Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies

@article{nokey,

title = {Rethinking Climate Justice: Toward Ecological Limitarianism},

author = {Michel Bourban},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/wp-content/uploads/Rethinking-Climate-Justice-Toward-Ecological-Limitarianism-1.pdf},

doi = {10.1080/21550085.2025.2574219},

year  = {2025},

date = {2025-11-10},

urldate = {2025-11-10},

journal = {Ethics, Policy & Environment},

abstract = {This article argues that climate justice should be discussed from a limitarian perspective and that limitarianism should be extended from wealth limitarianism to ecological limitarianism. It shows how egalitarian and sufficientarian considerations on climate change mitigation can be combined with an ecological limitarian approach to climate justice. This approach is built on a distinction between an institutional level composed of carbon markets and sufficiency policies and an individual level composed of ecological citizenship and a sustainable carbon footprint. To develop individual limitarianism, the article draws on virtue ethics and frames carbon sobriety as a key green virtue of ecological citizens.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {The distinction between generic and specific concepts and why it matters for conceptual engineering},

author = {Ibo van de Poel},

url = {https://www.esdit.nl/wp-content/uploads/Article-Ivdp-September-2025-1.pdf},

doi = {10.1080/0020174X.2025.2556750},

year  = {2025},

date = {2025-09-19},

urldate = {2025-09-19},

journal = {Inquiry},

abstract = {Conceptual engineering is an approach or method for assessing, improving, adapting and disposing concepts. While recent case studies have shown the possibility and success of conceptual engineering, I argue that not all concepts are equally open to conceptual engineering. It is therefore useful to distinguish between generic and specific concepts. While the latter can be the object of conceptual design, I argue that designing generic concepts is problematic for practical and normative reasons. Nevertheless, attempts can be made to change generic concepts through interventions in larger conceptual repertoires. Contrary to specific concepts, generic concepts do not have a well-delineated function that can provide a normative reference for conceptual engineering. Moreover, they are well entrenched in larger conceptual schemes or repertoires, so that they cannot be engineered in isolation. Generic concepts also raise more and larger challenges in terms of implementation and authority than specific concepts. I discuss the consequences of the distinction between generic and specific concepts for conceptual engineering, the ethics of socially disruptive technology and conceptual ethics.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}