2025
Paiusco, Elisa
A Capabilities Approach to Carbon Dioxide Removal Journal Article
In: Ethics, Policy & Environment, pp. 1–21, 2025, ISSN: 2155-0093.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags:
@article{Paiusco2025,
title = {A Capabilities Approach to Carbon Dioxide Removal},
author = {Elisa Paiusco},
doi = {10.1080/21550085.2025.2449797},
issn = {2155-0093},
year = {2025},
date = {2025-01-14},
urldate = {2025-01-14},
journal = {Ethics, Policy & Environment},
pages = {1--21},
publisher = {Informa UK Limited},
abstract = {The recent ethical debate concerning the implementation of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) has expanded the traditional scope of ethical analysis to investigate the appropriate role of CDR within the larger climate change mitigation discussion. Specifically, the recent scholarship is embedded in the disputed sustainable development landscape that presents various and competing visions of desirable futures. This article unpacks and clarifies the discussion between Darrel Moellendorf and Henry Shue as representatives of two camps in the recent debate, the former supporting carbon removal to achieve poverty-targeting sustainable development and the latter rejecting overreliance on CDR’s potential. Finally, moving beyond this discussion, the article proposes that a capabilities approach to CDR can adequately inform the debate, tackling some important limitations in the recent literature by offering a broader account of human well-being relevant to CDR implementation.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The recent ethical debate concerning the implementation of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) has expanded the traditional scope of ethical analysis to investigate the appropriate role of CDR within the larger climate change mitigation discussion. Specifically, the recent scholarship is embedded in the disputed sustainable development landscape that presents various and competing visions of desirable futures. This article unpacks and clarifies the discussion between Darrel Moellendorf and Henry Shue as representatives of two camps in the recent debate, the former supporting carbon removal to achieve poverty-targeting sustainable development and the latter rejecting overreliance on CDR’s potential. Finally, moving beyond this discussion, the article proposes that a capabilities approach to CDR can adequately inform the debate, tackling some important limitations in the recent literature by offering a broader account of human well-being relevant to CDR implementation.
2024
Veluwenkamp, Herman; Hopster, Jeroen; Köhler, Sebastian; Löhr, Guido
Socially Disruptive Technologies and Conceptual Engineering Journal Article
In: Ethics Inf Technol, vol. 26, no. 4, 2024, ISSN: 1572-8439.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags:
@article{Veluwenkamp2024,
title = {Socially Disruptive Technologies and Conceptual Engineering},
author = {Herman Veluwenkamp and Jeroen Hopster and Sebastian Köhler and Guido Löhr},
doi = {10.1007/s10676-024-09804-3},
issn = {1572-8439},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-12-00},
urldate = {2024-12-00},
journal = {Ethics Inf Technol},
volume = {26},
number = {4},
publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
abstract = {In this special issue, we focus on the connection between conceptual engineering and the philosophy of technology. Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of introducing, eliminating, or revising words and concepts. The philosophy of technology examines the nature and significance of technology. We investigate how technologies such as AI and genetic engineering (so-called “socially disruptive technologies”) disrupt our practices and concepts, and how conceptual engineering can address these disruptions. We also consider how conceptual engineering can enhance the practice of ethical design. The issue features seven articles that discuss a range of topics, including trust in blockchain applications and the evolving concept of nature. These articles highlight that as technology changes the world and our concepts, conceptual engineering provides invaluable tools and frameworks to reflect on these changes and adapt accordingly.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In this special issue, we focus on the connection between conceptual engineering and the philosophy of technology. Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of introducing, eliminating, or revising words and concepts. The philosophy of technology examines the nature and significance of technology. We investigate how technologies such as AI and genetic engineering (so-called “socially disruptive technologies”) disrupt our practices and concepts, and how conceptual engineering can address these disruptions. We also consider how conceptual engineering can enhance the practice of ethical design. The issue features seven articles that discuss a range of topics, including trust in blockchain applications and the evolving concept of nature. These articles highlight that as technology changes the world and our concepts, conceptual engineering provides invaluable tools and frameworks to reflect on these changes and adapt accordingly.
Bollen, Caroline
A conceptual and ethical framework for empathy and communication technologies Journal Article
In: Technology in Society, vol. 79, 2024, ISSN: 0160-791X.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags:
@article{Bollen2024b,
title = {A conceptual and ethical framework for empathy and communication technologies},
author = {Caroline Bollen},
doi = {10.1016/j.techsoc.2024.102707},
issn = {0160-791X},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-12-00},
urldate = {2024-12-00},
journal = {Technology in Society},
volume = {79},
publisher = {Elsevier BV},
abstract = {While there is an interest in questions related to empathy and communication technologies (CTs) in various disciplines, conceptual and ethical ambiguities on what empathy exactly is and whether and how it can be shaped by technologies make it unclear how to approach such questions. This paper sets out to provide such a framework: a way to understand empathy and its relationship to CTs in a conceptually and ethically robust manner. A critical reconsideration of the concept is needed, especially if we want to use the concept to evaluate technologies and their impact in terms of desirability and guidance to shape our future. I argue we need to understand empathy explicitly as a moral concept that is contextually situated, relational, and diverse, and to do so, I argue to understand empathy as a virtue. Section 2 lays down the theoretical foundation to explore empathy as a virtue, technological mediation, and CTs. In section 3, I apply these concepts to identify different ways in which CTs can mediate empathy and change what it means to be empathetic on both individual and societal levels. This multi-layered understanding of “CT-mediated empathy” provides a lens through which questions on CTs and empathy can be approached, such that we can reflect on, evaluate and improve specific technologies, their implementation, and their use. In section 4, I summarize this in a list of seven questions that require reflection in the design and implementation of a (new) CT. The paper ends with some forward-looking implications and recommendations for design, research, education, and policy towards an empathetic sociotechnical future.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
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While there is an interest in questions related to empathy and communication technologies (CTs) in various disciplines, conceptual and ethical ambiguities on what empathy exactly is and whether and how it can be shaped by technologies make it unclear how to approach such questions. This paper sets out to provide such a framework: a way to understand empathy and its relationship to CTs in a conceptually and ethically robust manner. A critical reconsideration of the concept is needed, especially if we want to use the concept to evaluate technologies and their impact in terms of desirability and guidance to shape our future. I argue we need to understand empathy explicitly as a moral concept that is contextually situated, relational, and diverse, and to do so, I argue to understand empathy as a virtue. Section 2 lays down the theoretical foundation to explore empathy as a virtue, technological mediation, and CTs. In section 3, I apply these concepts to identify different ways in which CTs can mediate empathy and change what it means to be empathetic on both individual and societal levels. This multi-layered understanding of “CT-mediated empathy” provides a lens through which questions on CTs and empathy can be approached, such that we can reflect on, evaluate and improve specific technologies, their implementation, and their use. In section 4, I summarize this in a list of seven questions that require reflection in the design and implementation of a (new) CT. The paper ends with some forward-looking implications and recommendations for design, research, education, and policy towards an empathetic sociotechnical future.
van Grunsven, Janna; Marin, Lavinia
Technosocial disruption, enactivism, & social media: On the overlooked risks of teenage cancel culture Journal Article
In: Technology in Society, vol. 78, pp. 102602, 2024, ISSN: 0160-791X.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: 4E Cognition, Philosophy of Mind, Technosocial disruption, Teenage Cancel Culture
@article{vanGrunsven2024,
title = {Technosocial disruption, enactivism, & social media: On the overlooked risks of teenage cancel culture},
author = {Janna van Grunsven and Lavinia Marin},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160791X24001507?via%3Dihub
https://www.esdit.nl/technosocial-disruption-enactivism-amp-social-media-on_2024_technology/},
doi = {10.1016/j.techsoc.2024.102602},
issn = {0160-791X},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-09-01},
urldate = {2024-09-01},
journal = {Technology in Society},
volume = {78},
pages = {102602},
abstract = {In a world undergoing rapid, large-scale technological change, the phenomenon of technosocial disruption is receiving increasing scholarly and societal attention. While the phenomenon is most actively delineated in philosophy of technology, it is also receiving growing attention within a different area of philosophy, namely the so-called “4E Cognition” approach to philosophy of mind. Despite this shared interest in technosocial disruption, there is relatively little exchange between the theorizing going on in these two different areas of philosophy. One of our paper's two main aims is programmatic: to motivate the fruitfulness of such an exchange. We do this by turning to a specific case of technosocial disruption, namely Teenage Cancel Culture [TCC]. TCC cannot be disentangled from the introduction of social media platforms [SMPs] into modern day social life. Hence, we will speak of SMP-Afforded TCC. SPM-afforded TCC is a phenomenon fretted over by societal actors but strikingly ignored in academic research. In our effort to narrow this knowledge gap, we analyze SMP-afforded TCC from a perspective of technosocial disruption enriched by insights from 4E-Cognition. This brings out a specific worry about the role of SMPs in the social lives of teenagers. We argue that SMP-afforded TCC disrupts the social relational domains within which teenagers develop, maintain, and express their precarious social identities, by creating social affordances that are hostile to healthy risky interpersonal identity-exploration. As such, SMP-afforded TCC not only cancels particular individuals for particular acts; it may also pre-emptively cancel a certain way of being a social self, namely a healthy social risk-taker. We conclude the paper by proposing several potential routes for mitigating the perniciously disruptive effects of SMP-afforded TCC and identifying future areas for research.},
keywords = {4E Cognition, Philosophy of Mind, Technosocial disruption, Teenage Cancel Culture},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In a world undergoing rapid, large-scale technological change, the phenomenon of technosocial disruption is receiving increasing scholarly and societal attention. While the phenomenon is most actively delineated in philosophy of technology, it is also receiving growing attention within a different area of philosophy, namely the so-called “4E Cognition” approach to philosophy of mind. Despite this shared interest in technosocial disruption, there is relatively little exchange between the theorizing going on in these two different areas of philosophy. One of our paper's two main aims is programmatic: to motivate the fruitfulness of such an exchange. We do this by turning to a specific case of technosocial disruption, namely Teenage Cancel Culture [TCC]. TCC cannot be disentangled from the introduction of social media platforms [SMPs] into modern day social life. Hence, we will speak of SMP-Afforded TCC. SPM-afforded TCC is a phenomenon fretted over by societal actors but strikingly ignored in academic research. In our effort to narrow this knowledge gap, we analyze SMP-afforded TCC from a perspective of technosocial disruption enriched by insights from 4E-Cognition. This brings out a specific worry about the role of SMPs in the social lives of teenagers. We argue that SMP-afforded TCC disrupts the social relational domains within which teenagers develop, maintain, and express their precarious social identities, by creating social affordances that are hostile to healthy risky interpersonal identity-exploration. As such, SMP-afforded TCC not only cancels particular individuals for particular acts; it may also pre-emptively cancel a certain way of being a social self, namely a healthy social risk-taker. We conclude the paper by proposing several potential routes for mitigating the perniciously disruptive effects of SMP-afforded TCC and identifying future areas for research.
Kudina, Olya; van de Poel, Ibo
A sociotechnical system perspective on AI Journal Article
In: Minds & Machines, vol. 34, no. 3, 2024, ISSN: 1572-8641.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags:
@article{Kudina2024,
title = {A sociotechnical system perspective on AI},
author = {Olya Kudina and Ibo van de Poel},
doi = {10.1007/s11023-024-09680-2},
issn = {1572-8641},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-09-00},
urldate = {2024-09-00},
journal = {Minds & Machines},
volume = {34},
number = {3},
publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},
abstract = {The aim of this special issue is to provide a sociotechnical system perspective on Artificial Intelligence (AI). Discussions on AI still often focus on the technology itself rather than on the broader systems in which it functions. This is even true when it comes to the social and ethical issues raised by AI. For example, people often talk about fair algorithms or explainable AI, as if fairness and explainability depend solely on the technology and not also on the broader sociotechnical systems in which AI technologies are embedded.
Consider, for example, an AI algorithm that is used by a government agency to find potential cases of fraud with social welfare. Fairness in this case no doubt partly depends on the algorithm itself; for example does it meet certain fairness metrics as they have now been proposed in the literature (e.g., Mehrabi et al., 2019)? However, there are multiple and conflicting fairness metrics, and in order to decide on which of these to focus, one first needs to know more about the broader context: what are the main unfairness that might occur in this context? Which people are most vulnerable and dependent on governmental decisions and should be protected from unfair decisions?
Even when the choice of fairness metrics is based on contextual considerations, it will make the resulting system not necessarily fair. That will also depend, for example, on the behavior of civil servants and politicians, the political climate with respect to fraud, and on internal rules in the relevant governmental agency. Is there room to deviate from the algorithm’s advice? Is the emphasis on finding fraud or avoiding unjust accusations? Are citizens offered the possibility to object to a governmental decision or to provide additional evidence if needed? Also legal rules and institutions will affect the functioning and fairness of the resulting sociotechnical system in which the AI algorithm is embedded. For example, are there independent possibilities to appeal against a decision based on the algorithm’s advice?
A sociotechnical system perspective is important to better understand how AI systems function, what social, political and ethical issues they raise, and how to best address these issues. It also matters for how to design AI; again, the focus should not solely be on the technology and how effective it is in achieving set goals, but also on how it is expected to function in broader sociotechnical systems of which it becomes part. In this contribution, we first set out what a sociotechnical systems perspective is, we then discuss why it is important and in particular what it can add to other approaches; next, we focus on the role of values in and the moral significance of a sociotechnical system approach. Finally, we discuss the contributions that are part of this special issue.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The aim of this special issue is to provide a sociotechnical system perspective on Artificial Intelligence (AI). Discussions on AI still often focus on the technology itself rather than on the broader systems in which it functions. This is even true when it comes to the social and ethical issues raised by AI. For example, people often talk about fair algorithms or explainable AI, as if fairness and explainability depend solely on the technology and not also on the broader sociotechnical systems in which AI technologies are embedded.
Consider, for example, an AI algorithm that is used by a government agency to find potential cases of fraud with social welfare. Fairness in this case no doubt partly depends on the algorithm itself; for example does it meet certain fairness metrics as they have now been proposed in the literature (e.g., Mehrabi et al., 2019)? However, there are multiple and conflicting fairness metrics, and in order to decide on which of these to focus, one first needs to know more about the broader context: what are the main unfairness that might occur in this context? Which people are most vulnerable and dependent on governmental decisions and should be protected from unfair decisions?
Even when the choice of fairness metrics is based on contextual considerations, it will make the resulting system not necessarily fair. That will also depend, for example, on the behavior of civil servants and politicians, the political climate with respect to fraud, and on internal rules in the relevant governmental agency. Is there room to deviate from the algorithm’s advice? Is the emphasis on finding fraud or avoiding unjust accusations? Are citizens offered the possibility to object to a governmental decision or to provide additional evidence if needed? Also legal rules and institutions will affect the functioning and fairness of the resulting sociotechnical system in which the AI algorithm is embedded. For example, are there independent possibilities to appeal against a decision based on the algorithm’s advice?
A sociotechnical system perspective is important to better understand how AI systems function, what social, political and ethical issues they raise, and how to best address these issues. It also matters for how to design AI; again, the focus should not solely be on the technology and how effective it is in achieving set goals, but also on how it is expected to function in broader sociotechnical systems of which it becomes part. In this contribution, we first set out what a sociotechnical systems perspective is, we then discuss why it is important and in particular what it can add to other approaches; next, we focus on the role of values in and the moral significance of a sociotechnical system approach. Finally, we discuss the contributions that are part of this special issue.
Consider, for example, an AI algorithm that is used by a government agency to find potential cases of fraud with social welfare. Fairness in this case no doubt partly depends on the algorithm itself; for example does it meet certain fairness metrics as they have now been proposed in the literature (e.g., Mehrabi et al., 2019)? However, there are multiple and conflicting fairness metrics, and in order to decide on which of these to focus, one first needs to know more about the broader context: what are the main unfairness that might occur in this context? Which people are most vulnerable and dependent on governmental decisions and should be protected from unfair decisions?
Even when the choice of fairness metrics is based on contextual considerations, it will make the resulting system not necessarily fair. That will also depend, for example, on the behavior of civil servants and politicians, the political climate with respect to fraud, and on internal rules in the relevant governmental agency. Is there room to deviate from the algorithm’s advice? Is the emphasis on finding fraud or avoiding unjust accusations? Are citizens offered the possibility to object to a governmental decision or to provide additional evidence if needed? Also legal rules and institutions will affect the functioning and fairness of the resulting sociotechnical system in which the AI algorithm is embedded. For example, are there independent possibilities to appeal against a decision based on the algorithm’s advice?
A sociotechnical system perspective is important to better understand how AI systems function, what social, political and ethical issues they raise, and how to best address these issues. It also matters for how to design AI; again, the focus should not solely be on the technology and how effective it is in achieving set goals, but also on how it is expected to function in broader sociotechnical systems of which it becomes part. In this contribution, we first set out what a sociotechnical systems perspective is, we then discuss why it is important and in particular what it can add to other approaches; next, we focus on the role of values in and the moral significance of a sociotechnical system approach. Finally, we discuss the contributions that are part of this special issue.
