n/a},

abstract = {The phenomenon of missed interactions between online users is a specific issue occurring when users of different language games interact on social media platforms. We use the lens of institutional theory to analyze this phenomenon and argue that current online institutions will necessarily fail to regulate user interactions in a way that creates common meanings because online institutions are not set up to deal with the multiplicity of language games and forms of life co-existing in the online social space. We argue for the need to enable and foster grassroots online institutions that can stabilize the norms of interaction by redesigning algorithms and user interfaces. Such online grassroots institutions would facilitate user orientation at three distinct levels: informational, normative, and semantic-pragmatic. We propose user orientation as a principle that would facilitate the formation of institutions aiming to regulate information exchanges between users inhabiting various forms of life. This principle of user orientation should guide design decisions, while designer teams would need to become aware of the institutional power unleashed when they set up interfaces and algorithms for user-generated content.},

keywords = {Design, Normativity, Technology interaction, User engagement, User-centered design},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Not Relational Enough? Towards an Eco-Relational Approach in Robot Ethics},

author = {Anna Puzio},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/not-relational-enough-towards-an-eco-relational-approach-in-robot-ethics/},

doi = {10.1007/s13347-024-00730-2},

isbn = {2210-5441},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-03-20},

journal = {Philosophy & Technology},

volume = {37},

issue = {2},

pages = {45},

keywords = {Ethical concepts, Non-human, properties, Relational ethics, Robot ethics, Social robots},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {“It takes a village to write a really good paper”: A normative framework for peer reviewing in philosophy},

author = {Samantha Copeland and Lavinia Marin},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/metaphilosophy-2024-copeland-it-takes-a-village-to-write-a-really-good-paper-a-normative-framework-for-peer/},

doi = {10.1111/meta.12670},

issn = {0026-1068},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-03-18},

urldate = {2024-03-18},

journal = {Metaphilosophy},

volume = {n/a},

issue = {n/a},

abstract = {That there is a "crisis of peer review" at the moment is not in dispute, but sufficient attention has not yet been paid to the normative potential that lies in current calls for reform. In contrast to approaches to "fixing" the problems in peer review, which tend to maintain the status quo in terms of professionalising opportunities, this paper addresses the needs of philosophers and how peer-review reform can be an opportunity to improve the academic discipline of philosophy, whereby progress is understood as making the discipline more fair to the global academic community and more conducive to the flourishing of academic philosophers. The paper evaluates recent categories of relevant norms and correlating reforms. In conclusion, it recommends that philosophy pursue the norms of transparency and democracy explicitly when proposing peer-review reform and suggest that proposals for forum-based models of peer review are most likely to support those norms.},

keywords = {Academic Philosophy, Fairness, Flourishing, Normativity, Peer Review},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Ethics of early detection of disease risk factors: A scoping review},

author = {Sammie Jansen and Bart A. Kamphorst and Bob Mulder and Irene van Kamp and Sandra Boekhold and Peter van den hazel and Marcel Verweij},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/wp-content/uploads/s12910-024-01012-4.pdf},

doi = {10.1186/s12910-024-01012-4},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-03-05},

urldate = {2024-03-05},

journal = {BMC Medical Ethics},

volume = {25},

abstract = {Background: Scientific and technological advancements in mapping and understanding the interrelated pathways through which biological and environmental exposures affect disease development create new possibilities for detecting disease risk factors. Early detection of such risk factors may help prevent disease onset or moderate the disease course, thereby decreasing associated disease burden, morbidity, and mortality. However, the ethical implications of screening for disease risk factors are unclear and the current literature provides a fragmented and case-by-case picture.

Methods: To identify key ethical considerations arising from the early detection of disease risk factors, we performed a systematic scoping review. The Scopus, Embase, and Philosopher’s Index databases were searched for peer-reviewed, academic records, which were included if they were written in English or Dutch and concerned the ethics of (1) early detection of (2) disease risk factors for (3) disease caused by environmental factors or gene-environment interactions. All records were reviewed independently by at least two researchers.

Results: After screening 2034 titles and abstracts, and 112 full papers, 55 articles were included in the thematic synthesis of the results. We identified eight common ethical themes: (1) Reliability and uncertainty in early detection, (2) autonomy, (3) privacy, (4) beneficence and non-maleficence, (5) downstream burdens on others, (6) responsibility, (7) justice, and (8) medicalization and conceptual disruption. We identified several gaps in the literature, including a relative scarcity of research on ethical considerations associated with environmental preventive health interventions, a dearth of practical suggestions on how to address expressed concerns about overestimating health capacities, and a lack of insights into preventing undue attribution of health responsibility to individuals.

