Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies

@article{Hopster2025,

title = {Conceptual Mediation in Technomoral Change: Reply to Danaher and Sætra},

author = {Jeroen K.G. Hopster and Jon Rueda and Robin Hillenbrink},

doi = {10.1007/s10677-025-10481-4},

issn = {1572-8447},

year  = {2025},

date = {2025-01-27},

urldate = {2025-01-27},

journal = {Ethic Theory Moral Prac},

publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},

abstract = {Philosophers of technology have identified various mechanisms through which technology can change moral norms, values, beliefs and practices. Danaher and Sætra (2023) offer a useful systematization of these mechanisms, with no claim to being exhaustive. We contribute to their work by analyzing how the mediating role of moral concepts fits into this scheme. First, we point out that concepts mediate the moral effects of technological changes, a process we call conceptual mediation. We illustrate this with the concepts of ‘brain death’ and ‘reproductive autonomy’, whose moral implications crystallized in the interplay with new medical technologies. Subsequently, we argue that conceptual mediation is best understood as a type of second-order mediation, which channels the moral implications of the first-order technological mediations identified by Danaher and Sætra (decisional, relational, perceptual). We conclude that second-order mediation plays a central and underappreciated role in processes of technomoral change.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{vanBalen2025,

title = {Can communication Brain-Computer Interfaces read minds?},

author = {Bouke van Balen},

doi = {10.1007/s11097-024-10044-5},

issn = {1572-8676},

year  = {2025},

date = {2025-01-20},

urldate = {2025-01-20},

journal = {Phenom Cogn Sci},

publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC},

abstract = {Recent developments in the domain of communication Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) technology have raised questions about the ability for communication BCIs to read minds. How those questions are answered depends on how we theorize the mind and mindreading in the first place. Thus, in this paper, I ask (1) what does it mean to read minds? (2) can a communication BCI do this? (3) what does this mean for potential users of this technology? and (4) what is at stake morally in light of this? I show that current answers to these questions are conceptually unclear and committed to a Cartesian picture of the mind and its relation to the brain, questionably informing how debates about BCIs as mindreading devices are framed. I offer an alternative perspective on these questions by turning to an enactive perspective on mindedness. I argue that this perspective can offer conceptual as well as ethical clarification about what is at stake in the domain of communication BCIs. From this perspective, the concerns raised about BCIs as mindreading machines are demystified. Instead, concerns are raised about BCIs as enabling users to flourish as authentic communicators.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}