Dudzik, Bernd J. W.; van der Waa, Jasper S.; Chen, Pei-Yu; Dobbe, Roel; de Troya, Inago M. D. R.; Bakker, Roos M.; de Boer, Maaike H. T.; Erdogan, Emre; Yolum, Pinar; Wang, Shihan; Santamaria, Selene Baez; Krause, Lea; Kamphorst, Bart
Viewpoint: Hybrid Intelligence Supports Application Development for Diabetes Lifestyle Management Journal Article
In: JAIR – Journal for Artificial Intelligence Research, vol. 80, 2024.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Diabetes lifestyle, Digital health, Digital health intervention, Healthcare
@article{Dudzik2024,
title = {Viewpoint: Hybrid Intelligence Supports Application Development for Diabetes Lifestyle Management},
author = {Bernd J. W. Dudzik and Jasper S. van der Waa and Pei-Yu Chen and Roel Dobbe and Inago M.D.R. de Troya and Roos M. Bakker and Maaike H. T. de Boer and Emre Erdogan and Pinar Yolum and Shihan Wang and Selene Baez Santamaria and Lea Krause and Bart Kamphorst},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.15916
https://www.esdit.nl/15916wpgs/},
doi = {10.1613/jair.1.15916},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-07-10},
urldate = {2024-07-10},
journal = {JAIR – Journal for Artificial Intelligence Research},
volume = {80},
abstract = {Type II diabetes is a complex health condition requiring patients to closely and continuously collaborate with healthcare professionals and other caretakers on lifestyle changes. While intelligent products have tremendous potential to support such Diabetes Lifestyle Management (DLM), existing products are typically conceived from a technology-centered perspective that insufficiently acknowledges the degree to which collaboration and inclusion of stakeholders is required. In this article, we argue that the emergent design philosophy of Hybrid Intelligence (HI) forms a suitable alternative lens for research and development. In particular, we (1) highlight a series of pragmatic challenges for effective AI-based DLM support based on results from an expert focus group, and (2) argue for HI’s potential to address these by outlining relevant research trajectories.},
keywords = {Diabetes lifestyle, Digital health, Digital health intervention, Healthcare},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Type II diabetes is a complex health condition requiring patients to closely and continuously collaborate with healthcare professionals and other caretakers on lifestyle changes. While intelligent products have tremendous potential to support such Diabetes Lifestyle Management (DLM), existing products are typically conceived from a technology-centered perspective that insufficiently acknowledges the degree to which collaboration and inclusion of stakeholders is required. In this article, we argue that the emergent design philosophy of Hybrid Intelligence (HI) forms a suitable alternative lens for research and development. In particular, we (1) highlight a series of pragmatic challenges for effective AI-based DLM support based on results from an expert focus group, and (2) argue for HI’s potential to address these by outlining relevant research trajectories.
Henschke, Adam (Ed.)
Cognitive Warfare Collection
Routledge, 2024.
@collection{Akintoye2024,
title = {Cognitive Warfare},
editor = {Adam Henschke},
doi = {10.4324/9781003126959},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-07-08},
urldate = {2024-07-08},
booktitle = {Cognitive Warfare; Grey Matters in Contemporary Political Conflict },
publisher = {Routledge},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {collection}
}
Puzio, Anna
From an Eco-Relational Approach to Ecologically Responsible Robot Ethics Journal Article
In: Philosophy & Technology, vol. 37, iss. 3, pp. 83, 2024, ISSN: 2210-5441.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Eco-Relational Approach, Robot ethics
@article{Puzio2024,
title = {From an Eco-Relational Approach to Ecologically Responsible Robot Ethics},
author = {Anna Puzio},
url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13347-024-00772-6
https://www.esdit.nl/wp-content/uploads/s13347-024-00772-6.pdf},
doi = {10.1007/s13347-024-00772-6},
issn = {2210-5441},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-07-02},
urldate = {2024-07-02},
journal = {Philosophy & Technology},
volume = {37},
issue = {3},
pages = {83},
abstract = {In this reply, I respond to Joshua C. Gellers’ commentary on my article “Not Relational Enough? Towards an Eco-Relational Approach in Robot Ethics” (Puzio, 2024a), in which I present a deeply relational, “eco-relational approach”. This approach asserts that it is necessary to consider the relationality with non-human entities such as animals and technology on a deeper level than has been done in robot ethics so far. This disrupts traditional ethical concepts. In his commentary “Not Ecological Enough: A Commentary on an Eco-Relational Approach in Robot Ethics” (2024), Gellers raises criticisms of my method and the consequences of the eco-relational approach. In this reply, I address these criticisms and focus especially on the ecological responsibility of the eco-relational approach.},
keywords = {Eco-Relational Approach, Robot ethics},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In this reply, I respond to Joshua C. Gellers’ commentary on my article “Not Relational Enough? Towards an Eco-Relational Approach in Robot Ethics” (Puzio, 2024a), in which I present a deeply relational, “eco-relational approach”. This approach asserts that it is necessary to consider the relationality with non-human entities such as animals and technology on a deeper level than has been done in robot ethics so far. This disrupts traditional ethical concepts. In his commentary “Not Ecological Enough: A Commentary on an Eco-Relational Approach in Robot Ethics” (2024), Gellers raises criticisms of my method and the consequences of the eco-relational approach. In this reply, I address these criticisms and focus especially on the ecological responsibility of the eco-relational approach.
Hannes, Tom; Bombaerts, Gunter
Being Taken for a Ride: Social and Technological Externalist Complements to the Internalist Reading of Buddhist Chariot Similes Journal Article
In: Philosophy East & West, vol. 74, no. 3, pp. 379–398, 2024, ISSN: 1529-1898.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags:
@article{Hannes2024,
title = {Being Taken for a Ride: Social and Technological Externalist Complements to the Internalist Reading of Buddhist Chariot Similes},
author = {Tom Hannes and Gunter Bombaerts},
doi = {10.1353/pew.2024.a939596},
issn = {1529-1898},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-07-00},
urldate = {2024-07-00},
journal = {Philosophy East & West},
volume = {74},
number = {3},
pages = {379--398},
publisher = {Project MUSE},
abstract = {Slavoj Zizek’s criticism of Western Buddhism (2014) for being a late capitalist opiate of the people is partly unwarranted and partly of undeniable relevance. His implicit assumption is that Buddhism is an internalist path that only looks into the individual inner world, leaving harmful societal systems in peace. This article offers a response to Zizek’s analysis, by interpreting the chariot simile in the Buddhist Pali Canon. Even though Pali chariot similes indeed support an internalist perspective, some of them also allow for a reading that opens up to two “externalist” complements: the social outer world and the technological environment. In this way, while acknowledging Zizek’s criticism, we point at Buddhist philosophy’s inherent potential for developing a social-technological critical stance, for instance by linking it to mediation theory.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Slavoj Zizek’s criticism of Western Buddhism (2014) for being a late capitalist opiate of the people is partly unwarranted and partly of undeniable relevance. His implicit assumption is that Buddhism is an internalist path that only looks into the individual inner world, leaving harmful societal systems in peace. This article offers a response to Zizek’s analysis, by interpreting the chariot simile in the Buddhist Pali Canon. Even though Pali chariot similes indeed support an internalist perspective, some of them also allow for a reading that opens up to two “externalist” complements: the social outer world and the technological environment. In this way, while acknowledging Zizek’s criticism, we point at Buddhist philosophy’s inherent potential for developing a social-technological critical stance, for instance by linking it to mediation theory.
Hofbauer, Benjamin
2024.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Climate engineering, Engineering ethics, Geoengineering, Solar climate engineering, Solar geoengineering
@phdthesis{Hofbauer2024,
title = {Governing Prometheus: Ethical Reflections On Risk & Uncertainty In Solar Climate Engineering Research},
author = {Benjamin Hofbauer},
url = {https://doi.org/10.4233/uuid:77b63c4a-85f7-4734-83f5-dd355b737191
https://www.esdit.nl/dissertation_ben_hofbauer_governing_prometheus_final/},
doi = {10.4233/uuid:77b63c4a-85f7-4734-83f5-dd355b737191},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-06-19},
urldate = {2024-06-19},
abstract = {This thesis explores the ethical challenges that a potential research program for solar climate engineering via Stratospheric Aerosol Injection (SAI) could incur. These ethical challenges are comprised of epistemic hurdles in relation to the research process, as well as societal questions of justice and the value of nature. The thesis proposes a variety of tools and approaches to assess and possibly govern the risks and uncertainties invoked by the research of SAI and its societal implications. The methodological approach is based mainly on ethical and philosophical analysis and reflection and the main findings take the form of discursive argumentation and normative reflection.
SAI is a form of climate engineering that seeks to reduce global warming by increasing the planet’s reflection levels through the injection of reflective agents (aerosols) into the stratosphere. The mere potential of researching a technology that would actively intervene in the global climate is highly contentious and has led to passionate debates throughout the expert community. Designing a research process for such a polarizing technology such as SAI inevitably raises fundamental moral questions, wherein issues of global justice, democracy, the value of and humanity’s relationship with nature, and the societal impacts of technological innovation all intersect. Given these far-reaching consequences, the thesis operates under the assumption that SAI is a highly disruptive idea and technology, that has the potential to challenge and undermine existing societal values and institutions. Accordingly, this work presents a range of philosophical modes of inquiry and assessments, in order to supply any proposed SAI research governance program with the necessary ethical considerations and frameworks.
The thesis is structured along four major inflection points, which form the individual chapters tied together through differing but interrelated research questions. What follows is an overview of the research questions, along with a brief description of how those questions were answered…},
keywords = {Climate engineering, Engineering ethics, Geoengineering, Solar climate engineering, Solar geoengineering},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {phdthesis}
}
This thesis explores the ethical challenges that a potential research program for solar climate engineering via Stratospheric Aerosol Injection (SAI) could incur. These ethical challenges are comprised of epistemic hurdles in relation to the research process, as well as societal questions of justice and the value of nature. The thesis proposes a variety of tools and approaches to assess and possibly govern the risks and uncertainties invoked by the research of SAI and its societal implications. The methodological approach is based mainly on ethical and philosophical analysis and reflection and the main findings take the form of discursive argumentation and normative reflection.
SAI is a form of climate engineering that seeks to reduce global warming by increasing the planet’s reflection levels through the injection of reflective agents (aerosols) into the stratosphere. The mere potential of researching a technology that would actively intervene in the global climate is highly contentious and has led to passionate debates throughout the expert community. Designing a research process for such a polarizing technology such as SAI inevitably raises fundamental moral questions, wherein issues of global justice, democracy, the value of and humanity’s relationship with nature, and the societal impacts of technological innovation all intersect. Given these far-reaching consequences, the thesis operates under the assumption that SAI is a highly disruptive idea and technology, that has the potential to challenge and undermine existing societal values and institutions. Accordingly, this work presents a range of philosophical modes of inquiry and assessments, in order to supply any proposed SAI research governance program with the necessary ethical considerations and frameworks.
The thesis is structured along four major inflection points, which form the individual chapters tied together through differing but interrelated research questions. What follows is an overview of the research questions, along with a brief description of how those questions were answered…
SAI is a form of climate engineering that seeks to reduce global warming by increasing the planet’s reflection levels through the injection of reflective agents (aerosols) into the stratosphere. The mere potential of researching a technology that would actively intervene in the global climate is highly contentious and has led to passionate debates throughout the expert community. Designing a research process for such a polarizing technology such as SAI inevitably raises fundamental moral questions, wherein issues of global justice, democracy, the value of and humanity’s relationship with nature, and the societal impacts of technological innovation all intersect. Given these far-reaching consequences, the thesis operates under the assumption that SAI is a highly disruptive idea and technology, that has the potential to challenge and undermine existing societal values and institutions. Accordingly, this work presents a range of philosophical modes of inquiry and assessments, in order to supply any proposed SAI research governance program with the necessary ethical considerations and frameworks.
The thesis is structured along four major inflection points, which form the individual chapters tied together through differing but interrelated research questions. What follows is an overview of the research questions, along with a brief description of how those questions were answered…
Rueda, Jon; Segers, Seppe; Hopster, Jeroen; Kudlek, Karolina; Liedo, Belèn; Marchiori, Samuela; Danaher, John
Anticipatory gaps challenge the public governance of heritable human genome editing Journal Article
In: Journal of Medical Ethics, 2024.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Biotechnology, Human genome editing
@article{Rueda2024,
title = {Anticipatory gaps challenge the public governance of heritable human genome editing},
author = {Jon Rueda and Seppe Segers and Jeroen Hopster and Karolina Kudlek and Belèn Liedo and Samuela Marchiori and John Danaher},
url = {https://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2024/07/01/jme-2023-109801.citation-tools
https://www.esdit.nl/jme-2023-109801-full/},
doi = {10.1136/jme-2023-109801},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-06-14},
urldate = {2024-06-14},
journal = {Journal of Medical Ethics},
abstract = {Considering public moral attitudes is a hallmark of the anticipatory governance of emerging biotechnologies, such as heritable human genome editing. However, such anticipatory governance often overlooks that future morality is open to change and that future generations may perform different moral assessments on the very biotechnologies we are trying to govern in the present. In this article, we identify an ‘anticipatory gap’ that has not been sufficiently addressed in the discussion on the public governance of heritable genome editing, namely, uncertainty about the moral visions of future generations about the emerging applications that we are currently attempting to govern now. This paper motivates the relevance of this anticipatory gap, identifying the challenges it generates and offering various recommendations so that moral uncertainty does not lead to governance paralysis with regard to human germline genome editing.},
keywords = {Biotechnology, Human genome editing},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Considering public moral attitudes is a hallmark of the anticipatory governance of emerging biotechnologies, such as heritable human genome editing. However, such anticipatory governance often overlooks that future morality is open to change and that future generations may perform different moral assessments on the very biotechnologies we are trying to govern in the present. In this article, we identify an ‘anticipatory gap’ that has not been sufficiently addressed in the discussion on the public governance of heritable genome editing, namely, uncertainty about the moral visions of future generations about the emerging applications that we are currently attempting to govern now. This paper motivates the relevance of this anticipatory gap, identifying the challenges it generates and offering various recommendations so that moral uncertainty does not lead to governance paralysis with regard to human germline genome editing.
Turèl, Thijs; Geiser, Fabian; Hermann, Julia; Bednar, Kathrin; van de Poel, Ibo; IJsselsteijn, Wijnand; Dennis, Matthew; Pék, Job
Driving for Values; An explorative study on acceptance, acceptability and autonomy in the context of a navigation aid that promotes public values Technical Report
2024.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags:
@techreport{Turèl2024,
title = {Driving for Values; An explorative study on acceptance, acceptability and autonomy in the context of a navigation aid that promotes public values},
author = {Thijs Turèl and Fabian Geiser and Julia Hermann and Kathrin Bednar and Ibo van de Poel and Wijnand IJsselsteijn and Matthew Dennis and Job Pék},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/wp-content/uploads/Driving-for-Values-Report.pdf, download report},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-06-14},
urldate = {2024-06-14},
abstract = {This report outlines the findings of an investigation conducted by the Responsible Sensing Lab, philosophy of technology experts from the ESDiT consortium (Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies) and representatives from the Smart Mobility Program of the city of Amsterdam. The investigation
employs a research through design approach, merging prototyping activities, empirical studies, and philosophical reflection. It aims to explore the Driving for Values concept, focusing on car drivers’ experience of the value of autonomy and its relation to the notions of acceptability and acceptance.
The Driving for Values system is framed as a voluntary navigation aid providing car drivers with so called “social routes”, which supports the municipality in fostering a variety of public values such as livability and air quality, by managing the use of the public space. Autonomy is here conceptualized as involving two main components: i) the ability to freely choose among different options and ii) the availability of meaningful options, i.e options that enable the agent to decide and act on the basis of their own reasoned values and commitments.
Acceptance is conceptualized as the willingness to use the app. Acceptability refers to the system’s adherence to moral norms and principles. The goal of this investigation is to design and evaluate a variety of potential features of the Driving for Values system considering their impact on car drivers’ experience of autonomy and the effects on acceptance and acceptability of the system. Seven studies with a total of approximately 65 participants (including citizens of Amsterdam, designers and researchers) were conducted. In these studies, participants engaged with different versions of the Driving for Values system
and compared their features. The insights from these studies together with insights gathered from monthly workshops with experts from academia and municipality representatives are the basis of the recommendations presented below. These recommendations are intended to support the municipality of
Amsterdam in further researching and designing the Driving for Values and similar systems.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {techreport}
}
This report outlines the findings of an investigation conducted by the Responsible Sensing Lab, philosophy of technology experts from the ESDiT consortium (Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies) and representatives from the Smart Mobility Program of the city of Amsterdam. The investigation
employs a research through design approach, merging prototyping activities, empirical studies, and philosophical reflection. It aims to explore the Driving for Values concept, focusing on car drivers’ experience of the value of autonomy and its relation to the notions of acceptability and acceptance.