Conclusions: The ethical concerns arising with the early detection of risk factors are often interrelated and complex. Comprehensive ethical analyses are needed that are better embedded in normative frameworks and also assess and weigh the expected benefits of early risk factor detection. Such research is necessary for developing and implementing responsible and fair preventive health policies.},

keywords = {Early detection, Environmental health, Ethics, Prevention, Public health, Risk Factors, Scoping review, Screening},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Digital Slot Machines: Social Media Platforms as Attentional Scaffolds},

author = {Voinea Cristina and Lavinia Marin and Constantin Vica},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/digital-slot-machines/},

doi = {10.1007/s11245-024-10031-0},

issn = {1572-8749},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-03-02},

urldate = {2024-03-02},

journal = {Topoi},

abstract = {In this paper we introduce the concept of attentional scaffolds and show the resemblance between social media platforms and slot machines, both functioning as hostile attentional scaffolds. The first section establishes the groundwork for the concept of attentional scaffolds and draws parallels to the mechanics of slot machines, to argue that social media platforms aim to capture users’ attention to maximize engagement through a system of intermittent rewards. The second section shifts focus to the interplay between emotions and attention, revealing how online attentional capture through emotionally triggering stimuli leads to distraction. The final section elucidates the collective implications of scaffolding attention through social media platforms. The examination of phenomena such as emotional contagion and the emergence of group emotions underscores the transition from individual experiences to shared collective outcomes. Employing online moral outrage as a case study, we illustrate how negative emotions serve as scaffolds for individuals’ attention, propagate within social groups, and give rise to collective attitudes.},

keywords = {Attention, Social media, Social media technologies},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Socially disruptive technologies and epistemic injustice},

author = {Jeroen Hopster},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/j-hopster_socially-disruptve-technologies-and-epistemic-injustice-2/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-024-09747-9},

issn = {1572-8439},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-02-27},

journal = {Ethics and Information Technology},

volume = {26},

issue = {1},

pages = {14},

abstract = {Recent scholarship on technology-induced ‘conceptual disruption’ has spotlighted the notion of a conceptual gap. Conceptual gaps have also been discussed in scholarship on epistemic injustice, yet up until now these bodies of work have remained disconnected. This article shows that ‘gaps’ of interest to both bodies of literature are closely related, and argues that a joint examination of conceptual disruption and epistemic injustice is fruitful for both fields. I argue that hermeneutical marginalization—a skewed division of hermeneutical resources, which serves to diminish the experiences of marginalized folk—does not only transpire because of conceptual gaps, but also because of two other kinds of conceptual disruption: conceptual overlaps and conceptual misalignments. Hence, there are multiple kinds of conceptual disruption that can be usefully studied through the normative lens of epistemic injustice. Technology can play different roles vis-a-vis epistemic injustices, both as a causal trigger of conceptual disruption, but also as a mediator of hermeneutical resources. Its role is normatively significant, in particular because socially disruptive technologies can have different epistemic implications for different groups: they may amplify the epistemic resources of some groups, while diminishing those of others.},

keywords = {Conceptual gap, Conceptual misalignment, Conceptual overlap, Epistemic injustice, Hermeneutical marginalization, Socially disruptive technologies},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {E-coaching systems and social justice: ethical concerns about inequality, coercion, and stigmatization},

author = {Bart Kamphorst and Joel Anderson},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/ecoaching_systems_and_social_justice_ethical_conc-wageningen_university_and_research_650099/},

doi = {10.1007/s43681-024-00424-7},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-02-19},

urldate = {2024-02-19},

journal = {AI and Ethics},

pages = {1-10},

abstract = {Poor self-regulation has been linked to various behaviors that contribute to pressing societal issues, including rising household debt, inefficient use of sustainable resources, and increasing healthcare demands. In light of this observation, the prospect of individuals receiving automated, tailored support by “e-coaching systems” to scaffold and improve their self-regulation is thought to hold promise for making society-wide progress in addressing such issues. Though there may be legitimate reasons for promoting the use of such systems, and individuals might welcome the support, our aim in the present article is to contribute to the ethics of e-coaching by showing how societal pressures towards the widespread adoption of automated e-coaching systems raise concerns in relation to three distinct aspects of social justice. We argue that societal inequalities may be introduced or exacerbated by (1) unequal access to the technologies, (2) unequally distributed restrictions to liberty and subjection to coercion, and (3) the potentially disparate impact of the use of e-coaching technologies on (self-)stigmatizing perceptions of competence. The article offers a research agenda for studying and addressing these concerns.},

keywords = {Coercion, E-coaching systems, Ethics, Inequality, social justice, Stigmatisation},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Picturing finitude: Photography of mountain glaciers as a multiple practice of dealing with environmental loss},