The Driving for Values system is framed as a voluntary navigation aid providing car drivers with so called “social routes”, which supports the municipality in fostering a variety of public values such as livability and air quality, by managing the use of the public space. Autonomy is here conceptualized as involving two main components: i) the ability to freely choose among different options and ii) the availability of meaningful options, i.e options that enable the agent to decide and act on the basis of their own reasoned values and commitments.
Acceptance is conceptualized as the willingness to use the app. Acceptability refers to the system’s adherence to moral norms and principles. The goal of this investigation is to design and evaluate a variety of potential features of the Driving for Values system considering their impact on car drivers’ experience of autonomy and the effects on acceptance and acceptability of the system. Seven studies with a total of approximately 65 participants (including citizens of Amsterdam, designers and researchers) were conducted. In these studies, participants engaged with different versions of the Driving for Values system
and compared their features. The insights from these studies together with insights gathered from monthly workshops with experts from academia and municipality representatives are the basis of the recommendations presented below. These recommendations are intended to support the municipality of
Amsterdam in further researching and designing the Driving for Values and similar systems.
employs a research through design approach, merging prototyping activities, empirical studies, and philosophical reflection. It aims to explore the Driving for Values concept, focusing on car drivers’ experience of the value of autonomy and its relation to the notions of acceptability and acceptance.
The Driving for Values system is framed as a voluntary navigation aid providing car drivers with so called “social routes”, which supports the municipality in fostering a variety of public values such as livability and air quality, by managing the use of the public space. Autonomy is here conceptualized as involving two main components: i) the ability to freely choose among different options and ii) the availability of meaningful options, i.e options that enable the agent to decide and act on the basis of their own reasoned values and commitments.
Acceptance is conceptualized as the willingness to use the app. Acceptability refers to the system’s adherence to moral norms and principles. The goal of this investigation is to design and evaluate a variety of potential features of the Driving for Values system considering their impact on car drivers’ experience of autonomy and the effects on acceptance and acceptability of the system. Seven studies with a total of approximately 65 participants (including citizens of Amsterdam, designers and researchers) were conducted. In these studies, participants engaged with different versions of the Driving for Values system
and compared their features. The insights from these studies together with insights gathered from monthly workshops with experts from academia and municipality representatives are the basis of the recommendations presented below. These recommendations are intended to support the municipality of
Amsterdam in further researching and designing the Driving for Values and similar systems.
Dennis, Matthew; Annemans, Daan
Reimagining Digital Well-Being Technical Report
2024.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Digital well-being, Well-being
@techreport{Dennis2024,
title = {Reimagining Digital Well-Being},
author = {Matthew Dennis and Daan Annemans},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/wp-content/uploads/Reimagining-Digital-Well-Being_REPORT.pdf, download report},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-06-03},
urldate = {2024-06-03},
abstract = {This report aims to offer insights into cutting-edge research on digital well-being. Many of these insights come from a 2-day academic-impact event, The Future of Digital Well-Being, hosted by a team of researchers working with the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) in February 2024.
Today, achieving and maintaining well-being in the face of online technologies is a multifaceted challenge that we believe requires using theoretical resources of different research disciplines. This report explores diverse perspectives on how digital well-being can be actively cultivated, while also emphasising the importance of considering individual differences, societal contexts, and nuanced cultural factors. We aim to offer a holistic view of the future of digital well-being, one that will inspire the next generation of designers of online tools, as well as policymakers who will regulate these tools.
We start by asking what digital well-being is – how we can best define a concept that is used by diverse stakeholders and researchers from many disciplines in various ways. To do this, we explore the classic ethical theories of well-being, showing how they can give us insights into how
the term digital well-being is currently deployed.
We then move to look at the existing strategies that have been proposed to actively cultivate digital well-being, exploring the business models that threaten digital well-being and the relative advantages of the digital and non-digital solutions that are currently proposed. On the one hand, digital tools – such as Apple’s Screen Time and app blockers such as Opal and Forest – integrate seamlessly with the digital lifestyles of users. They also create precise metrics for digital well-being, which facilitates their solutions to reduce screen time. On the other hand, non-digital solutions, including mindfulness practices, digital detoxes, and digital well-being coaching, offer a new set of tools to reconnect individuals to their natural rhythms and help to actively promote offline activities.
We then move to discuss diversity and how various groups of users have strikingly different digital well-being needs. Embracing neurodiversity in digital well-being is crucial as it strongly impacts the users’ experience of online technologies. When designing for diversity, organisations and designers alike need to prioritise customization for people with physical disabilities, mitigate harmful content for users with mental well-being conditions, address gender stereotypes and online harassment, and be designed in ways that recognize the very real risks of online technologies.
This report closes by examining cultural differences. We believe that non-Western conceptions of well-being offer rich sources for enhancing digital well-being insofar as these traditions can inform and inspire the designers of future online technologies. We focus on East-Asian and South-Asian traditions, although in further work we recognise it would be useful to investigate conceptions of well-being that are influential in the Gulf region, Africa, and South America. Each of these areas have ethical frameworks that discuss well-being in depth as well as a rich cultural heritage.
In conclusion, this report’s insights underscore the imperative of recognizing diversity in digital well-being, both in terms of cultural contexts and disciplinary perspectives. It emphasises the need for culturally responsive design methodologies and the integration of non-Western philosophical perspectives into current digital well-being research. Embracing this diversity, we believe, offers the best chance to create digital environments that prioritise well-being for users and the societies they live in across the world. Ultimately, we believe that it is not only about designing better online products; it’s about shaping a digital landscape that promotes well-being and flourishing for everyone.},
keywords = {Digital well-being, Well-being},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {techreport}
}
This report aims to offer insights into cutting-edge research on digital well-being. Many of these insights come from a 2-day academic-impact event, The Future of Digital Well-Being, hosted by a team of researchers working with the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) in February 2024.
Today, achieving and maintaining well-being in the face of online technologies is a multifaceted challenge that we believe requires using theoretical resources of different research disciplines. This report explores diverse perspectives on how digital well-being can be actively cultivated, while also emphasising the importance of considering individual differences, societal contexts, and nuanced cultural factors. We aim to offer a holistic view of the future of digital well-being, one that will inspire the next generation of designers of online tools, as well as policymakers who will regulate these tools.
We start by asking what digital well-being is – how we can best define a concept that is used by diverse stakeholders and researchers from many disciplines in various ways. To do this, we explore the classic ethical theories of well-being, showing how they can give us insights into how
the term digital well-being is currently deployed.
We then move to look at the existing strategies that have been proposed to actively cultivate digital well-being, exploring the business models that threaten digital well-being and the relative advantages of the digital and non-digital solutions that are currently proposed. On the one hand, digital tools – such as Apple’s Screen Time and app blockers such as Opal and Forest – integrate seamlessly with the digital lifestyles of users. They also create precise metrics for digital well-being, which facilitates their solutions to reduce screen time. On the other hand, non-digital solutions, including mindfulness practices, digital detoxes, and digital well-being coaching, offer a new set of tools to reconnect individuals to their natural rhythms and help to actively promote offline activities.
We then move to discuss diversity and how various groups of users have strikingly different digital well-being needs. Embracing neurodiversity in digital well-being is crucial as it strongly impacts the users’ experience of online technologies. When designing for diversity, organisations and designers alike need to prioritise customization for people with physical disabilities, mitigate harmful content for users with mental well-being conditions, address gender stereotypes and online harassment, and be designed in ways that recognize the very real risks of online technologies.
This report closes by examining cultural differences. We believe that non-Western conceptions of well-being offer rich sources for enhancing digital well-being insofar as these traditions can inform and inspire the designers of future online technologies. We focus on East-Asian and South-Asian traditions, although in further work we recognise it would be useful to investigate conceptions of well-being that are influential in the Gulf region, Africa, and South America. Each of these areas have ethical frameworks that discuss well-being in depth as well as a rich cultural heritage.
In conclusion, this report’s insights underscore the imperative of recognizing diversity in digital well-being, both in terms of cultural contexts and disciplinary perspectives. It emphasises the need for culturally responsive design methodologies and the integration of non-Western philosophical perspectives into current digital well-being research. Embracing this diversity, we believe, offers the best chance to create digital environments that prioritise well-being for users and the societies they live in across the world. Ultimately, we believe that it is not only about designing better online products; it’s about shaping a digital landscape that promotes well-being and flourishing for everyone.
Today, achieving and maintaining well-being in the face of online technologies is a multifaceted challenge that we believe requires using theoretical resources of different research disciplines. This report explores diverse perspectives on how digital well-being can be actively cultivated, while also emphasising the importance of considering individual differences, societal contexts, and nuanced cultural factors. We aim to offer a holistic view of the future of digital well-being, one that will inspire the next generation of designers of online tools, as well as policymakers who will regulate these tools.
We start by asking what digital well-being is – how we can best define a concept that is used by diverse stakeholders and researchers from many disciplines in various ways. To do this, we explore the classic ethical theories of well-being, showing how they can give us insights into how
the term digital well-being is currently deployed.
We then move to look at the existing strategies that have been proposed to actively cultivate digital well-being, exploring the business models that threaten digital well-being and the relative advantages of the digital and non-digital solutions that are currently proposed. On the one hand, digital tools – such as Apple’s Screen Time and app blockers such as Opal and Forest – integrate seamlessly with the digital lifestyles of users. They also create precise metrics for digital well-being, which facilitates their solutions to reduce screen time. On the other hand, non-digital solutions, including mindfulness practices, digital detoxes, and digital well-being coaching, offer a new set of tools to reconnect individuals to their natural rhythms and help to actively promote offline activities.
We then move to discuss diversity and how various groups of users have strikingly different digital well-being needs. Embracing neurodiversity in digital well-being is crucial as it strongly impacts the users’ experience of online technologies. When designing for diversity, organisations and designers alike need to prioritise customization for people with physical disabilities, mitigate harmful content for users with mental well-being conditions, address gender stereotypes and online harassment, and be designed in ways that recognize the very real risks of online technologies.
This report closes by examining cultural differences. We believe that non-Western conceptions of well-being offer rich sources for enhancing digital well-being insofar as these traditions can inform and inspire the designers of future online technologies. We focus on East-Asian and South-Asian traditions, although in further work we recognise it would be useful to investigate conceptions of well-being that are influential in the Gulf region, Africa, and South America. Each of these areas have ethical frameworks that discuss well-being in depth as well as a rich cultural heritage.
In conclusion, this report’s insights underscore the imperative of recognizing diversity in digital well-being, both in terms of cultural contexts and disciplinary perspectives. It emphasises the need for culturally responsive design methodologies and the integration of non-Western philosophical perspectives into current digital well-being research. Embracing this diversity, we believe, offers the best chance to create digital environments that prioritise well-being for users and the societies they live in across the world. Ultimately, we believe that it is not only about designing better online products; it’s about shaping a digital landscape that promotes well-being and flourishing for everyone.
Bollen, Caroline
Empathy 2.0: What it means to be empathetic in a diverse and digital world PhD Thesis
2024, ISBN: 978-94-6366-864-4.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Affective empathy, Cognitive empathy, Empathy
@phdthesis{Bollen2024,
title = {Empathy 2.0: What it means to be empathetic in a diverse and digital world},
author = {Caroline Bollen},
url = {https://doi.org/10.4233/uuid:5c1d9753-ab5b-4812-ab29-b66a6d0d772dhttps://www.esdit.nl/simon_stevin_thesis_caroline_bollen/},
doi = {10.4233/uuid:5c1d9753-ab5b-4812-ab29-b66a6d0d772d},
isbn = {978-94-6366-864-4},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-05-28},
urldate = {2024-05-28},
issue = {1574-941X},
abstract = {We have a general idea of what the term empathy refers to. We typically use the concept in a normative way - to express appreciation, concern, value, risks, etc, - with regard to how we relate to one another. However, the exact meaning of the concept is far from agreed upon. As such, it actually is unclear whether and how we can fairly use this concept for ethical reflection and guidance. But we do so anyway, and that is not without problems. One of these problems is that there is a strong link between how empathy is operationalised in research and the exclusion of autistic empathy. Furthermore, communication technologies (CTs) significantly shape our social lives and our ways of relating to one another, and it is unclear how to best understand empathy in light of this.
The aim of this dissertation is to expose present-day problems with how we understand empathy and provide a solution: an account of empathy as a normative concept to better serve the 21st century and its social and sociotechnical challenges. The research in this dissertation highlights a fundamental and humbling notion: my experience of the world is not the same as yours, but also not completely disconnected from it. Across differences, along similarities, we share a world with each other. I hope that this work on empathy 2.0 can help us understand and navigate that a bit better.},
keywords = {Affective empathy, Cognitive empathy, Empathy},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {phdthesis}
}
We have a general idea of what the term empathy refers to. We typically use the concept in a normative way - to express appreciation, concern, value, risks, etc, - with regard to how we relate to one another. However, the exact meaning of the concept is far from agreed upon. As such, it actually is unclear whether and how we can fairly use this concept for ethical reflection and guidance. But we do so anyway, and that is not without problems. One of these problems is that there is a strong link between how empathy is operationalised in research and the exclusion of autistic empathy. Furthermore, communication technologies (CTs) significantly shape our social lives and our ways of relating to one another, and it is unclear how to best understand empathy in light of this.
The aim of this dissertation is to expose present-day problems with how we understand empathy and provide a solution: an account of empathy as a normative concept to better serve the 21st century and its social and sociotechnical challenges. The research in this dissertation highlights a fundamental and humbling notion: my experience of the world is not the same as yours, but also not completely disconnected from it. Across differences, along similarities, we share a world with each other. I hope that this work on empathy 2.0 can help us understand and navigate that a bit better.
The aim of this dissertation is to expose present-day problems with how we understand empathy and provide a solution: an account of empathy as a normative concept to better serve the 21st century and its social and sociotechnical challenges. The research in this dissertation highlights a fundamental and humbling notion: my experience of the world is not the same as yours, but also not completely disconnected from it. Across differences, along similarities, we share a world with each other. I hope that this work on empathy 2.0 can help us understand and navigate that a bit better.
Ziliotti, Elena
Meritocratic Democracy; A Comparative Political Theory Book
Oxford University PressOxford, 2024, ISBN: 9780191998270.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags:
@book{Ziliotti2024b,
title = {Meritocratic Democracy; A Comparative Political Theory},
author = {Elena Ziliotti},
doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198896456.001.0001},
isbn = {9780191998270},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-05-28},
urldate = {2024-05-28},
publisher = {Oxford University PressOxford},
abstract = {This book offers a new theory of democracy that advances debates on democracy and political meritocracy by synthesizing the best of contemporary Western democratic theory and Confucian political theory. The general questions that this book poses, and attempts to answer, are: can findings in Western democratic theories be used to address the Confucian meritocrats’ concern for the ability of democracy to produce desirable outcomes? What is the relationship of political leaders with democracy? Can insights from Confucian political theory be used to reconceptualize how political parties in democratic societies ensure that their leaders use their power for common political goals? The answer to these questions is the theory of democracy defended in this book: meritocratic democracy. Meritocratic democracy comprises three main propositions: (a) Democratic rule is epistemically superior to meritocratic forms of government; (b) Contemporary democracies need public-spirited political leaders; (c) A system of partisan juries that preselect the candidates running for the party leadership can bring about public-spirited leadership. Meritocratic democracy opens a path for a global debate on democratic theory by exemplifying the inherent capacity of political theorization to transcend boundaries between various philosophical standpoints, and highlighting its potential for constructive reciprocal contestation.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {book}
}
This book offers a new theory of democracy that advances debates on democracy and political meritocracy by synthesizing the best of contemporary Western democratic theory and Confucian political theory. The general questions that this book poses, and attempts to answer, are: can findings in Western democratic theories be used to address the Confucian meritocrats’ concern for the ability of democracy to produce desirable outcomes? What is the relationship of political leaders with democracy? Can insights from Confucian political theory be used to reconceptualize how political parties in democratic societies ensure that their leaders use their power for common political goals? The answer to these questions is the theory of democracy defended in this book: meritocratic democracy. Meritocratic democracy comprises three main propositions: (a) Democratic rule is epistemically superior to meritocratic forms of government; (b) Contemporary democracies need public-spirited political leaders; (c) A system of partisan juries that preselect the candidates running for the party leadership can bring about public-spirited leadership. Meritocratic democracy opens a path for a global debate on democratic theory by exemplifying the inherent capacity of political theorization to transcend boundaries between various philosophical standpoints, and highlighting its potential for constructive reciprocal contestation.
Puzio, Anna
Towards an Eco-Relational Approach: Relational Approaches Must Be Applied in Ethics and Law Journal Article
In: Philosophy & Technology, vol. 37, iss. 2, pp. 67, 2024, ISSN: 2210-5441.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Relational ethics
@article{Puzio2024b,
title = {Towards an Eco-Relational Approach: Relational Approaches Must Be Applied in Ethics and Law},
author = {Anna Puzio},
url = {https://link.springer.com/epdf/10.1007/s13347-024-00753-9?sharing_token=myT770guIG5NPRTnru5p-ve4RwlQNchNByi7wbcMAY6zDiN9WeE-Kg6yFt6J6cLYDtfiC8X3lkou9Lw3p2TF_UuhEUb37xWDcxxO4PNy8vVKJNVYwrgHGSlkQ-zhyV_iyRqjZUXWiZKnpCXpKckGAn6tQW9QpzanX0pjEhkuwCY%3D},
doi = {13347-024-00753-9},
issn = {2210-5441},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-05-25},
urldate = {2024-05-25},
journal = {Philosophy & Technology},
volume = {37},
issue = {2},
pages = {67},
abstract = {Relational approaches are gaining more and more importance in philosophy of technology. This brings up the critical question of how they can be implemented in applied ethics, law, and practice. In “Extremely Relational Robots: Implications for Law and Ethics”, Nancy S. Jecker (2024) comments on my article “Not Relational Enough? Towards an Eco-Relational Approach in Robot Ethics” (Puzio, 2024), in which I present a deep relational, “eco-relational approach”. In this reply, I address two of Jecker’s criticisms: in section. 3, I deal with the connection of personhood and human identity with relationality, and in section. 4, I discuss the consequences of relational approaches for practical ethics and law. Unlike Jecker, I am strongly convinced that relational approaches can and should be implemented in applied ethics and law.},
keywords = {Relational ethics},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Relational approaches are gaining more and more importance in philosophy of technology. This brings up the critical question of how they can be implemented in applied ethics, law, and practice. In “Extremely Relational Robots: Implications for Law and Ethics”, Nancy S. Jecker (2024) comments on my article “Not Relational Enough? Towards an Eco-Relational Approach in Robot Ethics” (Puzio, 2024), in which I present a deep relational, “eco-relational approach”. In this reply, I address two of Jecker’s criticisms: in section. 3, I deal with the connection of personhood and human identity with relationality, and in section. 4, I discuss the consequences of relational approaches for practical ethics and law. Unlike Jecker, I am strongly convinced that relational approaches can and should be implemented in applied ethics and law.
van Grunsven, Janna; Marin, Lavinia; Gammon, Andrea; Franssen, Trijsje
4E cognition, moral imagination, and engineering ethics education: shaping affordances for diverse embodied perspectives Journal Article
In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2024, ISBN: 1572-8676.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Education, Ethical Education, Moral imagination
@article{vanGrunsven2024b,
title = {4E cognition, moral imagination, and engineering ethics education: shaping affordances for diverse embodied perspectives},
author = {Janna van Grunsven and Lavinia Marin and Andrea Gammon and Trijsje Franssen},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-09987-6https://www.esdit.nl/4e-cognition-moral-imagination-engineering-ethics-imagination/},
doi = {10.1007/s11097-024-09987-6},
isbn = {1572-8676},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-05-25},
urldate = {2024-05-25},
journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},
abstract = {While 4E approaches to cognition are increasingly introduced in educational contexts, little has been said about how 4E commitments can inform pedagogy aimed at fostering ethical competencies. Here, we evaluate a 4E-inspired ethics exercise that we developed at a technical university to enliven the moral imagination of engineering students. Our students participated in an interactive tinkering workshop, during which they materially redesigned a healthcare artifact. The aim of the workshop was twofold. Firstly, we wanted students to experience how material choices at the levels of design and functionality can enable morally significant reimaginings of the affordances commonly associated with existing artifacts. We term this type of reimagining world-directed moral imagination. Secondly, through the design process, we wanted students to robustly place themselves in the lived embodied perspectives of (potential) users of their selected artifacts. We term this person-directed moral imagination. While student testimonies about the exercise indicate that both their world-directed and person-directed moral imagination were enlivened, we note that the fostering of robust person-directed moral imagination proved challenging. Using 4E insights, we diagnose this challenge and ask how it might be overcome. To this end, we engage extensively with a recent 4E-informed critique of person-directed moral imagination, raised by Clavel Vázquez and Clavel-Vázquez (2023). They argue that person-directed moral imagination is profoundly limited, if not fundamentally misguided, particularly when exercised in contexts marked by emphatic embodied situated difference between the imaginer and the imagined. Building upon insights from both the 4E field and testimonies from critical disability studies, we argue that, while their critique is valuable, it ultimately goes too far. We conclude that a 4E approach can take on board recent 4E warnings regarding the limits of person-directed moral imagination while contributing positively to the development of moral imagination in engineering ethics education.},
keywords = {Education, Ethical Education, Moral imagination},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
While 4E approaches to cognition are increasingly introduced in educational contexts, little has been said about how 4E commitments can inform pedagogy aimed at fostering ethical competencies. Here, we evaluate a 4E-inspired ethics exercise that we developed at a technical university to enliven the moral imagination of engineering students. Our students participated in an interactive tinkering workshop, during which they materially redesigned a healthcare artifact. The aim of the workshop was twofold. Firstly, we wanted students to experience how material choices at the levels of design and functionality can enable morally significant reimaginings of the affordances commonly associated with existing artifacts. We term this type of reimagining world-directed moral imagination. Secondly, through the design process, we wanted students to robustly place themselves in the lived embodied perspectives of (potential) users of their selected artifacts. We term this person-directed moral imagination. While student testimonies about the exercise indicate that both their world-directed and person-directed moral imagination were enlivened, we note that the fostering of robust person-directed moral imagination proved challenging. Using 4E insights, we diagnose this challenge and ask how it might be overcome. To this end, we engage extensively with a recent 4E-informed critique of person-directed moral imagination, raised by Clavel Vázquez and Clavel-Vázquez (2023). They argue that person-directed moral imagination is profoundly limited, if not fundamentally misguided, particularly when exercised in contexts marked by emphatic embodied situated difference between the imaginer and the imagined. Building upon insights from both the 4E field and testimonies from critical disability studies, we argue that, while their critique is valuable, it ultimately goes too far. We conclude that a 4E approach can take on board recent 4E warnings regarding the limits of person-directed moral imagination while contributing positively to the development of moral imagination in engineering ethics education.
Hummel, Patrik
Algorithmic Fairness as an Inconsistent concept Journal Article Forthcoming
In: American Philosophical Quarterly, iss. 62, no. 1, Forthcoming, ISSN: 0003-0481.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Algorithms, Concepts, Fairness, Impossibility, Inconsistency
@article{Hummel2024,
title = {Algorithmic Fairness as an Inconsistent concept },
author = {Patrik Hummel},
url = {https://research.tue.nl/en/publications/algorithmic-fairness-as-an-inconsistent-concept},
doi = {https://research.tue.nl/en/publications/algorithmic-fairness-as-an-inconsistent-concept},
issn = {0003-0481},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-05-14},
urldate = {2024-05-14},
journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
number = {1},
issue = {62},
abstract = {In this article, I investigate whether algorithmic fairness is an inconsistent concept (the inconsistency thesis). Drawing on the work of Kevin Scharp, inconsistent concepts can apply and disapply at the same time (2.). It is shown that paradigmatic issues of algorithmic fairness fit this description (3.). Similarities and differences to received views (4.) and alternatives to the inconsistency thesis are considered (5.). Suggestions are articulated on how the inconsistency thesis might hold ground nevertheless, or at the very least denotes a distinctive option in argumentative space whose status and implications merit further evaluation.},
keywords = {Algorithms, Concepts, Fairness, Impossibility, Inconsistency},
pubstate = {forthcoming},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In this article, I investigate whether algorithmic fairness is an inconsistent concept (the inconsistency thesis). Drawing on the work of Kevin Scharp, inconsistent concepts can apply and disapply at the same time (2.). It is shown that paradigmatic issues of algorithmic fairness fit this description (3.). Similarities and differences to received views (4.) and alternatives to the inconsistency thesis are considered (5.). Suggestions are articulated on how the inconsistency thesis might hold ground nevertheless, or at the very least denotes a distinctive option in argumentative space whose status and implications merit further evaluation.
Claassen, Kristy
There is no "I" in Postphenomenology Journal Article
In: Human Studies, 2024, ISSN: 1572-851X.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Postphenomenological Subject, Postphenomenology, Social Subject
@article{Claassen2024,
title = {There is no "I" in Postphenomenology},
author = {Kristy Claassen},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/there-is-no-i-in-postphenomenology/},
doi = {10.1007/s10746-024-09727-4},
issn = {1572-851X},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-04-28},
urldate = {2024-04-28},
journal = {Human Studies},
abstract = {Human beings are embedded in diverse social, cultural and political groups through which we make sense of our technologically mediated lived experience. This article seeks to reaffirm the postphenomenological subject as a primarily social subject. Critics maintain that the current postphenomenological framework does not adequately address the social, cultural and political context in which human-technology relations take place. In recent years, various additions to postphenomenology have been suggested in order to address this contextual deficit. In this article, I argue that a return to the phenomenological roots of postphenomenology reveals underexamined analytical tools that allow for greater socio-cultural and political sensitivity. I take Don Ihde’s supposed macroperceptual and microperceptual divide as a point of departure in claiming that postphenomenology has too hastily turned away from the subject as primarily socially situated. I draw upon the phenomenological tradition, particularly the social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz, to develop a social postphenomenological approach. This approach is informed by the Schutzian notions of action, the stock of knowledge at hand and consociates. In the resulting account, the postphenomenological schema of I—Technology—World is reconstrued as We—Technology—World.},
keywords = {Postphenomenological Subject, Postphenomenology, Social Subject},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Human beings are embedded in diverse social, cultural and political groups through which we make sense of our technologically mediated lived experience. This article seeks to reaffirm the postphenomenological subject as a primarily social subject. Critics maintain that the current postphenomenological framework does not adequately address the social, cultural and political context in which human-technology relations take place. In recent years, various additions to postphenomenology have been suggested in order to address this contextual deficit. In this article, I argue that a return to the phenomenological roots of postphenomenology reveals underexamined analytical tools that allow for greater socio-cultural and political sensitivity. I take Don Ihde’s supposed macroperceptual and microperceptual divide as a point of departure in claiming that postphenomenology has too hastily turned away from the subject as primarily socially situated. I draw upon the phenomenological tradition, particularly the social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz, to develop a social postphenomenological approach. This approach is informed by the Schutzian notions of action, the stock of knowledge at hand and consociates. In the resulting account, the postphenomenological schema of I—Technology—World is reconstrued as We—Technology—World.
Braun, Matthias; Hummel, Patrik
Is digital sovereignty normatively desirable? Journal Article
In: Information, Communication & Society, pp. 1-14, 2024, ISSN: 1369-118X.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Digital Sovereignty, Normativity
@article{Braun2024b,
title = {Is digital sovereignty normatively desirable?},
author = {Matthias Braun and Patrik Hummel},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/is-digital-sovereignty-normatively-desirable/},
doi = {doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2024.2332624},
issn = {1369-118X},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-04-23},
urldate = {2024-04-23},
journal = {Information, Communication & Society},
pages = {1-14},
abstract = {Sovereignty is a frequently used term when it comes to analyzing and shaping digital processes and transformations. For example, digital sovereignty has become a central concept in European politics in recent years. In this article, we argue that references to digital sovereignty have largely operated with an implausibly one-dimensional, overly simplified notion of sovereignty in general and its application to the digital in particular. We explore the question of what talking about sovereignty in the context of data and digital spaces can comprise. As a basis for this exploration, we distinguish three aspects of the concept of sovereignty: (1) sovereignty as absolute power, (2) sovereignty as embodied power, and (3) sovereignty as institutional power. We argue that, at least in the European debate on digital sovereignty, two of these aspects pertaining to the intricate relation between sovereign and addressee(s) of claims to sovereignty are consistently overlooked. Once understood as encompassing the three aspects distinguished above, digital sovereignty could be part of a normative framework that is normatively oriented towards vulnerability and freedom, that remains open and sensitive to tensions and ambivalences, and that continuously takes these as starting points for new approaches to governance and regulation of digital practices.},
keywords = {Digital Sovereignty, Normativity},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Sovereignty is a frequently used term when it comes to analyzing and shaping digital processes and transformations. For example, digital sovereignty has become a central concept in European politics in recent years. In this article, we argue that references to digital sovereignty have largely operated with an implausibly one-dimensional, overly simplified notion of sovereignty in general and its application to the digital in particular. We explore the question of what talking about sovereignty in the context of data and digital spaces can comprise. As a basis for this exploration, we distinguish three aspects of the concept of sovereignty: (1) sovereignty as absolute power, (2) sovereignty as embodied power, and (3) sovereignty as institutional power. We argue that, at least in the European debate on digital sovereignty, two of these aspects pertaining to the intricate relation between sovereign and addressee(s) of claims to sovereignty are consistently overlooked. Once understood as encompassing the three aspects distinguished above, digital sovereignty could be part of a normative framework that is normatively oriented towards vulnerability and freedom, that remains open and sensitive to tensions and ambivalences, and that continuously takes these as starting points for new approaches to governance and regulation of digital practices.
Ziliotti, Elena
Breaking the Mold: Normative Hybridity as the Key to Contemporary “Non-Western” Political Theorizing Journal Article
In: American Political Science Review, pp. 1-14, 2024, ISSN: 0003-0554.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Confucian perspective, Confucian political meritocracy, Non-Western Political Theory, Normative Hybridity, Policy considerations, Political Theory
@article{Ziliotti2024,
title = {Breaking the Mold: Normative Hybridity as the Key to Contemporary “Non-Western” Political Theorizing},
author = {Elena Ziliotti},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/breaking-the-mold-normative-hybridity-as-the-key-to-contemporary-non-western-political-theorizing/},
doi = {10.1017/S0003055424000194},
issn = {0003-0554},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-04-15},
urldate = {2024-04-15},
journal = {American Political Science Review},
pages = {1-14},
abstract = {What normative compass can appropriately ground a theory for contemporary “non-Western” societies? This question has become urgent amid the pressure to decolonize political science and academia. The hybridity of numerous contemporary non-Western societies means that political theorists cannot refuse to engage with either Western-originated or premodern Indigenous concepts and ways of thinking that bear on the local public culture. However, these normative strands alone are unsuitable for grounding a contemporary theory. This methodological dilemma can be overcome if theorists adopt normative hybridity as a methodological stance. Normative hybridity suggests that hybridity is not only a feature of the theorist’s context of reference but should also be their modus operandi. Normative hybridity already underpins relevant works in contemporary Confucian political theory. Drawing from these works, I illustrate three methods to apply normative hybridity to theory building. This novel methodological approach uniquely addresses current political theory discussions and influences non-Western policymaking.},
keywords = {Confucian perspective, Confucian political meritocracy, Non-Western Political Theory, Normative Hybridity, Policy considerations, Political Theory},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
What normative compass can appropriately ground a theory for contemporary “non-Western” societies? This question has become urgent amid the pressure to decolonize political science and academia. The hybridity of numerous contemporary non-Western societies means that political theorists cannot refuse to engage with either Western-originated or premodern Indigenous concepts and ways of thinking that bear on the local public culture. However, these normative strands alone are unsuitable for grounding a contemporary theory. This methodological dilemma can be overcome if theorists adopt normative hybridity as a methodological stance. Normative hybridity suggests that hybridity is not only a feature of the theorist’s context of reference but should also be their modus operandi. Normative hybridity already underpins relevant works in contemporary Confucian political theory. Drawing from these works, I illustrate three methods to apply normative hybridity to theory building. This novel methodological approach uniquely addresses current political theory discussions and influences non-Western policymaking.
Marin, Lavinia; Vica, Constantin
Hic sunt leones. User orientation as a design principle for emerging institutions on social media platforms Journal Article
In: AI & SOCIETY, vol. n/a, iss. n/a, 2024, ISSN: 1435-5655.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Design, Normativity, Technology interaction, User engagement, User-centered design
@article{Marin2024,
title = {Hic sunt leones. User orientation as a design principle for emerging institutions on social media platforms},
author = {Lavinia Marin and Constantin Vica},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/hic-sunt-leones/},
doi = {10.1007/s00146-024-01932-0},
issn = {1435-5655},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-04-08},
urldate = {2024-04-08},
journal = {AI & SOCIETY},
volume = {n/a},
issue = {n/a},
abstract = {The phenomenon of missed interactions between online users is a specific issue occurring when users of different language games interact on social media platforms. We use the lens of institutional theory to analyze this phenomenon and argue that current online institutions will necessarily fail to regulate user interactions in a way that creates common meanings because online institutions are not set up to deal with the multiplicity of language games and forms of life co-existing in the online social space. We argue for the need to enable and foster grassroots online institutions that can stabilize the norms of interaction by redesigning algorithms and user interfaces. Such online grassroots institutions would facilitate user orientation at three distinct levels: informational, normative, and semantic-pragmatic. We propose user orientation as a principle that would facilitate the formation of institutions aiming to regulate information exchanges between users inhabiting various forms of life. This principle of user orientation should guide design decisions, while designer teams would need to become aware of the institutional power unleashed when they set up interfaces and algorithms for user-generated content.},
keywords = {Design, Normativity, Technology interaction, User engagement, User-centered design},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The phenomenon of missed interactions between online users is a specific issue occurring when users of different language games interact on social media platforms. We use the lens of institutional theory to analyze this phenomenon and argue that current online institutions will necessarily fail to regulate user interactions in a way that creates common meanings because online institutions are not set up to deal with the multiplicity of language games and forms of life co-existing in the online social space. We argue for the need to enable and foster grassroots online institutions that can stabilize the norms of interaction by redesigning algorithms and user interfaces. Such online grassroots institutions would facilitate user orientation at three distinct levels: informational, normative, and semantic-pragmatic. We propose user orientation as a principle that would facilitate the formation of institutions aiming to regulate information exchanges between users inhabiting various forms of life. This principle of user orientation should guide design decisions, while designer teams would need to become aware of the institutional power unleashed when they set up interfaces and algorithms for user-generated content.