author = {Lorina Bühr},

url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/09632719231221843},

doi = {10.1177/09632719231221843},

issn = {0963-2719},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-01-15},

urldate = {2024-01-15},

journal = {Environmental Values},

abstract = {In recent years, photographs and visualisations of glacier retreat have become emblematic images of climate change and its ecological consequences. This paper presents glacier photography as a subtype of environmental photography. I argue that photographs and photographic projects that focus on glacial retreat are best conceived not only as strategies for proving climate change or as visual rhetoric for social transformation, but also as a practice that potentially plays an integral role in dealing and coping with human-induced environmental loss. To this end, I draw on praxeological accounts in theory of photography and philosophy of art as well as some exemplary photographic projects to develop a framework to analyse glacier photography. With the help of this praxeological framework, multiple orientations in glacier photography are identified: epistemic, aesthetic, emotional and evocative, social, ethical, and political orientations. All these photographic orientations, I argue, point in their own way to the process and consequences of glacial disappearance and loss. The framework presented innovatively brings together scholarship on climate change visualisation, imagery and art, the theory of photography, and philosophical aesthetics.},

keywords = {Climate change, Environmental sustainability, Media, Photography},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Perspectives of patients and clinicians on big data and AI in health: a comparative empirical investigation},

author = {Patrik Hummel and Matthias Braun and Serena Bishoff and David Samhammer and Katharina Sietz and Peter A. Fasching and Peter Dabrock},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/perspectives-of-patients-and-clinicians-on-big-data-and-ai-in-health/},

doi = {10.1007/s00146-023-01825-8},

issn = {1435-5655},

year  = {2024},

date = {2024-01-07},

urldate = {2024-01-07},

journal = {AI & SOCIETY},

abstract = {Big data and AI applications now play a major role in many health contexts. Much research has already been conducted on ethical and social challenges associated with these technologies. Likewise, there are already some studies that investigate empirically which values and attitudes play a role in connection with their design and implementation. What is still in its infancy, however, is the comparative investigation of the perspectives of different stakeholders.},

keywords = {AI, Big data, Digital health},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Korenhof2023,

title = {Who owns NATURE? Conceptual appropriation in discourses on climate and biotechnologies},

author = {Jeroen Hopster and Alessio Gerola and Ben Hofbauer and Guido Löhr and Julia Rijssenbeek and Paulan Korenhof},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/hopster-et-al-2023-who-owns-nature-conceptual-appropriation-in-discourses-on-climate-and-biotechnologies/},

doi = {10.1177/09632719231196535},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-12-21},

urldate = {2023-12-21},

journal = {Environmental Values },

abstract = {Emerging technologies can have profound conceptual implications. Their emergence frequently calls for the articulation of new concepts, or for modifications and novel applications of concepts that are already entrenched in communication and thought. In this paper, we introduce the notion of “conceptual appropriation” to capture the dynamics between concepts and emerging technologies. By conceptual appropriation, we mean the novel application of a value-laden concept to lay a contestable claim on an underdetermined phenomenon. We illustrate the dynamics of conceptual appropriation by analyzing the concept NATURE and its uptake in three discourses of emerging technology: cellular agriculture, solar geo-engineering, and biomimicry. We argue that NATURE and its cognate NATURALNESS are strongly valanced concepts upon which different stakeholders lay a claim. In doing so, stakeholders advance distinct conceptions of nature, typically to suit their own interests. Our case-studies illustrate how in discourses on emerging technology, the application of value-concepts is entangled with ideological stakes and power dynamics.},

keywords = {Biomimicry, Cellular agricolture, Conceptual appropriation, Emerging technologies, Naturalness, Nature, Solar climate engineering},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {What Does it Mean to Mimic Nature? A Typology for Biomimetic Design},

author = {Alessio Gerola and Zoë Robaey and Vincent Blok },

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/s13347-023-00665-0/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-023-00665-0},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-12-18},

urldate = {2023-12-18},

journal = {Philosophy and Technology},

volume = {36},

number = {81},

abstract = {This commentary considers the typology and conceptual and normative heuristic framework as proposed by the authors as a valuable contribution to the new field of biomimetics philosophy and to the growing demand for critical evaluation of technology and design (decisions) in terms of ecological sustainability. However, further steps are needed to develop a more comprehensive normative analysis and evaluation. To inspire these efforts, I outline some additional normative dimensions of what I propose to call the ‘eco-normative profiling’ of technologies and design.},

keywords = {Biomimicry, Cellular agricolture, Nature},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {The Eco-Normative Profiling of Technology and Design: a Commentary on ‘What Does it Mean to Mimic Nature? A Typology for Biomimetic Design’},

author = {Lorina Buhr},

url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-023-00681-0},

doi = {10.1007/s13347-023-00681-0},

issn = {2210-5441},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-12-18},

urldate = {2023-12-18},

journal = {Philosophy & Technology},

volume = {36},

issue = {4},

pages = {81},

abstract = {This commentary considers the typology and conceptual and normative heuristic framework as proposed by the authors as a valuable contribution to the new field of philosophy of biomimetics and to the growing demand for critical evaluation of technology and design (decisions) in terms of ecological sustainability. However, further steps are needed to develop a more comprehensive normative analysis and evaluation. To inspire these efforts, I outline some additional normative dimensions of what I propose to call the ‘eco-normative profiling’ of technologies and design.},

keywords = {Biomimetic Design, Biomimicry, Eco-Normativity},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Lenzi2023,

title = {Justice in benefitting from carbon removal},

author = {Dominic Lenzi and Hanna Schübel and Ivo Wallimann-Helmer},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/justice-in-benefitting-from-carbon-removal/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/sus.2023.22},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-12-12},

urldate = {2023-12-12},

journal = {Global Sustainability },

volume = {6},

pages = {1-8},

abstract = {Non-Technical Summary

Climate stabilization requires scaling-up technologies to capture and store carbon. Carbon removal could be very profitable, and some of the agents best placed to benefit are ‘carbon majors’, i.e. fossil fuel companies. We argue that in ordinary circumstances only agents without significant historical climate responsibilities would be entitled to the full benefits from carbon removal. Under non-ideal conditions, carbon majors might be entitled to benefit, provided that no other agent could remove similar quantities of carbon at similar costs. This burden of proof is only likely to be met in countries with poor governance capacities.



Technical Summary

Climate stabilization requires scaling up technologies to capture and store carbon. Some of the agents best placed to profit from carbon removal are ‘carbon majors’, especially fossil fuel companies. Yet incentivizing carbon majors to undertake carbon removal poses an ethical dilemma: carbon majors have made significant historical contributions to climate change and have significantly benefitted from such contributions without being made to compensate for resulting climate harm. This is why it seems unfair to reward them with additional economic benefits. However, carbon majors possess the technological skills and infrastructure to upscale carbon removal efficiently. We argue that in ordinary circumstances, only agents without significant climate responsibilities would be morally entitled to fully benefit from carbon removal. Yet under non-ideal conditions, it might be permissible to reward carbon majors if no other agent could remove as much carbon at similar costs and on similar timeframes. We believe this argument faces an imposing burden of proof that is only likely to be met in countries with poor governance capacities. In more favourable circumstances, including those of most OECD countries, rewarding carbon majors without having them pay for their historical climate responsibilities remains impermissible.},

keywords = {adaptation and mitigation, policies, politics and governance},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Puzio2023,

title = {Robot, let us pray! Can and should robots have religious functions? An ethical exploration of religious robots},

author = {Anna Puzio},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/robot-let-us-pray/},

doi = {10.1007/s00146-023-01812-z},

isbn = {1435-5655},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-12-11},

urldate = {2023-12-11},

journal = {AI & Society},

abstract = {Considerable progress is being made in robotics, with robots being developed for many different areas of life: there are service robots, industrial robots, transport robots, medical robots, household robots, sex robots, exploration robots, military robots, and many more. As robot development advances, an intriguing question arises: should robots also encompass religious functions? Religious robots could be used in religious practices, education, discussions, and ceremonies within religious buildings. This article delves into two pivotal questions, combining perspectives from philosophy and religious studies: can and should robots have religious functions? Section 2 initiates the discourse by introducing and discussing the relationship between robots and religion. The core of the article (developed in Sects. 3 and 4) scrutinizes the fundamental questions: can robots possess religious functions, and should they? After an exhaustive discussion of the arguments, benefits, and potential objections regarding religious robots, Sect. 5 addresses the lingering ethical challenges that demand attention. Section 6 presents a discussion of the findings, outlines the limitations of this study, and ultimately responds to the dual research question. Based on the study’s results, brief criteria for the development and deployment of religious robots are proposed, serving as guidelines for future research. Section 7 concludes by offering insights into the future development of religious robots and potential avenues for further research.},

keywords = {Ethics, Existential, Relegious robots, Religion, Social robots, Spirituality},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {What does it mean that all is aflame? Non-axial Buddhist inspiration for an Anthropocene ontology},

author = {Tom Hannes and Gunter Bombaerts},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/what-does-it-mean-that-all-is-aflame/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/205301962311539},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-12-01},

urldate = {2023-12-01},

journal = {The Anthropocene Review},

volume = {10},

issue = {3},

pages = {771-786},

abstract = {Bruno Latour’s “practical climatoscepticism” expresses our moral inhibition with respect to the climate crisis. In spite of Clive Hamilton’s claim that the Anthropocene condition requires us to be suspicious of all previous (i.e. Holocene) ontologies, we propose a threefold Anthropocene ontological structure inspired by non-axial Buddhist elements. In the ontological field, the overall domain in which meaning is searched for, the Buddhist relationalist view on existence can nurture post-humanist philosophies. For the ontological home, one’s specific position and responsibilities, the Buddhist concept “dharma-position” can feed into Hamilton’s “new anthropocentrism.” For the ontological path, the ideal qualities of our interactions, the Buddhist “brahmaviharas” can lend functional structure to the tensions between philosophies of radical acceptance and engaged action. We discuss how this threefold ontological structure provides partial answers to Latour’s “practical climatoscepticism” and Hamilton’s no-analogue world. We sketch avenues for investigation for various Anthropocene ontologies.},