Puzio, Anna
Not Relational Enough? Towards an Eco-Relational Approach in Robot Ethics Journal Article
In: Philosophy & Technology, vol. 37, iss. 2, pp. 45, 2024, ISBN: 2210-5441.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Ethical concepts, Non-human, properties, Relational ethics, Robot ethics, Social robots
@article{Puzio2024c,
title = {Not Relational Enough? Towards an Eco-Relational Approach in Robot Ethics},
author = {Anna Puzio},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/not-relational-enough-towards-an-eco-relational-approach-in-robot-ethics/},
doi = {10.1007/s13347-024-00730-2},
isbn = {2210-5441},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-03-20},
urldate = {2024-03-20},
journal = {Philosophy & Technology},
volume = {37},
issue = {2},
pages = {45},
keywords = {Ethical concepts, Non-human, properties, Relational ethics, Robot ethics, Social robots},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Copeland, Samantha; Marin, Lavinia
“It takes a village to write a really good paper”: A normative framework for peer reviewing in philosophy Journal Article
In: Metaphilosophy, vol. n/a, iss. n/a, 2024, ISSN: 0026-1068.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Academic Philosophy, Fairness, Flourishing, Normativity, Peer Review
@article{Copeland2024,
title = {“It takes a village to write a really good paper”: A normative framework for peer reviewing in philosophy},
author = {Samantha Copeland and Lavinia Marin},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/metaphilosophy-2024-copeland-it-takes-a-village-to-write-a-really-good-paper-a-normative-framework-for-peer/},
doi = {10.1111/meta.12670},
issn = {0026-1068},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-03-18},
urldate = {2024-03-18},
journal = {Metaphilosophy},
volume = {n/a},
issue = {n/a},
abstract = {That there is a "crisis of peer review" at the moment is not in dispute, but sufficient attention has not yet been paid to the normative potential that lies in current calls for reform. In contrast to approaches to "fixing" the problems in peer review, which tend to maintain the status quo in terms of professionalising opportunities, this paper addresses the needs of philosophers and how peer-review reform can be an opportunity to improve the academic discipline of philosophy, whereby progress is understood as making the discipline more fair to the global academic community and more conducive to the flourishing of academic philosophers. The paper evaluates recent categories of relevant norms and correlating reforms. In conclusion, it recommends that philosophy pursue the norms of transparency and democracy explicitly when proposing peer-review reform and suggest that proposals for forum-based models of peer review are most likely to support those norms.},
keywords = {Academic Philosophy, Fairness, Flourishing, Normativity, Peer Review},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
That there is a "crisis of peer review" at the moment is not in dispute, but sufficient attention has not yet been paid to the normative potential that lies in current calls for reform. In contrast to approaches to "fixing" the problems in peer review, which tend to maintain the status quo in terms of professionalising opportunities, this paper addresses the needs of philosophers and how peer-review reform can be an opportunity to improve the academic discipline of philosophy, whereby progress is understood as making the discipline more fair to the global academic community and more conducive to the flourishing of academic philosophers. The paper evaluates recent categories of relevant norms and correlating reforms. In conclusion, it recommends that philosophy pursue the norms of transparency and democracy explicitly when proposing peer-review reform and suggest that proposals for forum-based models of peer review are most likely to support those norms.
Henschke, Adam; Miller, Seumas; Alexandra, Andrew; Walsh, Patrick F.; Bradbury, Roger
The Ethics of National Security Intelligence Institutions Book
Routledge, 2024, ISBN: 9781003106449.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags:
@book{Henschke2024b,
title = {The Ethics of National Security Intelligence Institutions},
author = {Adam Henschke and Seumas Miller and Andrew Alexandra and Patrick F. Walsh and Roger Bradbury},
doi = {10.4324/9781003106449},
isbn = {9781003106449},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-03-08},
urldate = {2024-03-08},
publisher = {Routledge},
abstract = {This book explores the ethics of national security intelligence institutions operating in contemporary liberal democracies.
Intelligence collection by agencies such as the CIA, MI6, and Mossad involves practices that are apparently inconsistent with the principles of ordinary morality – practices such as lying, spying, manipulation, and covert action. However, in the defence of national security, such practices may not only be morally permissible, but may also under some circumstances be morally obligatory. One approach to the ethics of national security intelligence activity has been to draw from the just war tradition (so-called ‘just intelligence theory’). This book identifies significant limitations of this approach and offers a new, institutionally based, teleological normative framework. In doing so, it revises some familiar principles designed for application to kinetic wars, such as necessity and proportionality, and invokes some additional ones, such as reciprocity and trust. It goes on to explore the applications of this framework and a revised set of principles for national security intelligence institutions and practices in contemporary and emerging political and technological settings.
This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, ethics, security studies and International Relations},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {book}
}
This book explores the ethics of national security intelligence institutions operating in contemporary liberal democracies.
Intelligence collection by agencies such as the CIA, MI6, and Mossad involves practices that are apparently inconsistent with the principles of ordinary morality – practices such as lying, spying, manipulation, and covert action. However, in the defence of national security, such practices may not only be morally permissible, but may also under some circumstances be morally obligatory. One approach to the ethics of national security intelligence activity has been to draw from the just war tradition (so-called ‘just intelligence theory’). This book identifies significant limitations of this approach and offers a new, institutionally based, teleological normative framework. In doing so, it revises some familiar principles designed for application to kinetic wars, such as necessity and proportionality, and invokes some additional ones, such as reciprocity and trust. It goes on to explore the applications of this framework and a revised set of principles for national security intelligence institutions and practices in contemporary and emerging political and technological settings.
This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, ethics, security studies and International Relations
Intelligence collection by agencies such as the CIA, MI6, and Mossad involves practices that are apparently inconsistent with the principles of ordinary morality – practices such as lying, spying, manipulation, and covert action. However, in the defence of national security, such practices may not only be morally permissible, but may also under some circumstances be morally obligatory. One approach to the ethics of national security intelligence activity has been to draw from the just war tradition (so-called ‘just intelligence theory’). This book identifies significant limitations of this approach and offers a new, institutionally based, teleological normative framework. In doing so, it revises some familiar principles designed for application to kinetic wars, such as necessity and proportionality, and invokes some additional ones, such as reciprocity and trust. It goes on to explore the applications of this framework and a revised set of principles for national security intelligence institutions and practices in contemporary and emerging political and technological settings.
This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, ethics, security studies and International Relations
Jansen, Sammie; Kamphorst, Bart A.; Mulder, Bob; van Kamp, Irene; Boekhold, Sandra; van den hazel, Peter; Verweij, Marcel
Ethics of early detection of disease risk factors: A scoping review Journal Article
In: BMC Medical Ethics, vol. 25, 2024.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Early detection, Environmental health, Ethics, Prevention, Public health, Risk Factors, Scoping review, Screening
@article{Jansen2024,
title = {Ethics of early detection of disease risk factors: A scoping review},
author = {Sammie Jansen and Bart A. Kamphorst and Bob Mulder and Irene van Kamp and Sandra Boekhold and Peter van den hazel and Marcel Verweij},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/wp-content/uploads/s12910-024-01012-4.pdf},
doi = {10.1186/s12910-024-01012-4},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-03-05},
urldate = {2024-03-05},
journal = {BMC Medical Ethics},
volume = {25},
abstract = {Background: Scientific and technological advancements in mapping and understanding the interrelated pathways through which biological and environmental exposures affect disease development create new possibilities for detecting disease risk factors. Early detection of such risk factors may help prevent disease onset or moderate the disease course, thereby decreasing associated disease burden, morbidity, and mortality. However, the ethical implications of screening for disease risk factors are unclear and the current literature provides a fragmented and case-by-case picture.
Methods: To identify key ethical considerations arising from the early detection of disease risk factors, we performed a systematic scoping review. The Scopus, Embase, and Philosopher’s Index databases were searched for peer-reviewed, academic records, which were included if they were written in English or Dutch and concerned the ethics of (1) early detection of (2) disease risk factors for (3) disease caused by environmental factors or gene-environment interactions. All records were reviewed independently by at least two researchers.
Results: After screening 2034 titles and abstracts, and 112 full papers, 55 articles were included in the thematic synthesis of the results. We identified eight common ethical themes: (1) Reliability and uncertainty in early detection, (2) autonomy, (3) privacy, (4) beneficence and non-maleficence, (5) downstream burdens on others, (6) responsibility, (7) justice, and (8) medicalization and conceptual disruption. We identified several gaps in the literature, including a relative scarcity of research on ethical considerations associated with environmental preventive health interventions, a dearth of practical suggestions on how to address expressed concerns about overestimating health capacities, and a lack of insights into preventing undue attribution of health responsibility to individuals.
Conclusions: The ethical concerns arising with the early detection of risk factors are often interrelated and complex. Comprehensive ethical analyses are needed that are better embedded in normative frameworks and also assess and weigh the expected benefits of early risk factor detection. Such research is necessary for developing and implementing responsible and fair preventive health policies.},
keywords = {Early detection, Environmental health, Ethics, Prevention, Public health, Risk Factors, Scoping review, Screening},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Background: Scientific and technological advancements in mapping and understanding the interrelated pathways through which biological and environmental exposures affect disease development create new possibilities for detecting disease risk factors. Early detection of such risk factors may help prevent disease onset or moderate the disease course, thereby decreasing associated disease burden, morbidity, and mortality. However, the ethical implications of screening for disease risk factors are unclear and the current literature provides a fragmented and case-by-case picture.
Methods: To identify key ethical considerations arising from the early detection of disease risk factors, we performed a systematic scoping review. The Scopus, Embase, and Philosopher’s Index databases were searched for peer-reviewed, academic records, which were included if they were written in English or Dutch and concerned the ethics of (1) early detection of (2) disease risk factors for (3) disease caused by environmental factors or gene-environment interactions. All records were reviewed independently by at least two researchers.
Results: After screening 2034 titles and abstracts, and 112 full papers, 55 articles were included in the thematic synthesis of the results. We identified eight common ethical themes: (1) Reliability and uncertainty in early detection, (2) autonomy, (3) privacy, (4) beneficence and non-maleficence, (5) downstream burdens on others, (6) responsibility, (7) justice, and (8) medicalization and conceptual disruption. We identified several gaps in the literature, including a relative scarcity of research on ethical considerations associated with environmental preventive health interventions, a dearth of practical suggestions on how to address expressed concerns about overestimating health capacities, and a lack of insights into preventing undue attribution of health responsibility to individuals.
Conclusions: The ethical concerns arising with the early detection of risk factors are often interrelated and complex. Comprehensive ethical analyses are needed that are better embedded in normative frameworks and also assess and weigh the expected benefits of early risk factor detection. Such research is necessary for developing and implementing responsible and fair preventive health policies.
Methods: To identify key ethical considerations arising from the early detection of disease risk factors, we performed a systematic scoping review. The Scopus, Embase, and Philosopher’s Index databases were searched for peer-reviewed, academic records, which were included if they were written in English or Dutch and concerned the ethics of (1) early detection of (2) disease risk factors for (3) disease caused by environmental factors or gene-environment interactions. All records were reviewed independently by at least two researchers.
Results: After screening 2034 titles and abstracts, and 112 full papers, 55 articles were included in the thematic synthesis of the results. We identified eight common ethical themes: (1) Reliability and uncertainty in early detection, (2) autonomy, (3) privacy, (4) beneficence and non-maleficence, (5) downstream burdens on others, (6) responsibility, (7) justice, and (8) medicalization and conceptual disruption. We identified several gaps in the literature, including a relative scarcity of research on ethical considerations associated with environmental preventive health interventions, a dearth of practical suggestions on how to address expressed concerns about overestimating health capacities, and a lack of insights into preventing undue attribution of health responsibility to individuals.
Conclusions: The ethical concerns arising with the early detection of risk factors are often interrelated and complex. Comprehensive ethical analyses are needed that are better embedded in normative frameworks and also assess and weigh the expected benefits of early risk factor detection. Such research is necessary for developing and implementing responsible and fair preventive health policies.
Cristina, Voinea; Marin, Lavinia; Vica, Constantin
Digital Slot Machines: Social Media Platforms as Attentional Scaffolds Journal Article
In: Topoi, 2024, ISSN: 1572-8749.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Attention, Social media, Social media technologies
@article{Cristina2024,
title = {Digital Slot Machines: Social Media Platforms as Attentional Scaffolds},
author = {Voinea Cristina and Lavinia Marin and Constantin Vica},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/digital-slot-machines/},
doi = {10.1007/s11245-024-10031-0},
issn = {1572-8749},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-03-02},
urldate = {2024-03-02},
journal = {Topoi},
abstract = {In this paper we introduce the concept of attentional scaffolds and show the resemblance between social media platforms and slot machines, both functioning as hostile attentional scaffolds. The first section establishes the groundwork for the concept of attentional scaffolds and draws parallels to the mechanics of slot machines, to argue that social media platforms aim to capture users’ attention to maximize engagement through a system of intermittent rewards. The second section shifts focus to the interplay between emotions and attention, revealing how online attentional capture through emotionally triggering stimuli leads to distraction. The final section elucidates the collective implications of scaffolding attention through social media platforms. The examination of phenomena such as emotional contagion and the emergence of group emotions underscores the transition from individual experiences to shared collective outcomes. Employing online moral outrage as a case study, we illustrate how negative emotions serve as scaffolds for individuals’ attention, propagate within social groups, and give rise to collective attitudes.},
keywords = {Attention, Social media, Social media technologies},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In this paper we introduce the concept of attentional scaffolds and show the resemblance between social media platforms and slot machines, both functioning as hostile attentional scaffolds. The first section establishes the groundwork for the concept of attentional scaffolds and draws parallels to the mechanics of slot machines, to argue that social media platforms aim to capture users’ attention to maximize engagement through a system of intermittent rewards. The second section shifts focus to the interplay between emotions and attention, revealing how online attentional capture through emotionally triggering stimuli leads to distraction. The final section elucidates the collective implications of scaffolding attention through social media platforms. The examination of phenomena such as emotional contagion and the emergence of group emotions underscores the transition from individual experiences to shared collective outcomes. Employing online moral outrage as a case study, we illustrate how negative emotions serve as scaffolds for individuals’ attention, propagate within social groups, and give rise to collective attitudes.
Hopster, Jeroen
Socially disruptive technologies and epistemic injustice Journal Article
In: Ethics and Information Technology, vol. 26, iss. 1, pp. 14, 2024, ISSN: 1572-8439.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Conceptual gap, Conceptual misalignment, Conceptual overlap, Epistemic injustice, Hermeneutical marginalization, Socially disruptive technologies
@article{Hopster2024,
title = {Socially disruptive technologies and epistemic injustice},
author = {Jeroen Hopster},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/j-hopster_socially-disruptve-technologies-and-epistemic-injustice-2/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-024-09747-9},
issn = {1572-8439},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-02-27},
urldate = {2024-02-27},
journal = {Ethics and Information Technology},
volume = {26},
issue = {1},
pages = {14},
abstract = {Recent scholarship on technology-induced ‘conceptual disruption’ has spotlighted the notion of a conceptual gap. Conceptual gaps have also been discussed in scholarship on epistemic injustice, yet up until now these bodies of work have remained disconnected. This article shows that ‘gaps’ of interest to both bodies of literature are closely related, and argues that a joint examination of conceptual disruption and epistemic injustice is fruitful for both fields. I argue that hermeneutical marginalization—a skewed division of hermeneutical resources, which serves to diminish the experiences of marginalized folk—does not only transpire because of conceptual gaps, but also because of two other kinds of conceptual disruption: conceptual overlaps and conceptual misalignments. Hence, there are multiple kinds of conceptual disruption that can be usefully studied through the normative lens of epistemic injustice. Technology can play different roles vis-a-vis epistemic injustices, both as a causal trigger of conceptual disruption, but also as a mediator of hermeneutical resources. Its role is normatively significant, in particular because socially disruptive technologies can have different epistemic implications for different groups: they may amplify the epistemic resources of some groups, while diminishing those of others.},
keywords = {Conceptual gap, Conceptual misalignment, Conceptual overlap, Epistemic injustice, Hermeneutical marginalization, Socially disruptive technologies},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Recent scholarship on technology-induced ‘conceptual disruption’ has spotlighted the notion of a conceptual gap. Conceptual gaps have also been discussed in scholarship on epistemic injustice, yet up until now these bodies of work have remained disconnected. This article shows that ‘gaps’ of interest to both bodies of literature are closely related, and argues that a joint examination of conceptual disruption and epistemic injustice is fruitful for both fields. I argue that hermeneutical marginalization—a skewed division of hermeneutical resources, which serves to diminish the experiences of marginalized folk—does not only transpire because of conceptual gaps, but also because of two other kinds of conceptual disruption: conceptual overlaps and conceptual misalignments. Hence, there are multiple kinds of conceptual disruption that can be usefully studied through the normative lens of epistemic injustice. Technology can play different roles vis-a-vis epistemic injustices, both as a causal trigger of conceptual disruption, but also as a mediator of hermeneutical resources. Its role is normatively significant, in particular because socially disruptive technologies can have different epistemic implications for different groups: they may amplify the epistemic resources of some groups, while diminishing those of others.