keywords = {Anthropocene, axial age, Buddhism, Charles Taylor, Clive Hamilton, eco-modernism, Ontology, post-humanism, Zen},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Can the Normic de minimis Expected Utility Theory save the de minimis Principle?},

author = {Björn Lundgren and H. Orri Stefánsson },

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/can-the-normic-de-minimis-eut-save-the-minimis-principles/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00751-x},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-11-28},

urldate = {2023-11-28},

journal = {Erkenntnis},

abstract = {Recently, Martin Smith defended a view he called the “normic de minimis expected utility theory”. The basic idea is to integrate a ‘normic’ version of the de minimis principle into an expected utility-based decision theoretical framework. According to the de minimis principle some risks are so small (falling below a threshold) that they can be ignored. While this threshold standardly is defined in terms of some probability, the normic conception of de minimis defines this threshold in terms of abnormality. In this article, we present three independent arguments against the normic de minimis expected utility theory, focusing on its reliance on the de minimis principle.},

keywords = {minimis Expected Utility Theory},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Public health measures and the rise of incidental surveillance: Considerations about private informational power and accountability },

author = {Bart A. Kamphorst and Adam Henschke},

doi = {10.1007/s10676-023-09732-8},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-11-16},

urldate = {2023-11-16},

journal = {Ethics and Information Technology},

volume = {25},

issue = {4},

abstract = {The public health measures implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic have resulted in a substantially increased shared reliance on private infrastructure and digital services in areas such as healthcare, education, retail, and the workplace. This development has (i) granted a number of private actors significant (informational) power, and (ii) given rise to a range of digital surveillance practices incidental to the pandemic itself. In this paper, we reflect on these secondary consequences of the pandemic and observe that, even though collateral data disclosure and additional activity monitoring appears to have been generally socially accepted as inevitable consequences of the pandemic, part and parcel of a larger conglomeration of emergency compromises, these increased surveillance practices were not directly justified by appeals to solidarity and public health in the same way that the instigating public health measures were. Based on this observation, and given the increased reliance on private actors for maintaining the digital space, we argue that governments have a duty to (i) seek and ensure that there are justifications for collateral data disclosure and activity monitoring by private actors in the context of (future) public health emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic, and (ii) regulate and provide accountability mechanisms for and oversight over these private surveillance practices on par with governmental essential services that engage in surveillance activities.},

keywords = {Accountability, Justification, Pandamic response, Public health, Surveillance},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {A reflective guide on the meaning of empathy in autism research},

author = {Caroline Bollen},

doi = {10.1016/j.metip.2022.100109},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-11-15},

urldate = {2023-11-15},

journal = {Methods in Psychology},

volume = {8},

number = {100109},

keywords = {Affective empathy, Autism, Cognitive empathy, Double empathy problem, Empathy, Neurodiversity, Theory of mind},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Examining the assumptions of AI hiring assessments and their impact on job seekers' autonomy over self-representation},

author = {Evgeni Aizenberg and Matthew Dennis and Jeroen van den Hoven},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/examining-the-assumptions-of-ai/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-023-01783-1},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-10-21},

urldate = {2023-10-21},

journal = {AI & Society},

abstract = {In this paper, we examine the epistemological and ontological assumptions algorithmic hiring assessments make about job seekers’ attributes (e.g., competencies, skills, abilities) and the ethical implications of these assumptions. Given that both traditional psychometric hiring assessments and algorithmic assessments share a common set of underlying assumptions from the psychometric paradigm, we turn to literature that has examined the merits and limitations of these assumptions, gathering insights across multiple disciplines and several decades. Our exploration leads us to conclude that algorithmic hiring assessments are incompatible with attributes whose meanings are context-dependent and socially constructed. Such attributes call instead for assessment paradigms that offer space for negotiation of meanings between the job seeker and the employer. We argue that in addition to questioning the validity of algorithmic hiring assessments, this raises an often overlooked ethical impact on job seekers’ autonomy over self-representation: their ability to directly represent their identity, lived experiences, and aspirations. Infringement on this autonomy constitutes an infringement on job seekers’ dignity. We suggest beginning to address these issues through epistemological and ethical reflection regarding the choice of assessment paradigm, the means to implement it, and the ethical impacts of these choices. This entails a transdisciplinary effort that would involve job seekers, hiring managers, recruiters, and other professionals and researchers. Combined with a socio-technical design perspective, this may help generate new ideas regarding appropriate roles for human-to-human and human–technology interactions in the hiring process.},

keywords = {AI, Algorithm, Authonomy, Dignity, Hiring, Self-representation},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Do Machine Learning Models Represents Their Targets?},