Kamphorst, Bart; Anderson, Joel
E-coaching systems and social justice: ethical concerns about inequality, coercion, and stigmatization Journal Article
In: AI and Ethics, pp. 1-10, 2024.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Coercion, E-coaching systems, Ethics, Inequality, social justice, Stigmatisation
@article{Kamphorst2024,
title = {E-coaching systems and social justice: ethical concerns about inequality, coercion, and stigmatization},
author = {Bart Kamphorst and Joel Anderson},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/ecoaching_systems_and_social_justice_ethical_conc-wageningen_university_and_research_650099/},
doi = {10.1007/s43681-024-00424-7},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-02-19},
urldate = {2024-02-19},
journal = {AI and Ethics},
pages = {1-10},
abstract = {Poor self-regulation has been linked to various behaviors that contribute to pressing societal issues, including rising household debt, inefficient use of sustainable resources, and increasing healthcare demands. In light of this observation, the prospect of individuals receiving automated, tailored support by “e-coaching systems” to scaffold and improve their self-regulation is thought to hold promise for making society-wide progress in addressing such issues. Though there may be legitimate reasons for promoting the use of such systems, and individuals might welcome the support, our aim in the present article is to contribute to the ethics of e-coaching by showing how societal pressures towards the widespread adoption of automated e-coaching systems raise concerns in relation to three distinct aspects of social justice. We argue that societal inequalities may be introduced or exacerbated by (1) unequal access to the technologies, (2) unequally distributed restrictions to liberty and subjection to coercion, and (3) the potentially disparate impact of the use of e-coaching technologies on (self-)stigmatizing perceptions of competence. The article offers a research agenda for studying and addressing these concerns.},
keywords = {Coercion, E-coaching systems, Ethics, Inequality, social justice, Stigmatisation},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Poor self-regulation has been linked to various behaviors that contribute to pressing societal issues, including rising household debt, inefficient use of sustainable resources, and increasing healthcare demands. In light of this observation, the prospect of individuals receiving automated, tailored support by “e-coaching systems” to scaffold and improve their self-regulation is thought to hold promise for making society-wide progress in addressing such issues. Though there may be legitimate reasons for promoting the use of such systems, and individuals might welcome the support, our aim in the present article is to contribute to the ethics of e-coaching by showing how societal pressures towards the widespread adoption of automated e-coaching systems raise concerns in relation to three distinct aspects of social justice. We argue that societal inequalities may be introduced or exacerbated by (1) unequal access to the technologies, (2) unequally distributed restrictions to liberty and subjection to coercion, and (3) the potentially disparate impact of the use of e-coaching technologies on (self-)stigmatizing perceptions of competence. The article offers a research agenda for studying and addressing these concerns.
Bühr, Lorina
Picturing finitude: Photography of mountain glaciers as a multiple practice of dealing with environmental loss Journal Article
In: Environmental Values, 2024, ISSN: 0963-2719.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Climate change, Environmental sustainability, Media, Photography
@article{Bühr2024,
title = {Picturing finitude: Photography of mountain glaciers as a multiple practice of dealing with environmental loss},
author = {Lorina Bühr},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/09632719231221843},
doi = {10.1177/09632719231221843},
issn = {0963-2719},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-01-15},
urldate = {2024-01-15},
journal = {Environmental Values},
abstract = {In recent years, photographs and visualisations of glacier retreat have become emblematic images of climate change and its ecological consequences. This paper presents glacier photography as a subtype of environmental photography. I argue that photographs and photographic projects that focus on glacial retreat are best conceived not only as strategies for proving climate change or as visual rhetoric for social transformation, but also as a practice that potentially plays an integral role in dealing and coping with human-induced environmental loss. To this end, I draw on praxeological accounts in theory of photography and philosophy of art as well as some exemplary photographic projects to develop a framework to analyse glacier photography. With the help of this praxeological framework, multiple orientations in glacier photography are identified: epistemic, aesthetic, emotional and evocative, social, ethical, and political orientations. All these photographic orientations, I argue, point in their own way to the process and consequences of glacial disappearance and loss. The framework presented innovatively brings together scholarship on climate change visualisation, imagery and art, the theory of photography, and philosophical aesthetics.},
keywords = {Climate change, Environmental sustainability, Media, Photography},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In recent years, photographs and visualisations of glacier retreat have become emblematic images of climate change and its ecological consequences. This paper presents glacier photography as a subtype of environmental photography. I argue that photographs and photographic projects that focus on glacial retreat are best conceived not only as strategies for proving climate change or as visual rhetoric for social transformation, but also as a practice that potentially plays an integral role in dealing and coping with human-induced environmental loss. To this end, I draw on praxeological accounts in theory of photography and philosophy of art as well as some exemplary photographic projects to develop a framework to analyse glacier photography. With the help of this praxeological framework, multiple orientations in glacier photography are identified: epistemic, aesthetic, emotional and evocative, social, ethical, and political orientations. All these photographic orientations, I argue, point in their own way to the process and consequences of glacial disappearance and loss. The framework presented innovatively brings together scholarship on climate change visualisation, imagery and art, the theory of photography, and philosophical aesthetics.
Hummel, Patrik; Braun, Matthias; Bishoff, Serena; Samhammer, David; Sietz, Katharina; Fasching, Peter A.; Dabrock, Peter
Perspectives of patients and clinicians on big data and AI in health: a comparative empirical investigation Journal Article
In: AI & SOCIETY, 2024, ISSN: 1435-5655.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: AI, Big data, Digital health
@article{Hummel2024b,
title = {Perspectives of patients and clinicians on big data and AI in health: a comparative empirical investigation},
author = {Patrik Hummel and Matthias Braun and Serena Bishoff and David Samhammer and Katharina Sietz and Peter A. Fasching and Peter Dabrock},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/perspectives-of-patients-and-clinicians-on-big-data-and-ai-in-health/},
doi = {10.1007/s00146-023-01825-8},
issn = {1435-5655},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-01-07},
urldate = {2024-01-07},
journal = {AI & SOCIETY},
abstract = {Big data and AI applications now play a major role in many health contexts. Much research has already been conducted on ethical and social challenges associated with these technologies. Likewise, there are already some studies that investigate empirically which values and attitudes play a role in connection with their design and implementation. What is still in its infancy, however, is the comparative investigation of the perspectives of different stakeholders.},
keywords = {AI, Big data, Digital health},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Big data and AI applications now play a major role in many health contexts. Much research has already been conducted on ethical and social challenges associated with these technologies. Likewise, there are already some studies that investigate empirically which values and attitudes play a role in connection with their design and implementation. What is still in its infancy, however, is the comparative investigation of the perspectives of different stakeholders.
2023
Hopster, Jeroen; Gerola, Alessio; Hofbauer, Ben; Löhr, Guido; Rijssenbeek, Julia; Korenhof, Paulan
Who owns NATURE? Conceptual appropriation in discourses on climate and biotechnologies Journal Article
In: Environmental Values , 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Biomimicry, Cellular agricolture, Conceptual appropriation, Emerging technologies, Naturalness, Nature, Solar climate engineering
@article{Korenhof2023,
title = {Who owns NATURE? Conceptual appropriation in discourses on climate and biotechnologies},
author = {Jeroen Hopster and Alessio Gerola and Ben Hofbauer and Guido Löhr and Julia Rijssenbeek and Paulan Korenhof},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/hopster-et-al-2023-who-owns-nature-conceptual-appropriation-in-discourses-on-climate-and-biotechnologies/},
doi = {10.1177/09632719231196535},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-12-21},
urldate = {2023-12-21},
journal = {Environmental Values },
abstract = {Emerging technologies can have profound conceptual implications. Their emergence frequently calls for the articulation of new concepts, or for modifications and novel applications of concepts that are already entrenched in communication and thought. In this paper, we introduce the notion of “conceptual appropriation” to capture the dynamics between concepts and emerging technologies. By conceptual appropriation, we mean the novel application of a value-laden concept to lay a contestable claim on an underdetermined phenomenon. We illustrate the dynamics of conceptual appropriation by analyzing the concept NATURE and its uptake in three discourses of emerging technology: cellular agriculture, solar geo-engineering, and biomimicry. We argue that NATURE and its cognate NATURALNESS are strongly valanced concepts upon which different stakeholders lay a claim. In doing so, stakeholders advance distinct conceptions of nature, typically to suit their own interests. Our case-studies illustrate how in discourses on emerging technology, the application of value-concepts is entangled with ideological stakes and power dynamics.},
keywords = {Biomimicry, Cellular agricolture, Conceptual appropriation, Emerging technologies, Naturalness, Nature, Solar climate engineering},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Emerging technologies can have profound conceptual implications. Their emergence frequently calls for the articulation of new concepts, or for modifications and novel applications of concepts that are already entrenched in communication and thought. In this paper, we introduce the notion of “conceptual appropriation” to capture the dynamics between concepts and emerging technologies. By conceptual appropriation, we mean the novel application of a value-laden concept to lay a contestable claim on an underdetermined phenomenon. We illustrate the dynamics of conceptual appropriation by analyzing the concept NATURE and its uptake in three discourses of emerging technology: cellular agriculture, solar geo-engineering, and biomimicry. We argue that NATURE and its cognate NATURALNESS are strongly valanced concepts upon which different stakeholders lay a claim. In doing so, stakeholders advance distinct conceptions of nature, typically to suit their own interests. Our case-studies illustrate how in discourses on emerging technology, the application of value-concepts is entangled with ideological stakes and power dynamics.
Gerola, Alessio; Robaey, Zoë; Blok, Vincent
What Does it Mean to Mimic Nature? A Typology for Biomimetic Design Journal Article
In: Philosophy and Technology, vol. 36, no. 81, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Biomimicry, Cellular agricolture, Nature
@article{Gerola2023,
title = {What Does it Mean to Mimic Nature? A Typology for Biomimetic Design},
author = {Alessio Gerola and Zoë Robaey and Vincent Blok },
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/s13347-023-00665-0/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-023-00665-0},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-12-18},
urldate = {2023-12-18},
journal = {Philosophy and Technology},
volume = {36},
number = {81},
abstract = {This commentary considers the typology and conceptual and normative heuristic framework as proposed by the authors as a valuable contribution to the new field of biomimetics philosophy and to the growing demand for critical evaluation of technology and design (decisions) in terms of ecological sustainability. However, further steps are needed to develop a more comprehensive normative analysis and evaluation. To inspire these efforts, I outline some additional normative dimensions of what I propose to call the ‘eco-normative profiling’ of technologies and design.},
keywords = {Biomimicry, Cellular agricolture, Nature},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
This commentary considers the typology and conceptual and normative heuristic framework as proposed by the authors as a valuable contribution to the new field of biomimetics philosophy and to the growing demand for critical evaluation of technology and design (decisions) in terms of ecological sustainability. However, further steps are needed to develop a more comprehensive normative analysis and evaluation. To inspire these efforts, I outline some additional normative dimensions of what I propose to call the ‘eco-normative profiling’ of technologies and design.
Buhr, Lorina
The Eco-Normative Profiling of Technology and Design: a Commentary on ‘What Does it Mean to Mimic Nature? A Typology for Biomimetic Design’ Journal Article
In: Philosophy & Technology, vol. 36, iss. 4, pp. 81, 2023, ISSN: 2210-5441.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Biomimetic Design, Biomimicry, Eco-Normativity
@article{Buhr2023b,
title = {The Eco-Normative Profiling of Technology and Design: a Commentary on ‘What Does it Mean to Mimic Nature? A Typology for Biomimetic Design’},
author = {Lorina Buhr},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-023-00681-0},
doi = {10.1007/s13347-023-00681-0},
issn = {2210-5441},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-12-18},
urldate = {2023-12-18},
journal = {Philosophy & Technology},
volume = {36},
issue = {4},
pages = {81},
abstract = {This commentary considers the typology and conceptual and normative heuristic framework as proposed by the authors as a valuable contribution to the new field of philosophy of biomimetics and to the growing demand for critical evaluation of technology and design (decisions) in terms of ecological sustainability. However, further steps are needed to develop a more comprehensive normative analysis and evaluation. To inspire these efforts, I outline some additional normative dimensions of what I propose to call the ‘eco-normative profiling’ of technologies and design.},
keywords = {Biomimetic Design, Biomimicry, Eco-Normativity},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
This commentary considers the typology and conceptual and normative heuristic framework as proposed by the authors as a valuable contribution to the new field of philosophy of biomimetics and to the growing demand for critical evaluation of technology and design (decisions) in terms of ecological sustainability. However, further steps are needed to develop a more comprehensive normative analysis and evaluation. To inspire these efforts, I outline some additional normative dimensions of what I propose to call the ‘eco-normative profiling’ of technologies and design.
Lenzi, Dominic; Schübel, Hanna; Wallimann-Helmer, Ivo
Justice in benefitting from carbon removal Journal Article
In: Global Sustainability , vol. 6, pp. 1-8, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: adaptation and mitigation, policies, politics and governance
@article{Lenzi2023,
title = {Justice in benefitting from carbon removal},
author = {Dominic Lenzi and Hanna Schübel and Ivo Wallimann-Helmer},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/justice-in-benefitting-from-carbon-removal/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/sus.2023.22},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-12-12},
urldate = {2023-12-12},
journal = {Global Sustainability },
volume = {6},
pages = {1-8},
abstract = {Non-Technical Summary
Climate stabilization requires scaling-up technologies to capture and store carbon. Carbon removal could be very profitable, and some of the agents best placed to benefit are ‘carbon majors’, i.e. fossil fuel companies. We argue that in ordinary circumstances only agents without significant historical climate responsibilities would be entitled to the full benefits from carbon removal. Under non-ideal conditions, carbon majors might be entitled to benefit, provided that no other agent could remove similar quantities of carbon at similar costs. This burden of proof is only likely to be met in countries with poor governance capacities.
Technical Summary
Climate stabilization requires scaling up technologies to capture and store carbon. Some of the agents best placed to profit from carbon removal are ‘carbon majors’, especially fossil fuel companies. Yet incentivizing carbon majors to undertake carbon removal poses an ethical dilemma: carbon majors have made significant historical contributions to climate change and have significantly benefitted from such contributions without being made to compensate for resulting climate harm. This is why it seems unfair to reward them with additional economic benefits. However, carbon majors possess the technological skills and infrastructure to upscale carbon removal efficiently. We argue that in ordinary circumstances, only agents without significant climate responsibilities would be morally entitled to fully benefit from carbon removal. Yet under non-ideal conditions, it might be permissible to reward carbon majors if no other agent could remove as much carbon at similar costs and on similar timeframes. We believe this argument faces an imposing burden of proof that is only likely to be met in countries with poor governance capacities. In more favourable circumstances, including those of most OECD countries, rewarding carbon majors without having them pay for their historical climate responsibilities remains impermissible.},
keywords = {adaptation and mitigation, policies, politics and governance},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Non-Technical Summary
Climate stabilization requires scaling-up technologies to capture and store carbon. Carbon removal could be very profitable, and some of the agents best placed to benefit are ‘carbon majors’, i.e. fossil fuel companies. We argue that in ordinary circumstances only agents without significant historical climate responsibilities would be entitled to the full benefits from carbon removal. Under non-ideal conditions, carbon majors might be entitled to benefit, provided that no other agent could remove similar quantities of carbon at similar costs. This burden of proof is only likely to be met in countries with poor governance capacities.
Technical Summary
Climate stabilization requires scaling up technologies to capture and store carbon. Some of the agents best placed to profit from carbon removal are ‘carbon majors’, especially fossil fuel companies. Yet incentivizing carbon majors to undertake carbon removal poses an ethical dilemma: carbon majors have made significant historical contributions to climate change and have significantly benefitted from such contributions without being made to compensate for resulting climate harm. This is why it seems unfair to reward them with additional economic benefits. However, carbon majors possess the technological skills and infrastructure to upscale carbon removal efficiently. We argue that in ordinary circumstances, only agents without significant climate responsibilities would be morally entitled to fully benefit from carbon removal. Yet under non-ideal conditions, it might be permissible to reward carbon majors if no other agent could remove as much carbon at similar costs and on similar timeframes. We believe this argument faces an imposing burden of proof that is only likely to be met in countries with poor governance capacities. In more favourable circumstances, including those of most OECD countries, rewarding carbon majors without having them pay for their historical climate responsibilities remains impermissible.
Climate stabilization requires scaling-up technologies to capture and store carbon. Carbon removal could be very profitable, and some of the agents best placed to benefit are ‘carbon majors’, i.e. fossil fuel companies. We argue that in ordinary circumstances only agents without significant historical climate responsibilities would be entitled to the full benefits from carbon removal. Under non-ideal conditions, carbon majors might be entitled to benefit, provided that no other agent could remove similar quantities of carbon at similar costs. This burden of proof is only likely to be met in countries with poor governance capacities.
Technical Summary
Climate stabilization requires scaling up technologies to capture and store carbon. Some of the agents best placed to profit from carbon removal are ‘carbon majors’, especially fossil fuel companies. Yet incentivizing carbon majors to undertake carbon removal poses an ethical dilemma: carbon majors have made significant historical contributions to climate change and have significantly benefitted from such contributions without being made to compensate for resulting climate harm. This is why it seems unfair to reward them with additional economic benefits. However, carbon majors possess the technological skills and infrastructure to upscale carbon removal efficiently. We argue that in ordinary circumstances, only agents without significant climate responsibilities would be morally entitled to fully benefit from carbon removal. Yet under non-ideal conditions, it might be permissible to reward carbon majors if no other agent could remove as much carbon at similar costs and on similar timeframes. We believe this argument faces an imposing burden of proof that is only likely to be met in countries with poor governance capacities. In more favourable circumstances, including those of most OECD countries, rewarding carbon majors without having them pay for their historical climate responsibilities remains impermissible.
Puzio, Anna
Robot, let us pray! Can and should robots have religious functions? An ethical exploration of religious robots Journal Article
In: AI & Society, 2023, ISBN: 1435-5655.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Ethics, Existential, Relegious robots, Religion, Social robots, Spirituality
@article{Puzio2023,
title = {Robot, let us pray! Can and should robots have religious functions? An ethical exploration of religious robots},
author = {Anna Puzio},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/robot-let-us-pray/},
doi = {10.1007/s00146-023-01812-z},
isbn = {1435-5655},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-12-11},
urldate = {2023-12-11},
journal = {AI & Society},
abstract = {Considerable progress is being made in robotics, with robots being developed for many different areas of life: there are service robots, industrial robots, transport robots, medical robots, household robots, sex robots, exploration robots, military robots, and many more. As robot development advances, an intriguing question arises: should robots also encompass religious functions? Religious robots could be used in religious practices, education, discussions, and ceremonies within religious buildings. This article delves into two pivotal questions, combining perspectives from philosophy and religious studies: can and should robots have religious functions? Section 2 initiates the discourse by introducing and discussing the relationship between robots and religion. The core of the article (developed in Sects. 3 and 4) scrutinizes the fundamental questions: can robots possess religious functions, and should they? After an exhaustive discussion of the arguments, benefits, and potential objections regarding religious robots, Sect. 5 addresses the lingering ethical challenges that demand attention. Section 6 presents a discussion of the findings, outlines the limitations of this study, and ultimately responds to the dual research question. Based on the study’s results, brief criteria for the development and deployment of religious robots are proposed, serving as guidelines for future research. Section 7 concludes by offering insights into the future development of religious robots and potential avenues for further research.},
keywords = {Ethics, Existential, Relegious robots, Religion, Social robots, Spirituality},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Considerable progress is being made in robotics, with robots being developed for many different areas of life: there are service robots, industrial robots, transport robots, medical robots, household robots, sex robots, exploration robots, military robots, and many more. As robot development advances, an intriguing question arises: should robots also encompass religious functions? Religious robots could be used in religious practices, education, discussions, and ceremonies within religious buildings. This article delves into two pivotal questions, combining perspectives from philosophy and religious studies: can and should robots have religious functions? Section 2 initiates the discourse by introducing and discussing the relationship between robots and religion. The core of the article (developed in Sects. 3 and 4) scrutinizes the fundamental questions: can robots possess religious functions, and should they? After an exhaustive discussion of the arguments, benefits, and potential objections regarding religious robots, Sect. 5 addresses the lingering ethical challenges that demand attention. Section 6 presents a discussion of the findings, outlines the limitations of this study, and ultimately responds to the dual research question. Based on the study’s results, brief criteria for the development and deployment of religious robots are proposed, serving as guidelines for future research. Section 7 concludes by offering insights into the future development of religious robots and potential avenues for further research.
Hannes, Tom; Bombaerts, Gunter
What does it mean that all is aflame? Non-axial Buddhist inspiration for an Anthropocene ontology Journal Article
In: The Anthropocene Review, vol. 10, iss. 3, pp. 771-786, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Anthropocene, axial age, Buddhism, Charles Taylor, Clive Hamilton, eco-modernism, Ontology, post-humanism, Zen
@article{Hannes2023,
title = {What does it mean that all is aflame? Non-axial Buddhist inspiration for an Anthropocene ontology},
author = {Tom Hannes and Gunter Bombaerts},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/what-does-it-mean-that-all-is-aflame/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/205301962311539},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-12-01},
urldate = {2023-12-01},
journal = {The Anthropocene Review},
volume = {10},
issue = {3},
pages = {771-786},
abstract = {Bruno Latour’s “practical climatoscepticism” expresses our moral inhibition with respect to the climate crisis. In spite of Clive Hamilton’s claim that the Anthropocene condition requires us to be suspicious of all previous (i.e. Holocene) ontologies, we propose a threefold Anthropocene ontological structure inspired by non-axial Buddhist elements. In the ontological field, the overall domain in which meaning is searched for, the Buddhist relationalist view on existence can nurture post-humanist philosophies. For the ontological home, one’s specific position and responsibilities, the Buddhist concept “dharma-position” can feed into Hamilton’s “new anthropocentrism.” For the ontological path, the ideal qualities of our interactions, the Buddhist “brahmaviharas” can lend functional structure to the tensions between philosophies of radical acceptance and engaged action. We discuss how this threefold ontological structure provides partial answers to Latour’s “practical climatoscepticism” and Hamilton’s no-analogue world. We sketch avenues for investigation for various Anthropocene ontologies.},
keywords = {Anthropocene, axial age, Buddhism, Charles Taylor, Clive Hamilton, eco-modernism, Ontology, post-humanism, Zen},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Bruno Latour’s “practical climatoscepticism” expresses our moral inhibition with respect to the climate crisis. In spite of Clive Hamilton’s claim that the Anthropocene condition requires us to be suspicious of all previous (i.e. Holocene) ontologies, we propose a threefold Anthropocene ontological structure inspired by non-axial Buddhist elements. In the ontological field, the overall domain in which meaning is searched for, the Buddhist relationalist view on existence can nurture post-humanist philosophies. For the ontological home, one’s specific position and responsibilities, the Buddhist concept “dharma-position” can feed into Hamilton’s “new anthropocentrism.” For the ontological path, the ideal qualities of our interactions, the Buddhist “brahmaviharas” can lend functional structure to the tensions between philosophies of radical acceptance and engaged action. We discuss how this threefold ontological structure provides partial answers to Latour’s “practical climatoscepticism” and Hamilton’s no-analogue world. We sketch avenues for investigation for various Anthropocene ontologies.
Lundgren, Björn; Stefánsson, H. Orri
Can the Normic de minimis Expected Utility Theory save the de minimis Principle? Journal Article
In: Erkenntnis, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: minimis Expected Utility Theory
@article{Lundgren2023,
title = {Can the Normic de minimis Expected Utility Theory save the de minimis Principle?},
author = {Björn Lundgren and H. Orri Stefánsson },
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/can-the-normic-de-minimis-eut-save-the-minimis-principles/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00751-x},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-11-28},
urldate = {2023-11-28},
journal = {Erkenntnis},
abstract = {Recently, Martin Smith defended a view he called the “normic de minimis expected utility theory”. The basic idea is to integrate a ‘normic’ version of the de minimis principle into an expected utility-based decision theoretical framework. According to the de minimis principle some risks are so small (falling below a threshold) that they can be ignored. While this threshold standardly is defined in terms of some probability, the normic conception of de minimis defines this threshold in terms of abnormality. In this article, we present three independent arguments against the normic de minimis expected utility theory, focusing on its reliance on the de minimis principle.},
keywords = {minimis Expected Utility Theory},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Recently, Martin Smith defended a view he called the “normic de minimis expected utility theory”. The basic idea is to integrate a ‘normic’ version of the de minimis principle into an expected utility-based decision theoretical framework. According to the de minimis principle some risks are so small (falling below a threshold) that they can be ignored. While this threshold standardly is defined in terms of some probability, the normic conception of de minimis defines this threshold in terms of abnormality. In this article, we present three independent arguments against the normic de minimis expected utility theory, focusing on its reliance on the de minimis principle.
Kamphorst, Bart A.; Henschke, Adam
Public health measures and the rise of incidental surveillance: Considerations about private informational power and accountability Journal Article
In: Ethics and Information Technology, vol. 25, iss. 4, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Accountability, Justification, Pandamic response, Public health, Surveillance
@article{Kamphorst2023,
title = {Public health measures and the rise of incidental surveillance: Considerations about private informational power and accountability },
author = {Bart A. Kamphorst and Adam Henschke},
doi = {10.1007/s10676-023-09732-8},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-11-16},
urldate = {2023-11-16},
journal = {Ethics and Information Technology},
volume = {25},
issue = {4},
abstract = {The public health measures implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic have resulted in a substantially increased shared reliance on private infrastructure and digital services in areas such as healthcare, education, retail, and the workplace. This development has (i) granted a number of private actors significant (informational) power, and (ii) given rise to a range of digital surveillance practices incidental to the pandemic itself. In this paper, we reflect on these secondary consequences of the pandemic and observe that, even though collateral data disclosure and additional activity monitoring appears to have been generally socially accepted as inevitable consequences of the pandemic, part and parcel of a larger conglomeration of emergency compromises, these increased surveillance practices were not directly justified by appeals to solidarity and public health in the same way that the instigating public health measures were. Based on this observation, and given the increased reliance on private actors for maintaining the digital space, we argue that governments have a duty to (i) seek and ensure that there are justifications for collateral data disclosure and activity monitoring by private actors in the context of (future) public health emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic, and (ii) regulate and provide accountability mechanisms for and oversight over these private surveillance practices on par with governmental essential services that engage in surveillance activities.},
keywords = {Accountability, Justification, Pandamic response, Public health, Surveillance},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The public health measures implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic have resulted in a substantially increased shared reliance on private infrastructure and digital services in areas such as healthcare, education, retail, and the workplace. This development has (i) granted a number of private actors significant (informational) power, and (ii) given rise to a range of digital surveillance practices incidental to the pandemic itself. In this paper, we reflect on these secondary consequences of the pandemic and observe that, even though collateral data disclosure and additional activity monitoring appears to have been generally socially accepted as inevitable consequences of the pandemic, part and parcel of a larger conglomeration of emergency compromises, these increased surveillance practices were not directly justified by appeals to solidarity and public health in the same way that the instigating public health measures were. Based on this observation, and given the increased reliance on private actors for maintaining the digital space, we argue that governments have a duty to (i) seek and ensure that there are justifications for collateral data disclosure and activity monitoring by private actors in the context of (future) public health emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic, and (ii) regulate and provide accountability mechanisms for and oversight over these private surveillance practices on par with governmental essential services that engage in surveillance activities.
Bollen, Caroline
A reflective guide on the meaning of empathy in autism research Journal Article
In: Methods in Psychology, vol. 8, no. 100109, 2023.
Links | BibTeX | Tags: Affective empathy, Autism, Cognitive empathy, Double empathy problem, Empathy, Neurodiversity, Theory of mind
@article{Bollen2023,
title = {A reflective guide on the meaning of empathy in autism research},
author = {Caroline Bollen},
doi = {10.1016/j.metip.2022.100109},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-11-15},
urldate = {2023-11-15},
journal = {Methods in Psychology},
volume = {8},
number = {100109},
keywords = {Affective empathy, Autism, Cognitive empathy, Double empathy problem, Empathy, Neurodiversity, Theory of mind},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Henschke, Adam
In: Macnisch, Kevin; Henschke, Adam (Ed.): Chapter 9, pp. 150-166, Oxford University Press, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Emergency ethics, Exceptionalism, Surveillance norms
@inbook{Henschke2023,
title = {The Dynamics Of Public Health Emergencies: Public Health Ethics, Covid-19 And Surveillance As Justifiable But Abnormal},
author = {Adam Henschke},
editor = {Kevin Macnisch and Adam Henschke},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/oso-9780192864918-chapter-10/},
doi = {10.1093/oso/9780192864918.001.0001},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-11-02},
urldate = {2023-11-02},
pages = {150-166},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
chapter = {9},
abstract = {This chapter looks at the ethics of Covid-19 to argue that situations like public health emergencies rely on a dynamic ethics and, as such, consideration must be given on how to reverse social norms that arise during these emergencies. While a great deal of ethical discussion looks at the conditions about when an ‘emergency ethics’ becomes operational, much less has been said about the end period. While certain policies and practices might be justifiable in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, we need to ensure that such policies are reversed once the Covid-19 emergency has receded, and that the social norms around particular surveillance practices and policies return to pre-Covid-19 state. This chapter argues that Covid-19 pandemic surveillance policies and technologies show us that emergency surveillance ought to be considered as justifiable but abnormal, and suggests how to ensure that the surveillance justified by public health ethics remains abnormal.},
keywords = {Emergency ethics, Exceptionalism, Surveillance norms},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
This chapter looks at the ethics of Covid-19 to argue that situations like public health emergencies rely on a dynamic ethics and, as such, consideration must be given on how to reverse social norms that arise during these emergencies. While a great deal of ethical discussion looks at the conditions about when an ‘emergency ethics’ becomes operational, much less has been said about the end period. While certain policies and practices might be justifiable in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, we need to ensure that such policies are reversed once the Covid-19 emergency has receded, and that the social norms around particular surveillance practices and policies return to pre-Covid-19 state. This chapter argues that Covid-19 pandemic surveillance policies and technologies show us that emergency surveillance ought to be considered as justifiable but abnormal, and suggests how to ensure that the surveillance justified by public health ethics remains abnormal.
Macnisch, Kevin; Henschke, Adam (Ed.)
The Ethics of Surveillance in Times of Emergency Collection
Oxford University Press, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Applied ethics, Emergency ethics, Pandamics, Public health, Surveillance
@collection{Macnisch2023,
title = {The Ethics of Surveillance in Times of Emergency},
editor = {Kevin Macnisch and Adam Henschke},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/9780192688309_web/},
doi = {10.1093/oso/9780192864918.001.0001},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-11-02},
urldate = {2023-11-02},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
abstract = {The Covid-19 pandemic is arguably the first international emergency of the twenty-first century. In order to respond to this emergency, countries and governments around the world were forced to engage in a range of actions and policies that would not otherwise have been permitted. Looking in particular at the use of surveillance technologies, this book examines the challenge of ethics in emergencies. What can states do to keep their populations safe, what can citizens expect of their governments, and when are those government actions unjustified? By looking at the use of surveillance in times of emergency, this book explores ethical, philosophical, political, and social concepts, challenges them, and offers a set of views on where those concepts may evolve into the future. As a global population, we will be faced with emergencies, and it is possible that these will also be global in their impact. The ethics of surveillance in times of emergency is both of its time, and ongoing; we must learn our lessons from the last emergency, to be prepared for the next ones.},
keywords = {Applied ethics, Emergency ethics, Pandamics, Public health, Surveillance},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {collection}
}
The Covid-19 pandemic is arguably the first international emergency of the twenty-first century. In order to respond to this emergency, countries and governments around the world were forced to engage in a range of actions and policies that would not otherwise have been permitted. Looking in particular at the use of surveillance technologies, this book examines the challenge of ethics in emergencies. What can states do to keep their populations safe, what can citizens expect of their governments, and when are those government actions unjustified? By looking at the use of surveillance in times of emergency, this book explores ethical, philosophical, political, and social concepts, challenges them, and offers a set of views on where those concepts may evolve into the future. As a global population, we will be faced with emergencies, and it is possible that these will also be global in their impact. The ethics of surveillance in times of emergency is both of its time, and ongoing; we must learn our lessons from the last emergency, to be prepared for the next ones.