author = {Emily Sullivan},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/do-machine-learning-models-represent-their-targets/},

doi = {0.1017/psa.2023.151},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-10-20},

urldate = {2023-10-20},

journal = {Philosophy of Sciences},

pages = {1-11},

abstract = {I argue that machine learning (ML) models used in science function as highly idealized toy models. If we treat ML models as a type of highly idealized toy model, then we can deploy standard representational and epistemic strategies from the toy model literature to explain why ML models can still provide epistemic success despite their lack of similarity to their targets.},

keywords = {Epistemology, Machine learning},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Conceptual Engineering and Philosophy of Technology: Amelioration or Adaptation?},

author = {Jeroen Hopster and Guido Löhr},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/conceptual-engineering-and-philosophy-of-technology/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-023-00670-3 },

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-10-18},

urldate = {2023-10-18},

journal = { Philosophy & Technology },

volume = {36},

abstract = {Conceptual Engineering (CE) is thought to be generally aimed at ameliorating deficient concepts. In this paper, we challenge this assumption: we argue that CE is frequently undertaken with the orthogonal aim of conceptual adaptation. We develop this thesis with reference to the interplay between technology and concepts. Emerging technologies can exert significant pressure on conceptual systems and spark ‘conceptual disruption’. For example, advances in Artificial Intelligence raise the question of whether AIs are agents or mere objects, which can be construed as a CE question regarding the concepts AGENT and OBJECT. We distinguish between three types of conceptual disruption (conceptual gaps, conceptual overlaps, and conceptual misalignments) and argue that when CE occurs to address these disruptions, its primary aim is not to improve concepts, but to retain their functional quality, or to prevent them from degrading. This is the characteristic aim of CE when undertaken in philosophy of technology: to preserve the functional role of a concept or conceptual scheme, rather than improving how a concept fulfills its respective function.},

keywords = {Amelioration, Conceptual adaptation, Conceptual engineering, Disruption, Misalignment, Preservation, Social disruptive technologies},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Balancing Caution and the Need for Change: The General Contextual Integrity Approach },

author = {Elizabeth O'Neill},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/balancing-caution-and-the-need-for-change/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-023-00671-2},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-10-16},

urldate = {2023-10-16},

journal = { Philosophy & Technology},

volume = {36},

number = {4},

abstract = {In this reply to van de Poel’s (Philosophy & Technology, 35(3), 82, 2022) commentary on O’Neill (Philosophy & Technology, 35(79), 2022), I discuss two worries about the general contextual integrity approach to evaluating technological change. First, I address van de Poel’s concern that the general contextual integrity approach will not supply the right guidance in cases where morally problematic technological change poses no threat to contextual integrity. Second, I elaborate on how the approach supplies mechanisms for balancing caution with the need for change.},

keywords = {Contextual integrity, Ethics of Technology, Norm change, Socially disruptive technologies, Technological change, Value change},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Not a Good Fix: Constitutivism on Value Change and Disagreement},

author = {Michael Klenk and Ibo van de Poel},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/not-a-good-fix/},

doi = {10.1007/s10670-023-00742-y},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-10-13},

urldate = {2023-10-13},

journal = {Erkenntnis},

abstract = {We examine whether Thomsonian constitutivism, a metaethical view that analyses value in terms of ‘goodness-fixing kinds,’ i.e. kinds that themselves set the standards for being a good instance of the respective kind, offers a satisfactory explanation of value change and disagreement. While value disagreement has long been considered an important explanandum, we introduce value change as a closely related but distinct phenomenon of metaethical interest. We argue that constitutivism fails to explain both phenomena because of its commitment to goodness-fixing kinds. Constitutivism explains away disagreement and at best explains the emergence of new values, not genuine change. Therefore, Thomsonian constitutivism is not a good fix for realist problems with explaining value disagreement, and value change.},

keywords = {Constitutivism, Metaethics, Value change, Value disagreement},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Is Lack of Literature Engagement a Reason for Rejecting a Paper in Philosophy?},

author = {Björn Lundgren},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/is-lack-of-literature-engagement-a-reason-for-rejecting-a-paper-in-philosophy/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09632-0},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-10-10},

urldate = {2023-10-10},

journal = {Res Publica},

abstract = {Although philosophy cites less than most other academic subjects, many scholars still take a lack of reference to and engagement with the relevant literature as a reason to reject a paper in philosophy. Here I argue against that idea. Literature requests should only in rare circumstances be an absolute requirement, and a lack of (engagement with) references is not a good reason to reject a paper. Lastly, I briefly discuss whether an author has reasons to provide references, and I argue that although there are special circumstances in which we ought to avoid referencing papers, there are strong reasons in favor of engaging with the literature. Hence there is an asymmetry between what the author has a reason to do in writing a paper and how reviewers and editors ought to evaluate it.},