Aizenberg, Evgeni; Dennis, Matthew; van den Hoven, Jeroen
Examining the assumptions of AI hiring assessments and their impact on job seekers' autonomy over self-representation Journal Article
In: AI & Society, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: AI, Algorithm, Authonomy, Dignity, Hiring, Self-representation
@article{Aizenberg2023,
title = {Examining the assumptions of AI hiring assessments and their impact on job seekers' autonomy over self-representation},
author = {Evgeni Aizenberg and Matthew Dennis and Jeroen van den Hoven},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/examining-the-assumptions-of-ai/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-023-01783-1},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-10-21},
urldate = {2023-10-21},
journal = {AI & Society},
abstract = {In this paper, we examine the epistemological and ontological assumptions algorithmic hiring assessments make about job seekers’ attributes (e.g., competencies, skills, abilities) and the ethical implications of these assumptions. Given that both traditional psychometric hiring assessments and algorithmic assessments share a common set of underlying assumptions from the psychometric paradigm, we turn to literature that has examined the merits and limitations of these assumptions, gathering insights across multiple disciplines and several decades. Our exploration leads us to conclude that algorithmic hiring assessments are incompatible with attributes whose meanings are context-dependent and socially constructed. Such attributes call instead for assessment paradigms that offer space for negotiation of meanings between the job seeker and the employer. We argue that in addition to questioning the validity of algorithmic hiring assessments, this raises an often overlooked ethical impact on job seekers’ autonomy over self-representation: their ability to directly represent their identity, lived experiences, and aspirations. Infringement on this autonomy constitutes an infringement on job seekers’ dignity. We suggest beginning to address these issues through epistemological and ethical reflection regarding the choice of assessment paradigm, the means to implement it, and the ethical impacts of these choices. This entails a transdisciplinary effort that would involve job seekers, hiring managers, recruiters, and other professionals and researchers. Combined with a socio-technical design perspective, this may help generate new ideas regarding appropriate roles for human-to-human and human–technology interactions in the hiring process.},
keywords = {AI, Algorithm, Authonomy, Dignity, Hiring, Self-representation},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In this paper, we examine the epistemological and ontological assumptions algorithmic hiring assessments make about job seekers’ attributes (e.g., competencies, skills, abilities) and the ethical implications of these assumptions. Given that both traditional psychometric hiring assessments and algorithmic assessments share a common set of underlying assumptions from the psychometric paradigm, we turn to literature that has examined the merits and limitations of these assumptions, gathering insights across multiple disciplines and several decades. Our exploration leads us to conclude that algorithmic hiring assessments are incompatible with attributes whose meanings are context-dependent and socially constructed. Such attributes call instead for assessment paradigms that offer space for negotiation of meanings between the job seeker and the employer. We argue that in addition to questioning the validity of algorithmic hiring assessments, this raises an often overlooked ethical impact on job seekers’ autonomy over self-representation: their ability to directly represent their identity, lived experiences, and aspirations. Infringement on this autonomy constitutes an infringement on job seekers’ dignity. We suggest beginning to address these issues through epistemological and ethical reflection regarding the choice of assessment paradigm, the means to implement it, and the ethical impacts of these choices. This entails a transdisciplinary effort that would involve job seekers, hiring managers, recruiters, and other professionals and researchers. Combined with a socio-technical design perspective, this may help generate new ideas regarding appropriate roles for human-to-human and human–technology interactions in the hiring process.
Sullivan, Emily
Do Machine Learning Models Represents Their Targets? Journal Article
In: Philosophy of Sciences, pp. 1-11, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Epistemology, Machine learning
@article{Sullivan2023,
title = {Do Machine Learning Models Represents Their Targets?},
author = {Emily Sullivan},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/do-machine-learning-models-represent-their-targets/},
doi = {0.1017/psa.2023.151},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-10-20},
urldate = {2023-10-20},
journal = {Philosophy of Sciences},
pages = {1-11},
abstract = {I argue that machine learning (ML) models used in science function as highly idealized toy models. If we treat ML models as a type of highly idealized toy model, then we can deploy standard representational and epistemic strategies from the toy model literature to explain why ML models can still provide epistemic success despite their lack of similarity to their targets.},
keywords = {Epistemology, Machine learning},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
I argue that machine learning (ML) models used in science function as highly idealized toy models. If we treat ML models as a type of highly idealized toy model, then we can deploy standard representational and epistemic strategies from the toy model literature to explain why ML models can still provide epistemic success despite their lack of similarity to their targets.
Hopster, Jeroen; Löhr, Guido
Conceptual Engineering and Philosophy of Technology: Amelioration or Adaptation? Journal Article
In: Philosophy & Technology , vol. 36, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Amelioration, Conceptual adaptation, Conceptual engineering, Disruption, Misalignment, Preservation, Social disruptive technologies
@article{Hopster2023,
title = {Conceptual Engineering and Philosophy of Technology: Amelioration or Adaptation?},
author = {Jeroen Hopster and Guido Löhr},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/conceptual-engineering-and-philosophy-of-technology/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-023-00670-3 },
year = {2023},
date = {2023-10-18},
urldate = {2023-10-18},
journal = { Philosophy & Technology },
volume = {36},
abstract = {Conceptual Engineering (CE) is thought to be generally aimed at ameliorating deficient concepts. In this paper, we challenge this assumption: we argue that CE is frequently undertaken with the orthogonal aim of conceptual adaptation. We develop this thesis with reference to the interplay between technology and concepts. Emerging technologies can exert significant pressure on conceptual systems and spark ‘conceptual disruption’. For example, advances in Artificial Intelligence raise the question of whether AIs are agents or mere objects, which can be construed as a CE question regarding the concepts AGENT and OBJECT. We distinguish between three types of conceptual disruption (conceptual gaps, conceptual overlaps, and conceptual misalignments) and argue that when CE occurs to address these disruptions, its primary aim is not to improve concepts, but to retain their functional quality, or to prevent them from degrading. This is the characteristic aim of CE when undertaken in philosophy of technology: to preserve the functional role of a concept or conceptual scheme, rather than improving how a concept fulfills its respective function.},
keywords = {Amelioration, Conceptual adaptation, Conceptual engineering, Disruption, Misalignment, Preservation, Social disruptive technologies},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Conceptual Engineering (CE) is thought to be generally aimed at ameliorating deficient concepts. In this paper, we challenge this assumption: we argue that CE is frequently undertaken with the orthogonal aim of conceptual adaptation. We develop this thesis with reference to the interplay between technology and concepts. Emerging technologies can exert significant pressure on conceptual systems and spark ‘conceptual disruption’. For example, advances in Artificial Intelligence raise the question of whether AIs are agents or mere objects, which can be construed as a CE question regarding the concepts AGENT and OBJECT. We distinguish between three types of conceptual disruption (conceptual gaps, conceptual overlaps, and conceptual misalignments) and argue that when CE occurs to address these disruptions, its primary aim is not to improve concepts, but to retain their functional quality, or to prevent them from degrading. This is the characteristic aim of CE when undertaken in philosophy of technology: to preserve the functional role of a concept or conceptual scheme, rather than improving how a concept fulfills its respective function.
Klenk, Michael; van de Poel, Ibo
Not a Good Fix: Constitutivism on Value Change and Disagreement Journal Article
In: Erkenntnis, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Constitutivism, Metaethics, Value change, Value disagreement
@article{Klenk2023,
title = {Not a Good Fix: Constitutivism on Value Change and Disagreement},
author = {Michael Klenk and Ibo van de Poel},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/not-a-good-fix/},
doi = {10.1007/s10670-023-00742-y},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-10-13},
urldate = {2023-10-13},
journal = {Erkenntnis},
abstract = {We examine whether Thomsonian constitutivism, a metaethical view that analyses value in terms of ‘goodness-fixing kinds,’ i.e. kinds that themselves set the standards for being a good instance of the respective kind, offers a satisfactory explanation of value change and disagreement. While value disagreement has long been considered an important explanandum, we introduce value change as a closely related but distinct phenomenon of metaethical interest. We argue that constitutivism fails to explain both phenomena because of its commitment to goodness-fixing kinds. Constitutivism explains away disagreement and at best explains the emergence of new values, not genuine change. Therefore, Thomsonian constitutivism is not a good fix for realist problems with explaining value disagreement, and value change.},
keywords = {Constitutivism, Metaethics, Value change, Value disagreement},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
We examine whether Thomsonian constitutivism, a metaethical view that analyses value in terms of ‘goodness-fixing kinds,’ i.e. kinds that themselves set the standards for being a good instance of the respective kind, offers a satisfactory explanation of value change and disagreement. While value disagreement has long been considered an important explanandum, we introduce value change as a closely related but distinct phenomenon of metaethical interest. We argue that constitutivism fails to explain both phenomena because of its commitment to goodness-fixing kinds. Constitutivism explains away disagreement and at best explains the emergence of new values, not genuine change. Therefore, Thomsonian constitutivism is not a good fix for realist problems with explaining value disagreement, and value change.
Lundgren, Björn
Is Lack of Literature Engagement a Reason for Rejecting a Paper in Philosophy? Journal Article
In: Res Publica, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Citation, Editorial policy, Literature engagement, Publishing, Referencing, Reviewing
@article{Lundgren2023b,
title = {Is Lack of Literature Engagement a Reason for Rejecting a Paper in Philosophy?},
author = {Björn Lundgren},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/is-lack-of-literature-engagement-a-reason-for-rejecting-a-paper-in-philosophy/},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-023-09632-0},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-10-10},
urldate = {2023-10-10},
journal = {Res Publica},
abstract = {Although philosophy cites less than most other academic subjects, many scholars still take a lack of reference to and engagement with the relevant literature as a reason to reject a paper in philosophy. Here I argue against that idea. Literature requests should only in rare circumstances be an absolute requirement, and a lack of (engagement with) references is not a good reason to reject a paper. Lastly, I briefly discuss whether an author has reasons to provide references, and I argue that although there are special circumstances in which we ought to avoid referencing papers, there are strong reasons in favor of engaging with the literature. Hence there is an asymmetry between what the author has a reason to do in writing a paper and how reviewers and editors ought to evaluate it.},
keywords = {Citation, Editorial policy, Literature engagement, Publishing, Referencing, Reviewing},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Although philosophy cites less than most other academic subjects, many scholars still take a lack of reference to and engagement with the relevant literature as a reason to reject a paper in philosophy. Here I argue against that idea. Literature requests should only in rare circumstances be an absolute requirement, and a lack of (engagement with) references is not a good reason to reject a paper. Lastly, I briefly discuss whether an author has reasons to provide references, and I argue that although there are special circumstances in which we ought to avoid referencing papers, there are strong reasons in favor of engaging with the literature. Hence there is an asymmetry between what the author has a reason to do in writing a paper and how reviewers and editors ought to evaluate it.
Nickel, Philip; Loosman, Iris; Frank, Lily; Vinnikova, Anna
Justice and Empowerment Through Digital Health: Ethical Challenges and Opportunities Journal Article
In: Digital Society, vol. 2, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Access to care, Conceptual engineering, Digital health, Equity, Ethics of Technology, Health literacy, Health empowerment, Justice, Responsibilization
@article{Nickel2023b,
title = {Justice and Empowerment Through Digital Health: Ethical Challenges and Opportunities},
author = {Philip Nickel and Iris Loosman and Lily Frank and Anna Vinnikova },
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/s44206-023-00075-x/},
doi = {10.1007/s44206-023-00075-x },
year = {2023},
date = {2023-10-10},
urldate = {2023-10-10},
journal = {Digital Society},
volume = {2},
abstract = {The proposition that digital innovations can put people in charge of their health has been accompanied by prolific talk of empowerment. In this paper we consider ethical challenges and opportunities of trying to achieve justice and empowerment using digital health initiatives. The language of empowerment can misleadingly suggest that by using technology, people can control their health and take responsibility for health outcomes to a greater degree than is realistic or fair. Also, digital health empowerment often primarily reaches people who already have high technological and health literacy, leaving others behind. We critically investigate whether the concept of health empowerment could be re-engineered to mean something different, namely the process of improving the health literacy and access of those who least possess it, in line with recent proposals for conceptual engineering in the service of justice. We settle on the weaker conclusion that underlying ethical values including justice should be used to interpret the existing concept of empowerment. To conclude, we take a high-level view of various strategies for achieving the ethical value associated with digital health empowerment.},
keywords = {Access to care, Conceptual engineering, Digital health, Equity, Ethics of Technology, Health literacy, Health empowerment, Justice, Responsibilization},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The proposition that digital innovations can put people in charge of their health has been accompanied by prolific talk of empowerment. In this paper we consider ethical challenges and opportunities of trying to achieve justice and empowerment using digital health initiatives. The language of empowerment can misleadingly suggest that by using technology, people can control their health and take responsibility for health outcomes to a greater degree than is realistic or fair. Also, digital health empowerment often primarily reaches people who already have high technological and health literacy, leaving others behind. We critically investigate whether the concept of health empowerment could be re-engineered to mean something different, namely the process of improving the health literacy and access of those who least possess it, in line with recent proposals for conceptual engineering in the service of justice. We settle on the weaker conclusion that underlying ethical values including justice should be used to interpret the existing concept of empowerment. To conclude, we take a high-level view of various strategies for achieving the ethical value associated with digital health empowerment.
van der Weij, Freek; Steinert, Steffen; van Poel, Ibo; Alleblas, Joost; Melnyk, Anna; de Wildt, Tristan; Abbink, David; Almeida, Denise
Value Change and Technological Design Journal Article
In: IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 25-32, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Moral values, Value change, value-sensitive design
@article{vanderWeij2023,
title = {Value Change and Technological Design},
author = {Freek van der Weij and Steffen Steinert and Ibo van Poel and Joost Alleblas and Anna Melnyk and Tristan de Wildt and David Abbink and Denise Almeida},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/value_change_and_technological_design/},
doi = {10.1109/MTS.2023.3302406},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-09-22},
urldate = {2023-09-22},
journal = {IEEE Technology and Society Magazine},
volume = {42},
number = {3},
pages = {25-32},
abstract = {Technology helps to solve problems, but it may also lead to unintended consequences. For example, biofuels may help to overcome the disadvantages of fossil fuels, but their production might compete with food production leading to higher food prices and hunger. Therefore, in recent decades, the societal impact of technology has come to the center of attention. To deal with potential ethical issues related to technology, many scholars have emphasized the importance of addressing values already during the design phase of new technology. Values are understood as beliefs about what is good or desirable, like human autonomy, safety, sustainability, or privacy. Researchers in ethics and philosophy of technology have developed a variety of approaches, like value-sensitive design (VSD) and responsible research and innovation, to help engineers embed values in technological design (e.g., [32] ).},
keywords = {Moral values, Value change, value-sensitive design},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Technology helps to solve problems, but it may also lead to unintended consequences. For example, biofuels may help to overcome the disadvantages of fossil fuels, but their production might compete with food production leading to higher food prices and hunger. Therefore, in recent decades, the societal impact of technology has come to the center of attention. To deal with potential ethical issues related to technology, many scholars have emphasized the importance of addressing values already during the design phase of new technology. Values are understood as beliefs about what is good or desirable, like human autonomy, safety, sustainability, or privacy. Researchers in ethics and philosophy of technology have developed a variety of approaches, like value-sensitive design (VSD) and responsible research and innovation, to help engineers embed values in technological design (e.g., [32] ).
van de Poel, Ibo; Sand, Martin
Responsibility beyond Control Book Section
In: Placani, Adriana; Broadhead, Stearns (Ed.): pp. 31-50, Routledge, 2023.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: increase control, Moral agency, reciprocal relation
@incollection{vandePoel2023c,
title = {Responsibility beyond Control},
author = {Ibo van de Poel and Martin Sand},
editor = {Adriana Placani and Stearns Broadhead},
url = {https://www.esdit.nl/responsibility-beyond-control/},
doi = {10.4324/9781003276029-3},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-09-15},
urldate = {2023-09-15},
pages = {31-50},
publisher = {Routledge},
chapter = {302},
abstract = {Traditionally, control is seen as a precondition for responsibility. We are not, and cannot reasonably be held, responsible for things that are beyond our control. This seems to explain, for example, why we are not responsible for natural hazards or so-called acts of God. At the same time, it seems to explain why, as nature is increasingly under human control in the technological age, we acquire new responsibilities as our span of control increases. Against this traditional view, this chapter explores whether there can also be cases in which responsibility precedes control. More specifically, the chapter suggests that we can take or assume responsibility for things that are still beyond our control, and that with the motivation to assume forward-looking responsibility usually comes the impetus to increase control, otherwise the set responsibilities cannot be fulfilled. The chapter discusses under which conditions it may be reasonable to take responsibility for certain risks beyond our control, and whether it may sometimes be morally required to take responsibility for risks beyond our control. Instead of seeing control as necessarily preceding responsibility, the resulting picture is one in which responsibility and control have a reciprocal relation. This chapter illuminates that this reciprocal relation might best be understood via the underlying notion of moral agency.},
keywords = {increase control, Moral agency, reciprocal relation},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {incollection}
}
Traditionally, control is seen as a precondition for responsibility. We are not, and cannot reasonably be held, responsible for things that are beyond our control. This seems to explain, for example, why we are not responsible for natural hazards or so-called acts of God. At the same time, it seems to explain why, as nature is increasingly under human control in the technological age, we acquire new responsibilities as our span of control increases. Against this traditional view, this chapter explores whether there can also be cases in which responsibility precedes control. More specifically, the chapter suggests that we can take or assume responsibility for things that are still beyond our control, and that with the motivation to assume forward-looking responsibility usually comes the impetus to increase control, otherwise the set responsibilities cannot be fulfilled. The chapter discusses under which conditions it may be reasonable to take responsibility for certain risks beyond our control, and whether it may sometimes be morally required to take responsibility for risks beyond our control. Instead of seeing control as necessarily preceding responsibility, the resulting picture is one in which responsibility and control have a reciprocal relation. This chapter illuminates that this reciprocal relation might best be understood via the underlying notion of moral agency.