keywords = {Citation, Editorial policy, Literature engagement, Publishing, Referencing, Reviewing},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Justice and Empowerment Through Digital Health: Ethical Challenges and Opportunities},

author = {Philip Nickel and Iris Loosman and Lily Frank and Anna Vinnikova },

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/s44206-023-00075-x/},

doi = {10.1007/s44206-023-00075-x },

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-10-10},

urldate = {2023-10-10},

journal = {Digital Society},

volume = {2},

abstract = {The proposition that digital innovations can put people in charge of their health has been accompanied by prolific talk of empowerment. In this paper we consider ethical challenges and opportunities of trying to achieve justice and empowerment using digital health initiatives. The language of empowerment can misleadingly suggest that by using technology, people can control their health and take responsibility for health outcomes to a greater degree than is realistic or fair. Also, digital health empowerment often primarily reaches people who already have high technological and health literacy, leaving others behind. We critically investigate whether the concept of health empowerment could be re-engineered to mean something different, namely the process of improving the health literacy and access of those who least possess it, in line with recent proposals for conceptual engineering in the service of justice. We settle on the weaker conclusion that underlying ethical values including justice should be used to interpret the existing concept of empowerment. To conclude, we take a high-level view of various strategies for achieving the ethical value associated with digital health empowerment.},

keywords = {Access to care, Conceptual engineering, Digital health, Equity, Ethics of Technology, Health  literacy, Health empowerment, Justice, Responsibilization},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Value Change and Technological Design},

author = {Freek van der Weij and Steffen Steinert and Ibo van Poel and Joost Alleblas and Anna Melnyk and Tristan de Wildt and David Abbink and Denise Almeida},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/value_change_and_technological_design/},

doi = {10.1109/MTS.2023.3302406},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-09-22},

urldate = {2023-09-22},

journal = {IEEE Technology and Society Magazine},

volume = {42},

number = {3},

pages = {25-32},

abstract = {Technology helps to solve problems, but it may also lead to unintended consequences. For example, biofuels may help to overcome the disadvantages of fossil fuels, but their production might compete with food production leading to higher food prices and hunger. Therefore, in recent decades, the societal impact of technology has come to the center of attention. To deal with potential ethical issues related to technology, many scholars have emphasized the importance of addressing values already during the design phase of new technology. Values are understood as beliefs about what is good or desirable, like human autonomy, safety, sustainability, or privacy. Researchers in ethics and philosophy of technology have developed a variety of approaches, like value-sensitive design (VSD) and responsible research and innovation, to help engineers embed values in technological design (e.g., [32] ).},

keywords = {Moral values, Value change, value-sensitive design},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {A historical perspective of biomedical explainable AI research},

author = {Luca Malinverno and Vesna Barros and Francesco Ghisoni and Giovanni Visonà and Roman Kern and Philip Nickel and Barbara Ventura and Ilija Šimić and Sarah Stryeck and Francesca Manni and Cesar Ferri and Claire Jean-Quartier and Laura Genga and Gabriele Schweikert and Mario Lovrić and Michal Rosen-Zvi},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/1-s2-0-s266638992300199x-main/},

doi = {10.1016/j.patter.2023.100830 },

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-09-08},

urldate = {2023-09-08},

journal = {Patterns},

volume = {4},

issue = {9},

pages = {9},

abstract = {The black-box nature of most artificial intelligence (AI) models encourages the development of explainability methods to engender trust into the AI decision-making process. Such methods can be broadly categorized into two main types: post hoc explanations and inherently interpretable algorithms. We aimed at analyzing the possible associations between COVID-19 and the push of explainable AI (XAI) to the forefront of biomedical research. We automatically extracted from the PubMed database biomedical XAI studies related to concepts of causality or explainability and manually labeled 1,603 papers with respect to XAI categories. To compare the trends pre- and post-COVID-19, we fit a change point detection model and evaluated significant changes in publication rates. We show that the advent of COVID-19 in the beginning of 2020 could be the driving factor behind an increased focus concerning XAI, playing a crucial role in accelerating an already evolving trend. Finally, we present a discussion with future societal use and impact of XAI technologies and potential future directions for those who pursue fostering clinical trust with interpretable machine learning models.},

keywords = {Artificial intelligence, Corona virus, COVID-19, Decision-making, Explainability, Foundation models, Machine learning, Meta-review, PRISMA, Trustworthiness},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Of Mammoths and Megalomaniacs},

author = {Bernice Bovenkerk and Keje Boersma},

doi = {10.5840/enviroethics202382964},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-09-05},

urldate = {2023-09-05},

journal = {Environmental Ethics},

volume = {45},

number = {4},

pages = {381-402},

abstract = {In this article, two ways of thinking about the potential disruptiveness of de-extinction and

gene drives for conservation are presented. The first way of thinking zooms in on particular

technologies and assesses the disruptiveness of their potential implications. This approach is

exemplified by a framework proposed by Hopster (2021) that is used to conduct our assessment.

The second way of thinking turns the logic of the first around. Here, the question is

how gene drives and de-extinction fit into a wider and partly pre-existing context of disruption

of human-nature relations. By only zooming in on a particular technology and its potential

implications, the context out of which the technology is born is unavoidably disregarded.

Gene drives and de-extinction are catalysts of a wider disruption already underway. And it

is precisely because this disruption is already underway that the terrain is opened for the

development and application of these technologies. In other words, the disruptiveness of

these technologies strengthens the disruptiveness that was already underway and vice versa.

It is argued that the two ways of thinking about emerging technologies in conservation need

to go together, meaning in technology assessment both perspectives need to be included.},

keywords = {Conceptual disruption, Conservation, De-extinction, Gene Drives},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Sustainability as an Intrinsic Moral Concern for Solidaristic Health Care},

author = {Marcel Verweij and Hans Ossebaard },

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/s10728-023-00469-5/},

doi = {10.1007/s10728-023-00469-5},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-09-04},

urldate = {2023-09-04},

journal = {Health Care Analysis},

abstract = {Environmental pollution and greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change have adverse impacts on global health. Somewhat paradoxically, health care systems that aim to prevent and cure disease are themselves major emitters and polluters. In this paper we develop a justification for the claim that solidaristic health care systems should include sustainability as one of the criteria for determining which health interventions are made available or reimbursed – and which not. There is however a complication: most adverse health effects due to climate change do occur elsewhere in the world. If solidarity would commit us to take care of everyone’s health, worldwide, it might imply that solidaristic health system cannot justifiably restrict universal access to their own national populations. In response we explain health solidarity is to be considered as a moral ideal. Such an ideal does not specify what societies owe to whom, but it does have moral implications. We argue that ignoring sustainability in political decision making about what health care is to be offered, would amount to betrayal of the ideal of solidarity.},

keywords = {Climate change, Environmental pollution, Environmental sustainability},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {A fairway to fairness: Toward a richer conceptualization of fairness perceptions for just energy transitions},

author = {Michèlle Bal and Marijn Stok and Gunter Bombaerts and Nicole Huijts and Philipp Schneider and Andreas Spahn and Vincent Buskens

},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/a-fairway-to-fairness-2/},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2023.103213},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-09-01},

urldate = {2023-09-01},

journal = {Energy Research & Social Science},

volume = {103},

abstract = {Current energy justice literature has developed a strong empirical approach to describe how justice plays a role in energy transitions. We argue that the individual-level perception measures are insufficiently developed within this field, while they are vital for a successful just energy transition. Reviewing studies on how people (citizens, users or consumers) perceive fairness in the context of the energy transition, we first investigate how fairness perceptions are currently studied within energy social science. Subsequently, we look into social and environmental justice research and interdependent decision-experiments, to map potential extensions of fairness conceptualizations and measures. Following the triumvirate model of energy justice – distinguishing distributive, procedural, and recognitive justice – we found that only recently studies also contained recognition justice aspects, while the majority of energy social science studies focuses on either distributive or procedural aspects. Extending these insights, we argue that environmental justice research provides a potential way of specifying groups to be recognized in the energy transition (i.e., future generations, non-human species, humans worldwide). Moreover, we propose that interactional justice could be an additional tenet of citizen's fairness perceptions to consider. Importantly, for a successful global energy transition, in-depth insight into the principles underlying people's justice judgments is necessary. Social justice theorizing and interdependent decision-experiments offer concrete ways of tapping into these principles. Interdependent decision-experiments in particular pose a way of measuring fairness tendencies that could be applied to the specific context of the energy transition and be expanded beyond the current research focus measuring distributive justice perceptions.},

keywords = {Behavioral game theory, Distributive fairness, Environmental justice, Fairness perceptions, Procedural fairness, Recognitive fairness},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Meaningful Human Control over AI for Health? A Review},

author = {Eva Maria Hille and Patrik Hummel and Matthias Braun},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/meaningful-human-control-over-ai-for-health/},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-08-27},

urldate = {2022-08-27},

journal = {BMJ Journals},

abstract = {Artificial intelligence is currently changing many areas of society. Especially in health, where critical decisions are made, questions of control must be renegotiated: who is in control when an automated system makes clinically relevant decisions? Increasingly, the concept of meaningful human control (MHC) is being invoked for this purpose. However, it is unclear exactly how this concept is to be understood in health. Through a systematic review, we present the current state of the concept of MHC in health. The results show that there is not yet a robust MHC concept for health. We propose a broader understanding of MHC along three strands of action: enabling, exercising and evaluating control. Taking into account these strands of action and the established rules and processes in the different health sectors, the MHC concept needs to be further developed to avoid falling into two gaps, which we have described as theoretical and labelling gaps.},

keywords = {Meaningful human control, Self-determination},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}